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Man is by nature a social animal. 







Economists widely agree that a country’s financial system plays an important role in its
economic development and – if well established – can provide considerable benefits to
society. Yet, we still know relatively little about those who work in the financial industry. 
Why do people decide to pursue a career in finance? How do finance professionals differ 
from other people in terms of their norms and values? And what determines their behavior? 
This thesis is aimed at broadening our understanding of who are the social animals that 
work in the U.S. financial industry. The three studies that comprise this thesis contribute 
to the emerging field of social finance by expanding our knowledge of the social factors 
that influence finance professionals and determine their economic behavior.  
The first study begins at the making of finance professionals. It provides evidence that 
people are substantially more likely to choose a career in finance if their fathers have 
already worked in the financial industry. This intergenerational correlation between fathers 
and their children is greater than in most other industries and is related to a considerable 
income surplus of second-generation finance industry employees. 
The second study documents a unique and worrisome deterioration in generalized trust, 
an important social belief, among finance industry employees over the past decades. This 
decline in trust is also significantly stronger than the trust decline among the general U.S. 
population over the same period. It appears to be associated with changes in the economic 
conditions in the U.S., shifts in the professional environment in the financial industry, and 
with a decreasing degree of socialization among finance professionals. 
The third study reveals a long-lasting association between the disruption of the family 
of origin during the childhood of mutual fund managers and their investment behavior later 
in life. Fund managers who experienced the death or divorce of their parents early in life 
exhibit a stronger disposition effect and take less risk in their delegated portfolios. This 
study hence promotes our understanding of the long-term impact of traumatic childhood 
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This thesis consists of three essays that study the social backgrounds of people working in 
the U.S. financial industry. The essays investigate, firstly, how the decision to pursue a 
career in finance correlates across generations, secondly, how social beliefs in finance have 
evolved over the past decades, and thirdly, how formative childhood experiences affect the 
investment behavior of professional investors. The thesis thus contributes to the growing 
social finance literature that deals with the question of who works in finance. 
The role of beliefs and personal experiences for economic behavior has attracted 
considerable attention among academics in recent years. While traditional economic 
theory is based on the assumption that people make rational choices, behavioral economics 
holds that they in fact use dozens of heuristics and are influenced by seemingly irrelevant 
factors like emotions (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1996). Heuristics are the product of 
evolutionary processes, genetic or memetic, as well as the result of experiences and 
learning. They usually work very well but may in some situations lead to severe errors or 
behavioral biases (Aumann, 2019). A recent Financial Times article provides a range of 
practical examples of how asset management firms have begun to pay attention to these 
biases that have the potential to negatively impact the performance of their funds, for 
instance, by hiring psychologists to advise their fund managers (Mooney, 2018). 
In academia, there is widespread agreement today that behavioral dimensions can 
increase the explanatory power of traditional models, which rely on the assumptions of 
utility maximization and market equilibrium, by enhancing them with more plausible 
psychological foundations (e.g., Angner and Loewenstein, 2012; Chetty, 2015). At their 
core, behavioral studies differ from their neoclassical cousins in the fact that they 
incorporate aspects such as intrinsic motivation to comply, peer effects, information 
imperfections about deterrence parameters, etc. As an example, substantial laboratory and 
field research suggests that people do not care solely about their own material payoffs but 






Bazerman, 1989; Camerer and Thaler 1995). Other studies find that people are inclined to 
make efforts to pursue social goals, such as saving water and energy, giving to charities, 
or donating blood, even when the (pecuniary) incentives go in the opposite direction (e.g., 
Frey, 1997; Camerer and Fehr, 2006).1  
Most importantly for this thesis is the idea of studying economic agents as people 
embedded in a dynamic social environment rather than as isolated decision-makers, which 
has laid the foundation for a new branch of behavioral economics known as social finance. 
Hirshleifer (2015) coined this term to subsume the rapidly growing strand of studies that 
are concerned with the role of sociological factors for financial behavior and outcomes. In 
his view, the study of social dynamics can, for example, help to further our understanding 
of the origins of various investment biases that we observe in financial markets, such as 
the disposition effect. Studies in this new field draw on social psychology and sociology 
to examine the interactions within families or circles of friends, the amount of social capital 
and norms prevailing in a society, and social preferences (see, e.g., Cronqvist, 2018).2 The 
three essays in this thesis contribute to this growing and exciting field. 
The following sections provide a brief overview of the results of the respective studies, 
a description of their contributions to the literature, and a discussion of their implications. 
Possible directions for future research are also pointed out in some places. Chapter 2 
investigates the personal characteristics of employees in the U.S. financial industry by 
analyzing long-term trends in gender diversity, racial composition, age structure, and 
intelligence in finance. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 constitute the three essays that form the main 
body of this thesis. Lastly, Chapter 6 concludes with some remarks. 
 
1 As Richard Thaler (2016) notes with a wink in his book, according to a traditional economist, hungry 
shoppers would also not subconsciously be influenced by their stomachs to buy more food. 
2 Studies that examine the flow of financial information through social networks are Cohen, Frazzini and 
Malloy (2008, 2010), Hvide and Östberg (2015), Pool, Stoffman, and Yonker (2015), Cai, Walkling, and 
Yang (2016), and Ahern (2017). Papers investigating how social norms and ideologies influence financial 
behavior include Hilary and Hui (2009), Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), Hong and Kostovetsky (2012), 
Kumar and Page (2014), and Pan, Siegel, and Wang (2017). Social preferences are studied by Bollen (2007), 






1.1 Parents and the decision to work in finance 
Parents are the most important factors influencing the development of their offspring. They 
are responsible for the genetic disposition of their children as well as for the environment 
in which they grow up. The intergenerational transmission of traits and economic outcomes 
from parents to children is of long-standing interest in the scientific community (see, e.g., 
Black and Devereux, 2011). A frequently studied topic in this field is the correlation of 
wealth, income, or socioeconomic status between parents and their children (e.g., Chetty 
et al., 2014). A much less discussed topic is the importance of parents for their children’s 
vocational development and especially the inheritance of industries and occupations from 
parents to children. Yet, as Schulenberg, Vondracek, and Crouter (1984) argue, parents 
have a far greater influence on the vocational development of their children than school or 
the circle of friends. 
Against this background, the first essay of this thesis, based on Schürmann (2020), 
examines the intergenerational industry mobility in the U.S. financial industry, i.e., the 
correlation between parents and their children in their decisions to pursue a career in 
finance. This study thus deepens our understanding of the structure of the finance industry 
labor market and specifically the mechanisms that govern the recruitment of employees. 
Understanding these mechanisms is important for at least two reasons. Firstly, it enables 
financial firms to establish efficient recruitment processes in order to find the best available 
talents. Secondly, it helps policy makers to implement effective rules that support social 
goals such as equal opportunities for entering the industry, an issue that appears frequently 
on the political agenda. More broadly, investigating the intergenerational inheritance of 
industries extends the existing literature on the role of parents in their children’s career 
choices and thereby helps explain how inequality is transmitted across generations since 
wages are higher in some industries than in others. 
To analyze the intergenerational industry mobility, I draw on representative survey data 
from the General Social Survey (GSS) over the 47-year period from 1972 to 2018. I present 






childhood are about eight percentage points more likely to also work in finance themselves. 
This significant father-child correlation indicates that fathers play an important role in their 
children’s decision to pursue a career in finance. Interestingly, I do not reveal a significant 
correlation between mothers and their children, even if the child is a daughter.  
When comparing the relative industry mobility in finance with other private sector 
industries, I discover that the magnitude of the father-child correlation in the financial 
industry is larger than in most others. Specifically, the increase in the likelihood to work 
in an industry when a person’s father already worked in that industry is larger in only three 
other industries: real estate, professional services, and agriculture. The finding that 
children often follow in their parents' footsteps in these three industries is consistent with 
the concept that human capital, corporate networks, and tangible assets in self-employed 
professions can be more easily transferred from one generation to the next. Accordingly, 
Laband and Lentz (1992) suggest that the sons of lawyers, who are part of the professional 
services industry, also frequently become lawyers because the profession is conducive to 
the cost-effective transfer of relevant skills and knowledge across generations, particularly 
in the context of family-run law firms. 
Furthermore, I document that the significant father-child correlation in the financial 
industry is driven solely by wealthier families. Generally, this finding is in line with earlier 
studies suggesting that the socioeconomic status of the family is related to children's career 
aspirations (Brook et al., 1974). Since wages in financial occupations are comparatively 
high, children from wealthier families may see these occupations as a way to meet their 
own expectations. Moreover, wealthier families are likely to invest more in their children’s 
human capital development during their upbringing, while at the same time also having 
stronger personal networks in the industry (Montgomery, 1991).  
In additional tests, I shed light on the question of whether second-generation employees 
in the financial industry benefit economically from their fathers’ prior industry experience. 
My analysis reveals that they indeed enjoy a substantial income surplus compared to their 
industry peers. In particular, the estimates indicate that having a father who also worked 






But why is the intergenerational industry correlation between fathers and their children 
so particularly high in the financial industry? And what mechanisms drive the substantial 
income surplus of second-generation finance industry employees? It is naturally difficult 
to examine these questions empirically, as pointed out, e.g., by Laband and Lentz (1992). 
Nevertheless, it is still worth looking at the potential explanations that labor market theory 
provides for the high intergenerational industry correlation in finance. 
The first group of explanations is based on the idea that human capital, preferences, 
and personal attributes are transmitted from parents to their children. Rosenzweig and 
Wolpin (1985) reveal that the high incidence of intra-family intergenerational successions 
in farms is due to implicit contracts between generations that maximize the profits from 
farm-specific knowledge acquired through experience. Similarly, the transfer of finance-
specific human capital may induce more children of finance industry employees to choose 
a career in finance as well. Of course, it is also possible that the affinity to the financial 
industry among children of fathers who worked in finance reflects similarities among 
family members in attitudes about or preferences for the industry itself. Moreover, there 
may be specific personal attributes that are correlated with the probability of pursuing a 
career in finance and that passed on within families (see, e.g., Ashraf, Bandiera, and 
Delfino, 2020). Therefore, the above explanations are based on the extensive literature that 
emphasizes the parental influence, either genetically or through parenting, on the personal 
development of their offspring. 
The second group of explanations is motivated by the theory of job search. Loury 
(2006) assumes that up to 50 percent of jobs in the United States are found through family, 
friends, or acquaintances.3 Companies recruit employees through informal networks either 
because of incomplete information about the quality and suitability of potential employees 
or because of detrimental nepotism in the hiring process. In turn, incomplete information 
exists due to the fact that prospective workers are heterogeneous in their preferences and 
 






abilities and that jobs are heterogeneous in terms of the skills required. As this double-
sided uncertainty cannot be easily removed without actually matching an employee to a 
vacant position, employers and employees are inclined to rely on information provided by 
contacts to reduce the chance that a match will be worse than it initially appeared. For 
example, Kramarz and Skans (2014) document that young adults in Sweden have a high 
tendency to find their first job in the same plants that also employ their parents. The authors 
attribute this phenomenon to the use of social ties in the matching process and find that 
both sides, the employer and the new worker, benefit from the use of these ties.  
In contrast, detrimental nepotism describes the use of parent-provided networks to find 
employment when other available candidates are better qualified. Hence, this sort of 
networking represents a mere transfer of rents and is inefficient from a macroeconomic 
perspective. Evidence for detrimental nepotism is provided by Lentz and Laband (1989) 
who find that children of doctors are more likely to be admitted into medical school in the 
U.S. than are comparable non-followers even when their level of human capital is taken 
into account. In a more general context, Gagliarducci and Manacorda (2020) suggest that 
private firms in Italy frequently hire or promote relatives of politicians or grant them higher 
earnings in exchange for or in anticipation of political favors. The financial industry in the 
U.S. has also experienced nepotism scandals regarding its hiring practices in the past, such 
as the scandal surrounding J.P. Morgan’s “Sons & Daughters Program.”4  
In summary, the comparatively high intergenerational correlation between fathers and 
their children in the decision to pursue a career in the financial industry could stem from 
the transmission of human capital, preferences, and personal attributes or from informal 
parent-provided job networks (or a combination of both). Albeit the GSS does not allow 
scholars to distinguish between these explanations, I argue in this study that the large 
income surplus among finance industry employees whose fathers also worked in the 
industry is difficult to reconcile with detrimental nepotism as the only mechanism at work. 
 






This is because the U.S. financial industry is generally known for its high degree of 
competitiveness. Sufficiently strong competition should arguably discourage firms from 
recruiting and promoting employees without any regard to productivity. 
This study thus provides novel empirical evidence on the important role of the parents 
in their children’s decision to enter the financial industry. In wealthier families, a father 
who has worked in the financial industry considerably increases the likelihood that his 
child will later also work in finance. The study also provides a first indication that second-
generation finance industry employees, who earn substantially more compared to their 
peers, likely form better matches with employers. This preliminary finding opens an 
interesting avenue for future work that unravels the role of informal parental networks and 
the transmission of human capital (or preferences) from parents to children. A follow-up 
study could, for example, use the mutual fund industry as a laboratory as the performance, 
compensation, and family backgrounds of fund managers are well observable.  
1.2 The evolution of trust in finance 
The second essay, based on an earlier version of Limbach, Rau, and Schürmann (2021), 
complements the literature on social capital. Specifically, it examines how generalized 
trust has evolved in the U.S. financial industry over the past nearly four decades.  
Social capital, defined by Putnam (1993) as networks and norms of civic engagement, 
is key to the economic prosperity of a society because it allows its members to trust one 
another. The kind of trust that is inherent in a society is called generalized trust. It is the 
trust vis-à-vis random members of a society (e.g., Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2009).  
Fukuyama (1995) contends that generalized trust is important from an economic point 
of view as it enables the establishment of large private corporations, a conjecture supported 
by Bloom et al. (2009) with empirical evidence. Several studies suggest that generalized 
trust also matters for financial decision-making at the individual level. For example, people 
who trust others more are more likely to become entrepreneurs (Guiso, Sapienza, and 
Zingales, 2006) and to participate in the stock market (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 






together, since practically every commercial transaction builds, at least to a certain extent, 
on trust in anonymous others (Arrow, 1972), understanding the formation and evolution 
of trust has long been a key task in economics. It is thus surprising that, although scholars 
agree on the relevance of trust for financial intermediation (e.g., Zingales, 2015), little is 
known about generalized trust in the financial industry so far.  
For our study, we use data from the General Social Survey for the period 1978-2016 
and document that generalized trust of individuals working in the U.S. financial industry 
has declined substantially over the past 39 years. Importantly, their trust has not only 
deteriorated in absolute terms but also relative to the general U.S. population. The trust 
decline observed in finance is also unparalleled by any other industry. It has been 
particularly strong in the investment sector and among professionals with higher seniority 
and influence. Moreover, our results suggest that the erosion of trust is tied to a lack of 
confidence in institutions deemed especially relevant to the financial industry, such as the 
executive branch of the government which monitors the financial industry. We examine 
several potential drivers for the erosion of generalized trust among finance professionals 
and find a mix of components that have contributed to this trend: A greater sensitivity to 
economic change compared to the general population, shifts in the composition of the 
finance industry workforce, and fewer opportunities to engage socially with one another 
all appear to have driven the loss of trust. Overall, the results of this study paint a relatively 
dark picture of the current state of the financial industry.  
They are worrisome since a lack of trust among finance professionals may have direct 
implications for the real economy through at least three channels. First, if banks are 
generally distrustful of their customers, they are likely to be more restrictive in their 
lending policies and therefore reluctant to finance profitable projects. Empirical evidence 
suggests that higher informational frictions between borrowers and lenders lead to more 
difficulties for firms in raising capital and insufficient financing of innovative, high-risk 
projects (Guiso, 1998). Thus, in the absence of trust, capital costs may increase and firms 
may consequently underinvest. Second, low levels of generalized trust among finance 






evidence to suggest that one's own trustworthiness is highly correlated with the subjective 
opinion about the trustworthiness of others, a concept known as reciprocity (see, e.g., 
Glaeser et al., 2000; Butler, Giuliano, and Guiso, 2015). Hence, a lack of trust among 
finance professionals can lead to a higher propensity to behave in an uncompliant or even 
unlawful manner, for instance, by committing fraud.5 Third, greater mistrust across the 
financial industry and more frequent instances of non-compliant behavior can threaten the 
reputation and ultimately the stability of the industry itself, especially in more turbulent 
economic times. As an example, anticipating the lack of trust and trustworthiness among 
finance professionals can lead to banks becoming the target of bank runs. Because a 
significant portion of their investments is usually long term, they would be forced to make 
inefficient fire sales if too many depositors demand redemption simultaneously.  
In summary, a trust crisis in the financial industry can have severe negative effects on 
the real economy and undermine the positive role of finance which is described in an 
extensive literature going back at least to Schumpeter (1911). Therefore, a natural question 
arising from our results is what options are available to avert the negative economic 
consequences of deteriorating generalized trust across the financial industry. What follows 
is a critical review of the most frequently discussed options that firms and the government 
have to mitigate trust-related issues in finance. 
A seemingly obvious solution for financial firms is to attempt to restore the level of 
generalized trust and thereby the trustworthiness of their employees. In his seminal book, 
Putnam (2000) calls for an era of civic inventiveness to rebuild social capital similar to the 
Progressive Era at the beginning of the twentieth century. Analogously, new formal as well 
as informal structures in financial firms that lead to higher standards of conduct could 
ensure the trustworthiness of their employees. As argued by Williamson (1993), many 
professional occupations, including finance, require their members to fulfill certain 
 
5 The recent wave of problematic financial practices and scandals have illustrated the enormous economic 
damage these behaviors of finance professionals can cause. Kantšukov and Medvedskaja (2013) estimate 






obligations, such as obtaining a license, following an ethical code, or meeting fiduciary 
obligations. If well-established and followed by most professionals, these obligations can 
increase their reputation and infuse confidence into interactions with them. Yet, despite 
the existence of some obligations, the financial industry is often criticized for its allegedly 
low moral standards, and survey evidence suggests that investment banking in particular 
has an alarming attitude towards moral values (Tenbrunsel and Thomas, 2015).6  
New measures could, for instance, target the corporate culture and bonus systems of 
companies so that they do not (unintentionally) create incentives for taking unmanageable 
risks or engaging in unethical behavior (Diamond and Rajan, 2009; Sheedy, Zhang, and 
Tam, 2019). Additionally, Putnam (2000) suggests novel workplace practices, such as 
flexible work hours or incentives to participate in community activities that increase social 
connectedness and enable the formation of generalized trust. Ultimately, there is no single 
mechanism that infuses trust but rather a series of measures financial firms themselves can 
take that help restoring generalized trust across the industry. However, it is important to 
note that these measures do most likely not have a rapid effect since the level of generalized 
trust that prevails in a society or group is characterized by considerable inertia. In this 
regard, Fukuyama (1995, p. 5) states that “[…] durable social institutions cannot be 
legislated into existence the way a government can create a central bank or an army.”  
Some economists and policy makers suggest yet another approach: stricter government 
regulation. Previous studies indicate that when the public is confronted with increasing 
mistrust or perceived unfairness, it tends to demand more and stricter control by the 
government (e.g., Glaeser and Schleifer, 2003; Aghion et al., 2010; Pinotti, 2012). 
Governments provide legal protection for consumers, create and manage regulatory 
bodies, enforce contracts, and prosecute unlawful behavior. With regard to financial 
 
6 For example, the official report by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011), which was tasked with 
investigating the causes of the 2008 financial crisis, concludes that before and during the crisis “[…] we 
witnessed an erosion of standards of responsibility and ethics that exacerbated the financial crisis. This was 






markets, Carlin, Dorobantu, and Viswanathan (2010) posit in their model that trust and 
formal regulation can function as substitutes. Consequently, when the level of generalized 
trust in a society is low, government interventions can help to protect investors and 
promote economic growth.7 However, the vast majority of U.S. governments have adopted 
deregulation strategies in past decades, including the current U.S. administration, which 
clarified from the beginning that it intends to relax regulations introduced after the 2008 
financial crisis. Today, many consider the system of financial regulation in the U.S. to be 
as complex and fragmented as the industry itself. Responsibilities are divided among 
several different federal and state authorities and numerous industry-sponsored self-
governing associations (Komai and Richardson, 2013). Moreover, strong lobbying 
activities have repeatedly prevented the implementation of new legislation (e.g., Zingales, 
2015). Against this background, it is an open question for researchers, policy makers, and 
practitioners whether the regulatory system is sufficient to cope with a growing degree of 
mistrust among finance professionals and its negative consequences. 
A third option to address the challenges related to the lack of trust in the financial 
industry has often been proposed by technology enthusiasts in recent years: blockchains.8 
Originally developed as the technology behind cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, blockchains 
allow any two parties to forge an agreement and conduct transactions without the need of 
intermediaries, i.e., without banks, money transfer services, exchange operators, lawyers, 
or government bodies (Tapscott and Tapscott, 2017). The Economist (2015) describes 
blockchain as “the trust machine” and the United Nations Development Programme 
(Wigley and Cary, 2018, p. 6) argues that “the decentralized, transparent, verifiable nature 
of [blockchain] means we can trust people and organizations precisely because trust is no 
 
7 Some studies also provide examples of cases where a high level of trust in a society has been able to fill 
the void left by an underdeveloped legal system and a lack of enforcement mechanisms, for instance, Greif 
(1989, 1993), Gomes (2000), Allen (2005), and Allen, Qian, and Qian (2005). 
8 A blockchain is a distributed transactional database secured by cryptography (Beck et al., 2017). Potential 






longer an issue.” Yet, the perception that blockchains can completely substitute for trust in 
economic activities requires closer scrutiny. Nakamoto (2008) describes Bitcoin in his 
whitepaper as a trustless digital payment system since payments from one party to another, 
e.g., in e-commerce trading, are secured despite the absence of a third party due to their 
irreversible and transparent nature. This feature can, for instance, offer a valuable solution 
to the common double-spending problem (Cong and He, 2019).  
Yet, as an electronic payment system, the Bitcoin blockchain only secures the exchange 
of money but not the transfer of assets or the fulfillment of other types of contractual 
agreements. Newer blockchains have extended the scope beyond electronic payments to 
the transfer of digital assets and are also able to represent the transfer of physical assets by 
means of digital representations of these assets. But since blockchains cannot track events 
in the physical “off-chain” world, the necessity for human agency and trust still remains.9 
Moreover, most blockchain applications, e.g., smart contracts, simply task technology with 
securing trust rather than third-party authorities. Put simply, blockchains can prevent some 
trust-related issues in economic transactions, in particular with regards to the involvement 
of intermediaries in payment processes, but they will not exempt individuals from the need 
to trust each other when engaging in economic activities (Altman, 2019). The technology 
is therefore at best a partial solution to problems related to the lack of trust among finance 
professionals. 
In light of the foregoing, the evidence presented in this study appears fundamental to 
our understanding of the financial system. An insufficient level of generalized trust across 
the industry can have serious negative implications for the industry itself and the real 
economy. While there is no silver bullet solution to the death of trust across the financial 
industry, there are some measures that can be taken to mitigate trust-related issues. From 
an academic perspective, our study thus offers several opportunities for future research. 
 
9 Some scholars also refer to the boundary between the virtual blockchain world and the physical world as 






1.3 The family of origin and investment behavior 
In addition to social capital and generalized trust, there is mounting evidence that financial 
behavior is influenced remarkably by another factor: people’s personal life experiences.10 
Long-standing research provides a wealth of empirical evidence that people exhibit various 
investment biases, such as a lack of diversification (Huberman, 2001), a preference for 
skewness and lottery-type investments (Kumar, 2009), an extrapolation of recent superior 
returns (Benartzi, 2001), and the home bias (French and Poterba, 1991). These biases are 
not always innate but can be acquired in the course of a person’s life, for example, through 
personal experiences.  
Using data on Swedish twins, Cronqvist and Siegel (2014) decompose differences in 
investment behavior into genetic versus environmental components. The authors find that 
more than half of the behavioral variation across individual investors can be attributed to 
environmental factors. For investors with professional finance experience, the relevance 
of environmental factors is even higher. Their study hence suggests that experiences and 
the environment play a crucial role in shaping investment behavior. Although scholars 
have attributed investment biases in part to psychological mechanisms (see, for example, 
the literature cited in Cronqvist and Siegel, 2014), very little research has been devoted to 
date to uncover their origins. Consequently, Hirshleifer (2015) considers studies in the 
field of social finance that examine how social factors influence financial behavior to be 
very promising for advancing our understanding of the origins of investment biases.  
The third essay of this thesis, based on Betzer et al. (2021), seeks to partly fill this void 
in the literature. It investigates whether the childhood rearing environment of mutual fund 
managers and in particular the disruption of this environment can explain to what extent 
 
10 A growing literature investigates experience-related heterogeneity in macroeconomic expectations and 
economic decision making, e.g., for households (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011), mutual fund managers 
(Greenwood and Nagel, 2009), CEOs (Malmendier and Tate 2005; Malmendier, Tate, and Yan 2011; 
Bernile, Bhagwat, and Rau, 2017), central bankers (Malmendier, Nagel, and Yan, 2021), and investors 






these managers are prone to a particular investment bias, the disposition effect. We use 
unique hand-collected information about the families of origin of fund managers and 
examine whether experiencing the death of one parent or a parental divorce up to the age 
of 20 significantly influences their investment behavior in later life. We look at parental 
death and divorce as both events are common social phenomena in virtually all societies. 
Psychologists argue that the death of a parent or a parental divorce challenge children's 
beliefs about themselves and the world (Epstein, 1991; Janoff-Bulman, 1992). As a result, 
they have been shown to have long-term effects on personality and well-being (e.g., Amato 
and Keith, 1991; Tennant, 1991; Parsons, 2011; Ellis, Dowrick, and Lloyd-Williams, 
2013; Flèche, Lekfuangfu, and Clark, 2019). 
The main result of our study is that fund managers who experienced an early-life family 
disruption exhibit a stronger disposition effect, take lower fund risk, and are more likely 
to sell their fund holdings following risk-increasing events in their investee firms. In short, 
we suggest that broken families produce fund managers who are more cautious and more 
reluctant to realize losses than managers from intact families. But why is this the case? 
The disposition effect, which describes the greater propensity of investors to sell assets 
when they are at a gain than when they are at a loss, was introduced by Shefrin and Statman 
(1985). It has attracted considerable attention from financial scholars because it has proved 
challenging to explain it with rational models of trading behavior. Instead, the disposition 
effect can be derived from behavioral theories, such as Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) 
prospect theory in combination with mental accounting (Thaler, 1985). Empirical evidence 
for disposition-prone behavior is provided across different assets and markets, such as for 
stocks (Odean, 1998), executive stock options (Heath, Huddart, and Lang, 1999), real 
estate (Genesove and Mayer, 2001), and online bets (Hartzmark and Solomon. 2012). The 
disposition effect was also observed across investor types, including futures traders (Locke 
and Mann, 2005), fund managers (Frazzini, 2006), and individual investors (Grinblatt and 
Keloharju, 2001), among others. In summary, extensive prior research implies that 
disposition-prone behavior is near-ubiquitous among non-professional and professional 






Regarding the psychological mechanisms that drive the disposition effect, the most 
promising explanations rely on the concept of self-justification, i.e., the tendency of 
individuals to justify their behavior and deny any negative feedback associated with it. For 
example, Chang, Solomon, and Westerfield (2016) argue that cognitive dissonance plays 
an important role. When individuals are presented with new information contradicting their 
original priors, they tend to use a combination of defense mechanisms and mental tricks to 
reduce dissonance-related discomfort. These mechanisms are especially effective when the 
initial cognition relates to a positive self-image (Greenwald and Ronis, 1978). In simple 
terms, if a stock held by an investor declines in value, he tries to convince himself that he 
is still a smart investor who bought the asset for a good reason to avoid admitting a bad 
investment decision and thereby negatively affecting his self-image. This, in turn, results 
in the observed difference between the willingness to sell an asset at a gain versus a loss. 
Alternatively, investors in a model by Barberis and Xiong (2009, 2012) derive utility not 
only from consumption but also from the realization of gains. The authors are able to 
formally explain the existence of the disposition effect in their setting as investors feel 
good when they sell stocks at a gain, which leads to the disproportionate realization of 
gains. Therefore, according to these and other studies, self-justification strategies are key 
drivers of the disposition effect. 
In light of the foregoing, the findings of Holland, Meertens, and van Vugt (2002) are 
of major importance. They document that a person's self-esteem is a crucial moderator for 
the application of self-justification strategies. People with a higher level of self-esteem are 
less likely to engage in self-justification strategies. We can therefore expect that the 
disposition effect observed in financial markets is, at least to a certain extent, rooted in 
investors' self-esteem. The reason for exploring the influence of the families of origin on 
the investment behavior of mutual fund managers is that psychological studies suggest that 
the family of origin plays a key role in an individual’s personality development, including 
the formation of self-esteem (Orth, 2018).  
After accounting for several alternative explanations, we conclude in our study that the 






persistent symptoms of post-traumatic stress, particularly lower self-esteem and increased 
anxiety. In particular, we examine whether the observed relationship is caused by a 
socioeconomic shock to the family due to the loss of a parent or by fund managers taking 
care of their bereaved parents. Yet, our results suggest that the link between family 
disruption and investment behavior is unlikely to be determined by these mechanisms 
because the magnitude of the effect does not depend on the wealth of a manager's family 
or whether the bereaved parent is still alive. In contrast, the behavioral patterns that we 
observe for treated mutual fund managers are in line with prior research in psychology 
which suggests that experiencing a family disruption early in life relates to a greater 
vulnerability to future loss (Mireault and Bond, 1992), lower self-esteem (Lutzke et al., 
1997; Ellis, Dowrick, and Lloyd-Williams, 2013), and higher levels of anxiety (Bifulco et 
al., 1992; Kendler et al., 1992; Tyrka et al. 2008). 
As outlined above, it is well documented that the childhood rearing environment has a 
significant influence on children’s personality development. Therefore, we additionally 
explore how various other characteristics of the family environment during childhood 
(besides family stability) influence the investment behavior of managers, such as the 
number of siblings and the professions of the parents. Including these characteristics as 
additional controls in our regressions also addresses potential concerns related to omitted 
variables. While we find that some of these characteristics are also significantly related to 
investment behavior, our results suggest that the (in)stability of the family environment in 
childhood is the only measure that consistently explains the variation in the disposition 
effect and the risk-taking behavior of fund managers later in life.  
Furthermore, to obtain a more sophisticated comprehension of family disruptions in 
childhood, we exploit observable heterogeneity in the disruption events. In particular, we 
separately examine parental deaths and divorces as well as unexpected deaths and deaths 
of non-working mothers. Our results remain significant for each of the four event types. 
These tests indicate that neither one of the two event types nor a wealth shock nor arguably 






The analysis of potential moderators that may cause variations in the treatment intensity 
between treated fund managers yields further interesting results. In particular, we provide 
evidence that the association between experiencing an early-life family disruption and fund 
risk is significantly stronger when the disruption occurred during a manager's formative 
years, i.e., age 5 to 15, or when the family had less social support. The disposition effect 
is also stronger in case of less social support. Interestingly, we find that the results reverse 
for both risk-taking and the disposition effect when a very high level of social support is 
provided, which implies that family disruptions sometimes even lead to post-traumatic 
growth (Tedeschi and Calhoun, 2004). Lastly, we investigate whether the existence of a 
skill gap between fund managers who experienced early-life family disruption and those 
who did not could explain our findings. We do, however, not observe any indication of a 
skill gap between the two groups.  
To conclude, our study is the first to empirically demonstrate that the stability of the 
family of origin in childhood has long-term consequences for the investment behavior of 
professional investors.11 Our results provide evidence that investment biases, although they 
are in part a manifestation of innate and evolutionary characteristics of human behavior, 
are also to a considerable extent determined by the familial environment in which investors 
grow up. In doing so, this study expands our understanding of the origins of investment 
biases, as proposed by Hirshleifer (2015), and the economic consequences of a common 
social phenomenon. More broadly, this study contributes to recent research showing that 
the management style of economic agents is a result of their life experiences rather than 
the traits they were born with (e.g., Adams, Keloharju, and Knüpfer, 2018). 
 
 
11 It is possible that we underestimate the impact of family disruption during childhood on the investment 
behavior of individuals later in life because we focus on fund managers who are usually highly educated and 
trained in dealing with financial risks. Their education and work experience may mitigate the impact of early-
life family disruption, while the average retail investor may be more affected by our treatment. Yet, since 
mutual fund investments constitute a significant portion of the financial assets of the average U.S. household, 






2 Demographic Characteristics and Intelligence in Finance 
2.1 Introduction 
The structure of the U.S. financial industry has changed drastically during the past decades. 
Just 30 years ago, sending someone cash electronically using something like a smartphone 
would have seemed like science fiction. Since then, the financial industry has grown much 
faster than the economy, pursued aggressive international expansion strategies, and 
disrupted its traditional processes with new technologies. Moreover, the formation of large 
conglomerates offering diverse services has substantially transformed the competitive 
landscape in the financial industry (Black and Strahan, 2002).  
Structural changes in an industry are usually also accompanied by shifts in the demand 
of companies for human capital. Philippon and Reshef (2012), for example, point out that 
decades of financial deregulation in the U.S. are associated with an increasing complexity 
of jobs in finance. The people recruited in an industry at any given point in time can thus 
be seen as the result of a match between human capital demand and supply.12 
Thus, studying the personal characteristics of employees in the financial industry and 
how they have evolved over time helps us understand the determinants of their behaviors 
and promotes our comprehension of structural and organizational dynamics within firms. 
Gaining an insight into these dynamics is relevant for scholars and policy makers alike 
since plenty of evidence suggests that a well-functioning financial industry is key to both 
individual prosperity and economic growth (e.g., Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996; Levine, 
2005; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine, 2007; Dupas et al., 2018). 
Anecdotal evidence of the latest ambitions of financial firms to change the structure of 
their workforce is presented in a recent ranking published by the World Street Journal. 
 
12 This match of employees to firms or tasks is naturally imperfect due to various frictions in the labor market, 






The financial industry, once considered a stronghold of older, mostly white men, is now 
ranked at the top of all S&P500 industries in terms of overall workforce diversity, largely 
due to the implementation of new diversity and inclusion programs (Sardon, 2019). 
In this chapter, I describe the development of some important personal characteristics 
of individuals in the U.S. financial industry over the last more than four decades. I also 
compare these trends with developments in the rest of the private sector. The analyses aim 
to document how the financial industry, and especially its human capital, has changed in 
the U.S. over time. The results thus form the basis for the research questions discussed in 
the following chapters. Using data from two representative surveys of the U.S. population, 
the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) of the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) and the General Social Survey (GSS), I present novel facts about people who work 
in the U.S. financial industry in four areas: 
(1) Gender diversity: The financial industry has historically always employed more 
women than men. Yet, consistent with prior research, women are less like to work 
in jobs with above-median wages and above-median working hours (e.g., Bertrand, 
Goldin, and Katz, 2010). Interestingly, the time pattern of the share of women in 
finance is inversely U-shaped between 1975 and 2018. 
(2) Racial composition: The share of non-white employees in finance has almost 
tripled since 1975. This trend largely mirrors the trend for the rest of the private 
sector. It is, however, not caused by an increasing proportion of black employees 
in finance over recent years. This is particularly noteworthy considering that black 
employees are expected to substantially increase their share of the private sector 
workforce until 2050 (Toossi, 2002). 
(3) Age structure: The financial industry workforce has become remarkably older over 
the past four decades, not only in absolute terms but also relative to other industries. 
Today, the median age of employees in finance is three years higher than in other 
private sector industries, although finance in particular is known for its competition 






(4) Intelligence: The cognitive abilities of finance industry employees are at the same 
level as those of employees in other industries when differences in education and 
income are taken into account. This finding sheds light on the hypothesis that the 
relative increase in wages and job complexity in finance may have lured talents 
away from other industries (Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1991).13 
These findings demonstrate the wealth of available data on employees in finance and 
also point to some interesting avenues for further, more detailed research.  
Furthermore, they complement prior studies on personal characteristics of workers in 
the U.S. financial industry. As one example, Philippon and Reshef (2012) reveal a U-
shaped pattern for education, wages, and the complexity of tasks performed in finance over 
the period 1909-2006 which they link to the deregulation trend in the financial industry. 
Another strand of research examines the trend in the decision of elite university graduates 
to enter the financial industry. For instance, Oyer (2008) shows that this decision is highly 
dependent on the stock market conditions upon graduation, while Goldin and Katz (2008) 
document that the probability of Harvard College graduates deciding to pursue a career in 
a finance profession has increased strikingly over time. Other studies investigate the 
personal characteristics of people who are employed in specific finance areas, such as 
gender diversity (Niessen-Ruenzi and Ruenzi, 2018), education (Chevalier and Ellison, 
1999), and family descent (Chuprinin and Sosyura, 2018) in asset management.  
The results in this chapter expand this earlier work by exploring for the entire finance 
industry workforce how gender diversity, racial composition, age structure, and cognitive 
abilities have evolved. For each of these characteristics, I provide stylized empirical facts, 
which, to my knowledge, have not yet been documented in this fashion elsewhere. 
 
13 Throughout this chapter, I use the terms “intelligence” and “cognitive abilities” interchangeably. Although 
there is no universal definition, some define intelligence as the ability to think, which is an essential part of 
a person’s cognitive abilities, along with knowledge, i.e., the store of true and relevant knowledge, and the 






2.2 Trends in employee characteristics in finance 
In this section, I describe the evolution of demographic characteristics of employees in the 
U.S. financial industry as well as their cognitive abilities over the past more than four 
decades. In line with prior research (e.g., Greenwood and Scharfstein, 2013), the financial 
industry is defined as a combination of the credit intermediation, securities, and insurance 
subsectors. I analyze the finance industry workforce relative to the private sector excluding 
finance by drawing on data from two representative surveys, the ASEC and the GSS. To 
spare the reader with details of the data here, I offer a comprehensive documentation of 
my sample selection and all variables in the appendix. The ASEC sample contains over 3 
million observations, while the GSS sample contains more than 17,000 observations. 
2.2.1 Gender diversity 
The question of why there are so few women in management positions in finance has 
attracted considerable public attention in the past (e.g., Newlands and Ram, 2016; 
Dunleavey, 2017), and scholars have pointed to various reasons for this phenomenon, e.g., 
customer-based discrimination (Niessen-Ruenzi and Ruenzi, 2018) or the traditional role 
of women in family and society (Adams, Barber, and Odean, 2016). 
I begin my analysis by examining how the proportion of women who work in finance 
has trended over time. Figure 2.1 reports the proportion of women in finance and the rest 
of the private sector from 1975 to 2018. The upper panel shows that the proportion of 
female employees in finance is generally much higher than in the rest of the private sector. 
Moreover, there are considerably more women than men employed in finance throughout 
the sample. The bottom panel reports the proportion of women among finance employees 
with above-median income and above-median working hours, respectively. The proportion 
of women among these workers is substantially smaller (on average 43 percent for income 
and 36 percent for working hours). In most years, the female proportion is even lower than 
in the rest of the private sector. This finding is consistent with the general notion that 
women are underrepresented particularly in higher ranks in finance, e.g., only 9.4% of 






Figure 2.1: Women in finance 
Panel A: Proportion of women in finance and the rest of the private sector 
 
Panel B: Proportion of women in finance jobs with above-median wage and working hours 
 
Notes: This figure shows the proportion of women in the U.S. financial industry and the rest of the 
private sector excluding finance over the period 1975-2018. Panel A illustrates the development over 
time of the proportion of women for both groups and Panel B shows the proportion of women in finance 






The pattern that emerges for finance industry employees in the upper panel is inversely 
U-shaped and suggests three distinct time periods. First, from 1975 to the end of the 1980s, 
the proportion of women in the industry increased steadily. While the share of female 
employees in finance was 57 percent in 1975, it reached 65 percent in 1988. This trend, 
however, reversed in the following years. From the beginning of the 1990s, the proportion 
of women in the financial industry slowly declined and at the turn of the millennium, the 
negative trend accelerated. In 2011, the proportion of women had reached 55 percent, a 
relative decrease of more than 15 percent from its peak in 1988. Finally, in the most recent 
years, the proportion of women in finance has stagnated at around 56 percent. By contrast, 
the female proportion in the rest of the private sector rose steadily between 1975 and 1998 
and has remained more or less the same since then. 
Overall, the data indicate that the U.S. financial industry has always employed more 
women than men. Nevertheless, the share of female employees in finance was highest in 
the late 1980s and declined substantially in subsequent years. This finding is particularly 
interesting in light of the various initiatives that have been implemented by financial firms 
to attract more female employees. The impact of these initiatives on the industry’s gender 
diversity will therefore still need to be assessed.  
Moreover, women are disproportionally less likely to have jobs with an above-median 
income and above-median working hours. This is in line with the widely held view that 
female workers are underrepresented in the upper echelons of financial management and 
investment services. The result also generally supports the argument that women have 
lower preferences to work long hours and favor flexible work schedules (e.g., Goldin, 
2014). For example, Women in the workplace, the largest comprehensive study on the state 
of women in corporate America, estimates that their proportion in banking and consumer 
finance is 50 percent at the entry-level and declines in higher management levels. The 
proportion of women in C-suite jobs is only 27 percent (Thomas et al., 2019).  
In summary, the above evidence underlines the importance of research that focuses on 
women’s chances and their willingness to move up the ranks in finance professions (e.g., 






2.2.2 Racial composition 
Next, I turn to exploring the time trend in racial diversity in the financial industry. Figure 
2.2 depicts the share of non-white employees, i.e., the sum of black and other employees, 
and black employees in finance and the rest of the private sector, respectively. Since the 
ASEC does not include a consistent and more detailed race classification across all years 
of my sample, I have to limit my analysis to these categories. 
Figure 2.2: Non-white and black employees in finance 
 
Notes: This figure illustrates how the proportion of non-white employees, i.e., blacks and others, and 
black employees has evolved in the U.S. financial industry and the rest of the private sector excluding 
finance over the period 1975-2018.  
 
The above figure shows that the workforce in the U.S. has become more racially diverse 
over the past four decades. The financial industry has largely mirrored this trend, although 
the proportion of non-white employees has historically been slightly lower than in the rest 
of the private sector. This gap narrowed slowly and closed around 1997. Both the financial 






overall racial diversity growth. Nevertheless, it is worth taking a closer look at the trend 
among black employees in recent years. While the share of black employees in the private 
sector has been slowly but steadily increasing since 2002, as predicted by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (Toossi, 2002), it has fluctuated between 9 and 11 percent in finance since 
2000. Thus, black employees have not contributed as much to the growth of racial diversity 
in the financial sector in recent years as in the first 20 years of the sample. 
This finding is also interesting in light of a recently heavily criticized statement by 
Wells Fargo's CEO Charles Scharf. He said that the bank is having difficulties meeting its 
diversity goals because "there is a very limited pool of Black talent to recruit from" (Ward, 
2020). Yet, others argue that biased hiring practices often lead to low shares of black 
employees. For example, since most white people do not have black friends, it is unlikely 
that incumbent employees recommend a black person for hiring. Additionally, Bertrand 
and Mullainathan (2004) find that firms favor résumés with white-passing names. This 
opens an interesting avenue for further research on the hiring practices in financial firms. 
2.2.3 Age structure 
The third demographic dimension that I analyze in this chapter is the age structure in the 
financial industry. The aging of the workforce in the U.S. in general has important direct 
implications along various dimensions, for example, for labor costs, productivity, and the 
sustainability of organizations. For financial firms, which are often viewed as pioneers 
when it comes to adopting new technologies to improve operational effectiveness and 
customer experience, the aging of the workforce can have even more severe consequences 
because they face a relatively higher pressure and more competition to attract young talents 
with the required technological expertise. 
To examine the changes in the age structure of the finance industry workforce and to 
compare them with the rest of the private sector, I split my sample into four subperiods, 
the first 14 years and the remaining three ten years long, i.e., 1975-1988, 1989-1998, 1999-
2008, and 2009-2018. Figure 2.3 shows the age structure in each of these subperiods for 
employees in the financial industry and the rest of the private sector, respectively. The 






Figure 2.3: Age structure in finance 
 
Notes: This figure shows the age structure of the finance industry workforce and the private sector 
workforce excluding finance between 1975 and 2018. The sample is divided into four subperiods: 1975-
1988, 1989-1998, 1999-2008, and 2009-2018. The median age per subperiod is reported at the bottom 






In line with the well-documented aging trend of the working population over the past 
decades, the four panels illustrate that the proportion of employees in younger cohorts has 
continuously declined. For example, the proportion of workers aged 25-29 years has 
decreased from over 14 percent in the first subperiod to 11 percent in the fourth subperiod. 
Historically, the financial industry has employed more workers from younger and less from 
older age cohorts compared to the rest of the private sector. Between 1975 and 1988, the 
proportion of employees under 35 years of age even exceeded 50 percent of the total 
finance industry workforce.14 Nevertheless, the median age of employees in finance and 
the rest of the private sector were historically very similar. Over time, the age structure has 
become more evenly distributed in finance as in all other sectors, i.e., the proportion of 
older workers has increased while the proportion of younger workers has decreased. 
Notably, in the last subperiod, the median age of employees in the financial industry is 
three years higher than in the rest of the private sector workforce (43 vs. 40).  
The data hence suggest that the financial industry has experienced an aging trend that 
is broadly similar to that of the rest of the U.S. workforce over the past more than four 
decades. This is largely in line with evidence by Hatfield and Kejriwal (2019) who analyze 
only the post-1998 period. Yet, in recent years, the median employee in finance has been 
remarkably older than in other private sector industries. One reason for this age gap could 
be the increasing complexity of finance jobs as mentioned at the outset of this chapter, 
which may have led to longer education periods. Indeed, I find that the median employee 
in finance in the subperiod between 2009 and 2018 holds at least a bachelor’s degree, while 
this was not the case in the first subperiod between 1975 and 1988. 
2.2.4 Intelligence 
Are employees in the financial industry more intelligent than workers in other industries? 
The question of superior cognitive abilities of workers in finance has been raised in several 
 
14 The youngest age cohort in the first subperiod is an exception in this respect, probably because of the 






theoretical papers (e.g., Acharya, Pagano, and Volpin, 2016; Glode and Lowery, 2016). 
However, empirical evidence on this issue, particularly for lower occupational ranks in the 
U.S. financial industry, is scarce mainly due to difficulties in measuring intelligence. 
Studies using international data to investigate the cognitive abilities of finance industry 
employees provide mixed evidence. For example, examining the financial industry in 
France, Célérier and Vallée (2019) provide evidence for a growing “brain-drain” towards 
finance over time, i.e., talented people are increasingly likely to join the financial industry 
since the 1980s. Böhm, Metzger, and Strömberg (2018) suggest that finance industry 
employees in Sweden are on average more talented than employees in other industries. 
Yet, they do not observe that their talent level has improved since the 1990s. There are 
several reasons for these mixed results across studies, namely inherent differences in the 
structure of the labor markets ass well as financial industries across countries or variations 
in the methods used to measure cognitive abilities.  
To my knowledge, the analysis in this chapter is the first to investigate whether the 
average employee in the financial industry in the U.S. has superior cognitive abilities 
compared with employees in other sectors. I measure the intelligence of individuals by the 
number of correct answers to a ten-word vocabulary test which was taken by half of the 
respondents of the GSS in each survey over the period 1974-2018, except 1975, 1977, 
1980, 1983, 1985, 1986, and 2002, leaving me with 23 cross-sectional waves for analysis. 
The vocabulary test is a subtest from the WAIS, a commonly used IQ test (Zhu and Weiss, 
2005), and has been used in previous studies as a measure of intelligence (e.g., Caplan and 
Miller, 2010). Wechsler (1958) reports a correlation greater than 0.8 between the overall 
WAIS score and the WAIS vocabulary subtest.  
Figure 2.4 shows the average number of correct answers to the test for employees in 
the financial industry and workers in the rest of the private sector in each year. It indicates 
that the number of correct answers from workers in finance is higher in most years, 
although the difference between the two groups is only small. In fact, the median across 
all sample years for both groups equals six. Furthermore, no time trend can be observed in 






(2012) that the relative education level of financial industry employees has increased 
remarkably since the 1980s. As intelligence and education are typically highly correlated, 
as discussed below, one could have expected a growing intelligence gap over time. 
Figure 2.4: Intelligence in finance 
 
Notes: This figure shows the average number of correct answers to a ten-word vocabulary test for people 
working in the financial industry and the rest of the private sector. The test was taken by half of the 
GSS respondents over the period 1974-2018 and is a measure of a respondent’s intelligence. 
 
To test for superior cognitive abilities of finance industry employees in a more formal 
fashion, I regress the intelligence measure on an indicator variable for working in finance. 
The OLS regression results are reported in Table 2.1. All specifications include region and 
interview year fixed effects. I add controls for respondents’ demographic characteristics in 
column (2), their educational attainment in column (3), and their family income in column 
(4). All controls are described in detail in the appendix. It is important to point out that 






different (Ceci, 1991). As Heckman (1995, p. 1111) explains, “[a]bility and education are 
distinct, and both have economic rewards.” It is thus particularly interesting to see how 
controlling for education affects the link between the finance indicator and intelligence.  
Table 2.1: Intelligence in finance 
Dependent variable Intelligence 
 Full sample  1974-1994 1996-2018 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (4) (5) 
In Finance 0.383*** 0.357*** 0.060 -0.036  -0.057 -0.012 
 (5.42) (5.27) (0.88) (-0.53)  (-0.45) (-0.15) 
Non-white  -1.030*** -0.804*** -0.699***  -0.837*** -0.637*** 
  (-19.52) (-15.52) (-13.29)  (-13.46) (-9.79) 
Female  0.228*** 0.190*** 0.229***  0.350*** 0.148** 
  (7.01) (4.61) (5.41)  (7.60) (2.62) 
U.S.-born  0.887*** 0.973*** 0.891***  0.873*** 0.910*** 
  (9.18) (9.63) (10.22)  (4.37) (9.81) 
High school    1.241*** 1.132***  1.186*** 1.009*** 
   (19.60) (18.33)  (21.80) (9.15) 
Junior college    1.744*** 1.544***  1.578*** 1.426*** 
   (26.63) (25.37)  (15.54) (15.26) 
Bachelor’s degree   2.541*** 2.293***  2.600*** 2.015*** 
   (27.82) (24.11)  (21.22) (21.05) 
Graduate degree   3.266*** 2.905***  3.158*** 2.667*** 
   (34.67) (29.49)  (21.82) (21.79) 
Ln (Income)    0.282***  0.320*** 0.270*** 
    (12.73)  (8.42) (10.76) 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 17,416 16,111 16,100 14,941  6,534 8,407 
Adj. R-squared 0.024 0.091 0.266 0.277  0.303 0.262 
Notes: This table reports coefficients from OLS regressions of Intelligence on the indicator In Finance 
capturing whether a respondent works in the financial industry. The variable Intelligence is the number 
of correct answers to a ten-word vocabulary test that was taken by half of the GSS respondents over the 
period 1974-2018 and corresponds to the variable WORDSUM in the GSS. The four education controls 
assess the influence of education compared to less than a high school degree. The income control is the 
natural logarithm of a respondent’s equivalized family income. All specifications include region and 
year fixed effects. All variables are defined in the appendix. Robust t-statistics (in parentheses) are 
based on standard errors clustered by interview year. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 






Consistent with the observations from Figure 2.4, the results in the first two columns 
suggest that workers in finance perform slightly better on the vocabulary test. The 
coefficient on the indicator variable is positive and highly significant in both specifications. 
Yet, when I additionally account for the educational attainment of respondents in column 
(3), the finance indicator loses its significance, while all four degree indicators are 
significant at the 1% level. These indicators measure the influence of the degree that a 
respondent obtained compared to less than a high school degree. In the regression in 
column (4), I additionally control for respondents’ family income, which is defined as the 
natural logarithm of the equivalized family income. The coefficient on Ln(Income) is also 
highly significant, while the coefficient on the finance indicator remains insignificant.15 In 
unreported tests, I also split the finance indicator variable into two separate variables: one 
for finance employees with a family income above and one below (or equal to) the median 
family income in a year. The regression results suggest that neither group has superior 
cognitive abilities. In the last two columns, I examine whether working in finance and 
intelligence are correlated differently in earlier compared to later years. Dividing the 
sample into two subperiods (1974-1994 vs. 1996-2018) does not provide any indication of 
a higher intelligence of employees in the financial industry in either of the two subperiods. 
In summary, the results suggest that the cognitive abilities of employees in the U.S. 
financial industry are on par with those of employees in other sectors when educational 
attainment and income are taken into account. Additionally, I do not find support for the 
hypothesis that cognitive abilities in the financial industry in the U.S. have increased over 
time relative to other industries. This finding is particularly relevant in light of research 
that finds a substantial relative increase in wages and job complexity in finance (Philippon 
and Reshef, 2012) as well as research that argues that these trends could lure talented 
people away from other industries (Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1991).  
 
15 Controlling for income but not for education also reveals no significant correlation between working in 






3 Who's Your Daddy? Intergenerational Mobility in the 
Financial Industry* 
3.1 Introduction 
The persistence between parents and children’s outcomes in different domains of life has 
attracted widespread attention over the past two centuries. Motivated by the interest in the 
degree to which inequality is transmitted across generations, much of the literature on 
intergenerational mobility is focused on changes in income, wealth, or social class within 
a family from one generation to the next (e.g., Solon, 2002; Charles and Hurst, 2003; 
Chetty et al., 2014).16 A considerably smaller proportion of papers has moved beyond 
socioeconomic measures and investigated whether children find work in the same industry 
or even at the same company as their parents. Nonetheless, the study of intergenerational 
mobility with regard to people’s career choices has proved to be very instructive. 
Hellerstein and Morrill (2011), for example, find that the increase in the likelihood of 
women in the U.S. to enter their fathers’ occupation over the twentieth century is due in 
large part to a growing transmission of occupation-specific human capital from fathers to 
daughters over time. Kramarz and Skans (2014) provide evidence that young adults in 
Sweden are more likely to find their first job in the plants in which their parents currently 
work, which benefits both the new employee and the employer, and Corak and Piraino 
(2011) document that 40 percent of a cohort of young Canadian men have been employed 
at some time with an employer for which their father also worked.  
These examples illustrate that examining intergenerational mobility across industries, 
occupations, and even employers can be of major interest for policy purposes. They 
 
* This chapter is based on Schürmann (2020). 






enhance our understanding of the structure of labor markets as well as the barriers 
embedded in them and, for instance, help to improve the effectiveness of interventions 
aimed at facilitating access to specific occupations for underrepresented groups, such as 
women in asset management (Dunleavey, 2017). 
With this study, I add to this literature by examining the intergenerational correlation 
in the decision of individuals to work in the U.S. financial industry using data from the 
General Social Survey over the 47-year period from 1972 to 2018.  
A large body of research shows that a country’s financial system plays a crucial role in 
its economic development (e.g., Levine, 2005). However, as Philippon and Reshef (2012) 
note, this literature does not explain how the financial industry is organized and, in 
particular, how it recruits its employees. Although several studies relate people’s education 
and macroeconomic experiences to their decision to start a career in finance (e.g., Goldin 
and Katz, 2008; Oyer, 2008), little is known about the role of the parental household. This 
is surprising given the ample evidence that parents have a major influence on their 
children’s career choices (e.g., Watson and McMahon, 2005, and the literature therein). 
By focusing on intergenerational industry mobility, my approach provides new insights 
into the role of parents in their children’s decision to enter the financial industry. Among 
other things, it allows me to show that the likelihood of working in finance is higher than 
in most other industries if a person’s father also worked in the same industry while he or 
she was growing up. The comparably high correlation between fathers and children in 
finance has two possible explanations. First, choosing the same industry as their parents 
may indicate the transmission of industry-specific human capital or other traits from 
parents to children (Black, Devereux, and Salvanes, 2005). Secondly, it may reflect the 
importance of informal personal networks for hiring decisions. The latter may also be a 
sign of nepotism in the recruitment process in the financial industry. In this respect, Bellow 
(2003) distinguishes between “good” nepotism and “bad” nepotism. While recruitment 
based on personal ties can be beneficial for both employees and employers, e.g., due to 
less uncertainty about the quality of a match (Simon and Warner, 1992; Loury 2006), a 






an example, preferred hiring from a limited talent pool may interfere with the search for 
the best available talent leading to inefficiencies in financial firms. In addition, a small, 
elitist group that “feeds” the financial industry relatively more frequently may be more 
inclined to provide financing and other services preferably to their peers, which, in turn, 
results in undesirable outcomes for the economy as a whole. Moreover, interventions 
directed to promote diversity in financial firms will not be as effective if the ultimate access 
to jobs is determined to a considerable extent by informal networks. 
A compelling example of nepotism in hiring decisions in the financial industry in the 
U.S. is provided by the “Sons & Daughters Program,” which J.P. Morgan introduced to 
hire children of Chinese officials and executives in order to allegedly win business in 
China. In 2016, the bank agreed to pay a $264 million fine to settle claims that its hiring 
practices violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). 
Finally, by documenting a substantial income surplus for finance industry employees 
whose fathers were also working in the industry, I provide evidence that is difficult to 
reconcile with hiring practices purely based on personal ties without considering employee 
productivity. Instead, I argue that the results are more compatible with better quality 
matches between workers and employers. 
3.2 Parents and children in the financial industry 
To investigate whether children of parents who worked in finance are more likely to work 
in the industry themselves, I use data from the General Social Survey (GSS), a nationally 
representative survey that is administered by the National Opinion Research Center at the 
University of Chicago (Smith et al., 2019). In line with prior literature (e.g., Greenwood 
and Scharfstein, 2013), the financial industry is defined as a combination of the credit 
intermediation, securities, and insurance subsectors. Information on the industry in which 
respondents’ parents worked is available in the GSS for fathers in the period 1972-2018 
and for mothers in the period 1994-2018. So as not to burden the reader with details of the 
data here, I provide a comprehensive documentation about my sample construction and all 






3.2.1 Intergenerational finance industry mobility 
I examine the following linear model for the probability that a person works in the financial 
industry and one of the parents also worked in finance while the person was growing up: 
𝑦 𝑖,𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (3.1) 
where 𝑦 𝑖,𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 is an indicator variable taking the value one if individual 𝑖 interviewed in 
year 𝑡 works in the financial industry. 𝑃𝑖,𝑡𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 is an indicator capturing whether a parent 
of that person worked in finance while the respondent was growing up. The parameter 𝛽1 
measures the rate of relative mobility (Chetty et al., 2020), i.e., the association between 
the mean probability of children and their parents to both work in finance. The estimate of 𝛽1 hence answers the following question: “How much more likely is the average 
respondent to work in finance if a parent also worked in the financial industry while the 
respondent was growing up?” In order to account for the time-varying heterogeneity in 
macroeconomic and social influences to which individuals are exposed, I include birth year 
fixed effects 𝛼𝑖 in all regressions. For example, Oyer (2008) suggests that a person’s 
decision to enter the financial industry is affected by his or her recently experienced stock 
market performance. 
Table 3.1 presents results from regressions of the form described in equation (3.1). The 
estimates for fathers in columns (1) to (3) are strongly significant and positive implying 
that individuals are more likely to work in the financial industry if their fathers also worked 
in the industry. Specifically, the estimated magnitude with only birth year fixed effects in 
column (1) is 7.4 percentage points. Controlling for demographic characteristics in column 
(2) has no impact on the significance of this relationship and hardly any effect on its 
magnitude. Additionally accounting for a person’s educational degree and other family 
background characteristics in column (3), for example, whether a respondent lived with 
both parents at the age of 16, slightly increases the magnitude of the correlation to 8.1 






Table 3.1: Intergenerational industry mobility in finance 
Dependent variable In Finance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Father in Finance 0.074*** 0.075*** 0.081***    
 (5.54) (5.30) (4.31)    
Mother in Finance    0.015 0.017 0.004 
    (1.21) (1.40) (0.38) 
Non-white  0.001 0.009*  0.007 0.017** 
  (0.27) (1.83)  (1.25) (2.32) 
Female  0.027*** 0.027***  0.022*** 0.022*** 
  (7.77) (7.55)  (5.48) (4.50) 
U.S.-born  -0.007 -0.008  -0.027*** -0.025** 
  (-1.22) (-1.06)  (-3.17) (-2.39) 
High school degree   0.029***   0.024*** 
   (7.11)   (3.84) 
Junior college degree   0.027***   0.029** 
   (3.39)   (2.49) 
Bachelor’s degree   0.063***   0.065*** 
   (9.96)   (8.93) 
Graduate degree   0.025***   0.028** 
   (3.51)   (2.44) 
Lived with both   0.011**   0.008 
parents at age 16   (2.47)   (1.42) 
Number of siblings   -0.001*   -0.002** 
   (-1.98)   (-2.10) 
Lived in a city    0.015***   0.013*** 
at age 16   (3.83)   (3.07) 
Income below   -0.007   -0.005 
average at age 16   (-1.59)   (-0.94) 
Constant 0.000 0.007 -0.038*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.008 
 (0.99) (1.22) (-2.91) (-0.99) (-0.98) (-0.64) 
Birth year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 28,075 25,118 19,829 12,933 12,909 8,823 
Adj. R-squared 0.00348 0.00717 0.0169 0.000939 0.00497 0.0144 
Notes: This table reports results from regressions of the form described in equation (3.1) and examine 
the intergenerational mobility in the financial industry. Robust t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on 
standard errors clustered by birth year. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 






Altogether, the results suggest that a person is about eight percentage points more likely 
to work in finance if his or her father worked in the industry while the person was growing 
up. However, columns (4) to (6) indicate that this is not the case for mothers.17 
Figure 3.1: Intergenerational mobility in relation to fathers across industries 
 
Notes: This figure shows the relative industry mobility of individuals in relation to their fathers across 
different industries. Each point represents the estimation of 𝛽1 from a regression of the form described 
in equation (3.1). Regressions include controls for a person’s demographic characteristics, educational 
degree, and family background as well as birth year fixed effects as in column (3) of Table 3.1. Standard 
errors are clustered by birth year. All parameters are significant at least at the 5% level. 
 
17 The results presented in Table 3.1 are robust to various alternative specifications, which are reported in 
the appendix. For example, the coefficient remains virtually unchanged when I add fixed effects for the U.S. 
regions where respondents lived at age 16 and for the regions where they live today. Replacing birth year 






To gauge the magnitude of the relative finance industry mobility with regard to 
respondents’ fathers, I estimate the regression model in column (3) for all private sector 
industries available in the GSS. Figure 3.1 plots the relative mobility parameter for each 
industry for which it is significant at the 5% level or higher. Across 16 industries, the 
probability of a person entering an industry grows significantly if the father has already 
worked in that industry during the person’s childhood. Yet, the increase in likelihood is 
greater than in the financial industry in only three other industries: real estate, professional 
services, and agriculture. The comparably high correlation in finance suggests that fathers 
who gained professional experience in finance have a relatively strong influence on their 
children’s decision to follow them in their footsteps. 
3.2.2 The socioeconomic status of the family 
Next, I investigate whether the intergenerational finance industry mobility varies with the 
socioeconomic status of the family of origin during the child’s upbringing. This analysis 
is motivated by early research indicating that a family’s socioeconomic status is related to 
children’s occupational aspirations (Brook et al., 1974). Moreover, wealthier families are 
better able to invest in their children’s human capital formation and have (on average) the 
more embedded workers, i.e., those with stronger personal networks in the industry that 
are useful for the labor market (Montgomery, 1991). 
For the purpose of this analysis, I divide the sample into two groups: the people who 
responded that their family income at age 16 was below and those who responded that their 
family income was equal to or above the average income. The regression results are 
reported in Table 3.2. In line with the above arguments, the estimates indicate that the 
correlation between fathers and their children is solely driven by wealthier families. Hence, 
the socioeconomic status of a family appears to be a key factor in the intergenerational 
finance industry mobility. This finding is also remarkable against the background of the 
literature arguing that personal ties are generally more relevant for people with poor labor 
market prospects (Galeotti and Merlino, 2014). This general contention may not be true 






Table 3.2: Families’ socioeconomic status and intergenerational mobility 
Dependent variable In Finance 
 
Family income at age 16       
< Average 
 Family income at age 16       
≥ Average 
 (1)  (2) 
Father in Finance 0.058  0.084*** 
 (1.40)  (4.05) 
Constant 0.005  -0.035** 
 (0.70)  (-2.07) 
Controls as in column (3) of Table 
3.1 
Yes  Yes 
Birth year FE Yes  Yes 
Observations 5,182  14,647 
Adj. R-squared 0.0187  0.0172 
Notes: This table investigates the role of families’ socioeconomic status during the child’s upbringing 
for the intergenerational finance industry mobility of fathers and their children. Robust t-statistics (in 
parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by birth year. ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
3.2.3 Children’s income in finance 
A natural follow-up question to the above results is whether children of parents who 
worked in finance during their upbringing differ in their labor market outcomes when they 
work in the financial industry themselves. To shed light on this question, I restrict the 
sample to finance industry employees and regress their family income on the indicator that 
captures whether a parent of that person worked in finance.  
Regression results are reported in Table 3.3. The dependent variable Ln(Income) is the 
natural logarithm of the equivalized family income and defined in detail in the appendix. 
The models in columns (2) and (4) additionally include a respondent’s (squared) age as 
controls. The estimates indicate that having a father who worked in the financial industry 
is correlated with a substantially higher income surplus. Specifically, the income of 
second-generation employees in the financial industry is 25 percent higher if their fathers 






Table 3.3: Intergenerational industry mobility in finance 
Dependent variable Ln(Income) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Father in Finance 0.251** 0.243***    
 (2.53) (2.66)    
Mother in Finance    -0.040 0.068 
    (-0.30) (0.50) 
Age  0.070***   0.104*** 
  (4.69)   (2.90) 
Age squared  -0.001***   -0.001** 
  (-3.26)   (-2.21) 
Non-white -0.285*** -0.286***  -0.289*** -0.279** 
 (-3.65) (-3.98)  (-2.67) (-2.52) 
Female -0.215*** -0.215***  -0.149 -0.156* 
 (-2.95) (-3.13)  (-1.62) (-1.91) 
U.S.-born -0.044 0.004  -0.076 -0.070 
 (-0.49) (0.04)  (-0.56) (-0.47) 
High school degree 0.328* 0.280  0.488** 0.454* 
 (1.75) (1.45)  (2.19) (1.99) 
Junior college degree 0.569*** 0.479**  0.720*** 0.661** 
 (2.92) (2.40)  (2.73) (2.46) 
Bachelor’s degree 0.675*** 0.555**  0.995*** 0.926*** 
 (3.09) (2.55)  (4.15) (3.96) 
Graduate degree 1.106*** 0.874***  1.323*** 1.210*** 
 (5.09) (3.96)  (4.69) (4.24) 
Lived with both parents at age 16 -0.083 -0.096  0.058 0.023 
 (-0.85) (-1.05)  (0.54) (0.23) 
Number of siblings -0.004 -0.008  0.006 -0.000 
 (-0.32) (-0.60)  (0.28) (-0.02) 
Lived in a city at age 16 0.074* 0.059  0.042 0.049 
 (1.79) (1.48)  (0.48) (0.54) 
Income below average at age 16 0.059 -0.039  -0.020 -0.040 
 (1.02) (-0.64)  (-0.18) (-0.38) 
Constant -0.285*** -0.286***  -0.289*** -0.279** 
 (-3.65) (-3.98)  (-2.67) (-2.52) 
Birth year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 1,012 1,012  427 427 






Notes: This table studies the income of finance industry employees dependent on whether their fathers 
or mothers have also worked in finance. The dependent variable in all regressions is Ln(Income) which 
is the natural logarithm of a respondent’s equivalized family income. Robust t-statistics (in parentheses) 
are based on standard errors clustered by birth year. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
The substantial income surplus of people whose fathers were also employed in the 
financial industry is difficult to reconcile with “bad” nepotism as the only mechanism at 
work, i.e., the hiring of children entirely because of family connections with no regard to 
productivity (Bellow, 2003). This is because the financial industry is generally known for 
its high degree of competitiveness and the need for highly educated young talent, 
especially those with deep technological expertise. These forces arguably prevent financial 
firms to engage in inefficient hiring activities, at least on a large scale.  
In contrast, the income surplus appears to be more in line with the idea that higher-
quality matches can be achieved for second-generation finance industry employees, either 
through informal job networks (Simon and Warner, 1992) or through the transmission of 
valuable human capital from parents to children (e.g., Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1985). 
3.3 Conclusion 
This study corroborates the results of previous research on intergenerational industry 
mobility and the importance of the parents in people’s career choices. I focus on the U.S. 
financial industry and reveal that the relative industry mobility for fathers and their 
children, i.e., the increase in the likelihood to work in the same industry, is greater in 
finance than in most other industries. This comparably high correlation is driven by 
wealthier families, which, on the one hand, are able to provide more valuable informal 
networks, and, on the other hand, invest more in the human capital formation of their 
children. Moreover, I document that second-generation finance industry employees, whose 
fathers were themselves employed in the industry, enjoy a substantial income surplus 
compared to their industry peers. I argue that this cannot easily be explained by the hiring 
of children solely because of family ties without regard to productivity. More likely, the 






Therefore, my work provides some interesting avenues for further research, especially 
studies that disentangle the role of informal networks and the transmission of human 
capital (and preferences) as the two potential drivers of my findings. A follow-up study 
could, for example, focus on the highly competitive U.S. mutual fund industry. Fund 
managers perform standardized tasks and compete for the capital of their clients. Their 
performance as well as their compensation can be observed and compared across mutual 
fund firms. Superior performance by those managers whose parents also worked in finance 
would alleviate concerns that recruitment is based on inefficient nepotism. Furthermore, 
tests using more detailed data, e.g., on the profession, employers, and place of residence 
of the parents of mutual fund managers, could enable researchers to pin down the exact 






4 The Death of Trust Across the U.S. Financial Industry† 
“The fundamental problem isn’t lack of capital. It’s lack of trust. And without trust,  
Wall Street might as well fold up its fancy tents.” 
Robert B. Reich, former U.S. Secretary of Labor  
4.1 Introduction 
The financial sector plays a crucial role in a country’s economic development. More 
mature financial systems are associated with faster economic growth (Calderón and Liu, 
2003), a higher level of entrepreneurial activities (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2004), 
spurred technological innovation (Levine, 1999), and reduced poverty (Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt, and Levine, 2007). The financial industry produces, trades, and settles financial 
contracts, which, at their core, specify the conditions for exchanging money today for the 
promise to return more money in the future. Hence, a well-functioning financial system 
critically depends on the reliability of contractors. This reliability can be either achieved 
through explicit mechanisms, particularly formal regulation by the government, or by 
implicit incentives, such as social norms that prevail in a society or class. In fact, in many 
common economic situations, the behavior of individuals appears to be governed by social 
norms specifying what is allowed, i.e., socially acceptable, and what is not, i.e., socially 
unacceptable, rather than by authorities or prices (Richter and Rubinstein, 2020).18  
Despite the general erosion of trust in American society (e.g., Putnam, 2000), virtually 
nothing is known about the evolution of trust across finance professionals. In this study, 
 
† This chapter is based on an earlier version of Limbach, Rau, and Schürmann (2021). 
18 A recent example of this premise is the vibrant public debate on whether companies, including financial 
firms, that receive emergency financial aid from governments should pay out dividends or bonuses to their 






we show how implicit incentives in the form of generalized trust, i.e., trust in anonymous 
others, have evolved over the past four decades in the financial industry. 
We uncover three novel empirical findings. First, we show that generalized trust of 
professionals working in the financial industry has declined substantially over the last four 
decades. Notably, the level of trust of finance professionals has not only declined in 
absolute terms but also relative to the general U.S. population. Simply put, while 
generalized trust has declined in the U.S. society as a whole, it has declined significantly 
more across finance professionals. This relative decline in trust is unique to finance. 
Second, we find that the relative decline in trust is particularly strong in the investment 
sector and among professionals with higher seniority, i.e., those who set the tone. Third, 
we find evidence for several channels, particularly changes in economic conditions, the 
professional environment, and the level of socialization, that are related to and may 
potentially explain the significant deterioration in trust among finance professionals. 
Why does generalized trust in the financial industry matter? According to Arrow (1972, 
p. 357), “[v]irtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust.” 
Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009, p.1101) describe generalized trust as “[t]he trust that 
people have toward a random member of an identifiable group.” It is therefore crucial for 
interactions between strangers (Newton, 2007; Nannestad, 2008), which are common in 
financial markets. Economists argue that generalized trust and other forms of social capital 
facilitate economic activities because they discourage opportunistic behavior (Guiso, 
Sapienza, and Zingales, 2011) and increase people's willingness to cooperate (La Porta et 
al., 1997). Due to the reciprocal nature of trust, it determines their trustworthiness (Berg, 
Dickhaut, and McCabe, 1995) and trust responsiveness (Bacharach, Guerra, and Zizzo, 
2007). In other words, people who trust others more also tend to act more trustworthily 
since untrustworthy behavior, e.g., cheating, entails psychological and social costs such as 
guilt and shame. It is also associated with a lack of reciprocation, ostracism, and more 
direct forms of punishment by others (Knack and Keefer, 1997; Fehr and Gaechter, 2000; 
Francois and Zabojnik, 2005; Anderlini and Terlizzese, 2017). Therefore, generalized trust 






environment, individuals need not spend much time in protecting themselves from being 
exploited in economic transactions (Zack and Knack, 2001). Knack and Keefer (1997) 
consistently contend that – all else equal – written contracts are also less likely to be needed 
in these environments and litigation may be less frequent. 
In the financial industry, generalized trust is especially important because financial 
products are complex and conflicts of interest are common. Zingales (2015) notes that the 
financial industry provides services that most people need but only few understand. The 
level of information asymmetry between finance professionals and clients is higher than 
in most other industries. Clients also frequently rely on financial advisers. Providing advice 
and selling products to clients, however, naturally involves conflicts of interests since 
advisers may not be willing to tell clients about products of other firms that better suit their 
needs but instead try to steer them towards one of their own offerings (Bolton, Freixas, and 
Shapiro, 2007). Ghent, Torous, and Valkanov (2019) show that the complexity of financial 
products has strikingly grown over time, which increases the information asymmetry 
between clients and financial intermediaries. Piskorski, Seru, and Witkin (2015) argue that 
the growing complexity of the industry is also due to the high number of players involved, 
which makes it even more difficult for outsiders to comprehend. Overall, the relatively 
high complexity and large informational asymmetries combined with potential conflicts of 
interest render generalized trust particularly crucial for any kind of financial transaction. 
 Furthermore, our study is motivated by a political trend observable in the U.S. over 
the past few decades: The financial industry has experienced almost half a century of 
deregulation (e.g., Philippon and Reshef, 2012).19 Both theoretical and empirical studies 
(e.g., Fukuyama, 1995; Carlin, Dorobantu, and Viswanathan, 2009; Aghion et al., 2010) 
 
19 Examples include the relaxations of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1987, 1989, 1997, and 1999 (when the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act finally repealed the Glass-Steagall Act) the removal of interest rates ceilings in 
the 1980s, and the repeal of the Bank Holding Company Act in 1999. An exception is the Dodd-Frank Act, 
which was enacted in 2010. However, several requirements of the Act have already been repealed or are 






suggest that generalized trust is particularly valuable if formal regulation and governance 
are less established or efficient because trust, as it discourages opportunistic behavior, can 
provide a substitute for formal regulation. It is thus likely that a simultaneous decline of 
generalized trust and regulation, as has been the case in the U.S., leads to adverse outcomes 
for both consumers and society.  
Taken together, generalized trust is hence an essential implicit mechanism that guides 
the behavior of finance professionals. It promotes their willingness to cooperate, reduces 
the risk of clients being expropriated, and serves as a safeguard against financial fraud. 
Given their crucial role in today’s financial systems, it is therefore fundamental to explore 
how trust has evolved among finance professionals, not only for clients and financial 
institutions but also for regulators and policy makers.  
In this study, we investigate the time trend in generalized trust of people working in 
the financial industry relative to the general U.S. population using data from the General 
Social Survey (GSS). We use survey responses from 25 cross-sectional waves spanning a 
39-year period (covering ~1,500 respondents each year from 1978 through 1993 and 
~2,800 respondents every other year from 1994 through 2016) to the question: “Generally 
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful 
in dealing with people?” This measure of generalized trust has been extensively used in 
the literature and has been shown to be a valid predictor for people’s actual level of trust 
(see, for example, Fehr et al., 2003; Johnson and Mislin, 2012).20 
We show that the level of generalized trust of professionals working in the financial 
industry has declined substantially over the last almost four decades. Importantly, not only 
has the level of generalized trust declined in absolute terms but it has also significantly 
declined relative to the general U.S. population. Across all industries covered by the GSS, 
 
20 Sapienza, Toldra-Simats, and Zingales (2013) show that responses to the survey question we use here are 
motivated by what they refer to as the “belief-based component of trust.” In other words, responses strongly 
correlate with the sender’s expectations about the receiver’s behavior in the standard trust game (Berg, 






the relative decline in trust is unparalleled and is thus unique to finance. In particular, this 
decline in generalized trust is not observed in other industries that depend heavily on trust, 
such as the healthcare, legal services, or the tech industry. While the decline in trust is 
prevalent across both different finance subsectors and professionals of different ages, it is 
particularly strong in the investment sector and for professionals working in higher 
hierarchy levels who generally strive to “set the tone” of an ethical work culture. 
In addition, we examine the degree of confidence that people in the financial industry 
place in various institutions and groups. We find a steady erosion in confidence across 
most of these institutions over the past four decades, though in most cases this loss is 
similar to the loss of confidence experienced by the average American. However, we 
document a significantly sharper loss of confidence in counterparties that are likely to be 
particularly relevant to the financial industry, specifically major companies, the executive 
branch of the federal government, and Congress. 
We then ask what has driven the relative trust decline among finance professionals and 
investigate three non-mutually exclusive explanations – changes in general economic 
conditions, selection, and socialization. The economic conditions hypothesis argues that 
trends in economic conditions have differential effects on finance professionals and the 
average citizen. The selection hypothesis maintains that the type of people entering the 
financial industry has changed over time and that this change in the workforce composition 
affects their level of trust. Finally, the socialization hypothesis argues that changes in the 
style of working in the financial industry over time have led to fewer opportunities for 
social interactions, which, in turn, made the formation of generalized trust more difficult.  
For a factor to constitute an explanation for the relative decline of trust among finance 
professionals it needs (i) to be correlated with the generalized trust of workers in finance, 
(ii) to change in the relevant way over our sample period, and (iii) either be correlated 
significantly more with the generalized trust of workers in the financial industry or the 
change of the factor over time needs to be significantly larger among workers in finance 
than among the rest of the population. We test these criteria and document evidence that 






Consistent with the first hypothesis, proxies for economic conditions in the U.S. are 
disproportionally stronger correlated with trust among finance professionals than the 
average American. In particular, income inequality in the U.S., as measured by the Gini 
index, is strongly negatively related to trust, while economic growth, as reflected by the 
change in GDP, is strongly positively related to trust of people working in the financial 
industry. Since the Gini index also exhibits a significant and positive time trend over our 
sample, it constitutes a potential explanation for the decline in trust. Our evidence also 
suggests that, consistent with the previous literature, a more heterogeneous professional 
environment is related to lower levels of trust. Specifically, we find that a larger fraction 
of highly educated workers, a more ethnically diverse workforce, and a larger income 
inequality in the financial industry are correlated with lower levels of trust, while a higher 
share of women in finance is related to higher levels of generalized trust. Examining shifts 
in the selection of people into the financial industry over time shows that the share of 
highly educated finance professionals has grown disproportionally, while the share of 
female workers has declined disproportionally relative to trends in the general U.S. 
population. Hence, shifts in the type of people who have entered the financial industry over 
time provide a second potential explanation for the erosion of trust. Finally, we document 
that the generation of social capital and consequently the development of generalized trust 
through social activities has become rarer for finance professionals than for the rest of the 
population. People in finance work more hours and are less likely to participate in social 
groups than they used to. In particular, the propensity of workers in finance to be a member 
of a Putnam-type group, i.e., a group that is unlikely to act as a distributional coalition 
focused purely on rent-seeking, has declined disproportionally over our sample. These two 
trends, an absolute and relative increase in working hours and a concomitant decrease in 
social engagement are again unobserved in any other industry apart from finance. 
Our work has important practical implications, in particular for the design of stimulus 
and bailout programs that governments implement in times of crises. A lack of generalized 
trust across finance professionals may hamper these programs as actions taken by central 






participants. This is also important, for instance, in the recent crisis as governments are 
currently implementing various policies to address the negative economic consequences 
of the pandemic with only few mandatory requirements. As a result, the need for trust as 
an implicit mechanism increases. One example is the recent Paycheck Protection Program. 
Designed to provide struggling small businesses with the money they need, which they do 
not have to pay back if they keep their employees, the program has become mired in 
controversy over perceptions that banks favor their largest customers, whom they trust 
most, over customers in need. In addition, the U.S. government may in the future need to 
pay even more attention to the stability of financial institutions. A publicly perceived 
instability of an institution coupled with a low level of generalized trust and trustworthiness 
among finance professionals could cause public bank runs, fire sales, and other adverse 
consequences that have the potential to exacerbate a crisis. 
Our work also contributes to the ongoing public and academic debate on ethics and 
misbehavior in the financial industry. As an example, Cohn et al. (2014) demonstrate that 
as soon as bankers’ professional identities become engaged in a moral dilemma scenario, 
they become considerably more dishonest – a finding not replicated across other industries. 
Zingales (2015, p. 1327) argues that “[…] without proper rules, finance can easily 
degenerate into a rent-seeking activity.” Our evidence suggests that trust, i.e., implicit 
contracts, has significantly declined, which renders “proper” explicit mechanisms, such as 
formal regulation, more important.  
More generally, we contribute to research on long-term trends in the U.S. financial 
industry. Prior studies have, for instance, investigated causes for the enormous growth of 
the financial sector during the second half of the past century (Greenwood and Scharfstein, 
2013), the development of the cost of financial intermediation (Philippon, 2015), and 
trends in wages and education in the U.S. financial industry (e.g., Goldin and Katz, 2008; 
Philippon and Reshef, 2012). Our study complements this research and is, to the best of 
our knowledge, the first to explore the long-term trend in an important social factor, i.e., 






4.2 Data and methodology 
4.2.1 Data 
We examine the trust of people working in the financial industry and the general U.S. 
population using data from the GSS (Smith et al., 2019). The GSS is a nationally 
representative survey administered by the National Opinion Research Center at the 
University of Chicago that is designed to track attitudes, preferences, political views, and 
social behavior in American society. We use data from 25 cross-sectional waves spanning 
the 39-year period from 1978 to 2016. The survey contains about 1,500 respondents each 
year from 1978 through 1993 (except 1979, 1981, and 1992), and continues with around 
2,800 respondents every second year from 1994 through 2016. Our study generally relies 
on a subset of the total sample due to the availability of demographic and other information 
about respondents and questions that were not asked in every survey wave. 
Generalized trust is measured in the GSS by the question: “Generally speaking, would 
you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with 
people?” This question was asked in all but two survey waves (1982 and 1985) and is the 
most common measure used in the literature to assess individuals’ level of generalized 
trust (e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1997; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2004, 2006, 2008; 
Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen, 2012; Lins, Servaes, and Tamayo, 2017). We construct 
our main dependent variable, Most people can be trusted, as an indicator that equals one 
for a person who responds to the question that “most people can be trusted” and zero for a 
person who responds that either it “depends” or that you “can’t be too careful.” We drop 
from our analyses all individuals who responded that they “don’t know” or refused to 
answer the trust question. 
The long duration of the GSS and the use of consistent language for measuring attitudes 
and preferences make it ideally suited for exploring long-term trends. A few changes to 
the survey over time, however, require researchers to make some adjustments (see Smith, 
1990). Three changes are particularly relevant in our context: (1) an oversample of blacks 






completed by respondents in English were administered in Spanish; (3) until 1988, the 
order of questions preceding the trust question was not the same in all interviews. This last 
point is pertinent because Smith (1988) shows that responses to the trust question are 
sensitive to the immediately preceding battery of questions. In particular, respondents 
reported a lower level of trust when the question followed questions on crime compared to 
questions on life and job values. To create a consistent data set, we adjust the data as 
suggested by prior studies that use the GSS (e.g., Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008a, 2008b, 
2009; Ifcher and Zarghamee, 2014). First, we drop black oversamples in the years 1982 
and 1987. Second, we exclude all interviews from 2006 onwards that occurred in Spanish 
and could not have been completed in English. Third, we adapt the methodology described 
by Stevenson and Wolfers (2008b) to account for the varying question order in 1978, 1983, 
1986, and 1988 using the split-ballot experiments of the GSS. Finally, to ensure that our 
data is representative, we weight all estimates using the GSS weight variable WTSSALL. 
After these adjustments, the GSS is well suited to studying trends in generalized trust.  
We use the 2010 Census industry classification to classify respondents as workers in 
the financial industry. Following Philippon and Reshef (2012) and Greenwood and 
Scharfstein (2013), we define the financial industry as the combination of the credit 
intermediation, securities, and insurance subsectors.21 This classification yields a 
proportion of around five percent of respondents who work in the financial industry in a 
year. We verify this figure using data from the March supplement of the Current Population 
Survey (CPS) for the same period. The CPS data provide similar yearly proportions, and 
the average yearly difference between the two data sets is 0.032%. 
 
21 The corresponding industry codes are 6870-6990. The U.S. Census Bureau's Industry Classification 
System is based on the North American Industry Classification System and is used in several official 
government data sets in the U.S. The 2010 Census classification system is equivalent to the 2007 NAICS 






4.2.2 Graphical representation of the trust trends 
Figure 4.1 shows how generalized trust has trended over time for individuals in finance 
and the general U.S. population. We adjust the level of trust for the socioeconomic status 
as well as other subjective characteristics that have been shown to be associated with 
people’s level of trust (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 
2008). The figure graphs the residuals of generalized trust after accounting for a wide range 
of personal characteristics. The top panel plots the residuals from an OLS regression of 
Most people can be trusted on demographic and socioeconomic controls as well as region 
fixed effects (we describe all controls in more detail below). The bottom panel shows the 
differences in the residuals as bars and plots its linear time trend as a dashed line.  
Figure 4.1: Generalized trust in the United States, 1978-2016 








Panel B: Annual differences in residual trust 
 
Notes: This figure illustrates how the residuals of generalized trust have trended over time for people 
in finance and the general U.S. population after accounting for a wide range of personal characteristics. 
The top panel plots the residuals from an OLS regression of Most people can be trusted on demographic 
and socioeconomic controls as well as region fixed effects for both groups (all variables are described 
in the text below). The bottom panel shows the differences in the residuals as bars and plots its linear 
time trend as a dashed line.  
 
As has been documented by both scholars and the press (e.g., Putnam, 2000; Twenge 
et al., 2014; Lins, Servaes, and Tamayo, 2017), trust among U.S. Americans has eroded 
over the past several decades. Importantly for our study, the graphs show that individuals 
who work in the financial industry were historically more likely to report higher levels of 
trust. This gap reverses over time as the trust levels of finance professionals declines more 
than that of the general U.S. population over our sample. Since the beginning of the 1990s, 
residual trust, i.e., the part of trust that is not explained by demographic, socioeconomic, 
or regional factors, of individuals in the financial industry is below that of the general 






4.2.3 Empirical methodology 
To analyze the time trends in generalized trust for workers in the financial industry and the 
U.S. population in a more formal fashion, we follow the methodology of Stevenson and 
Wolfers (2009). Formally, we estimate a regression of the form 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝑛𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 × 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 − 1978100 + 𝛽2 𝑁𝑜𝑡𝐼𝑛𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 × 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 − 1978100  + 𝛽3 𝐼𝑛𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 + Г 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(4.1) 
where i denotes an individual and t denotes the year in which that individual was surveyed 
by the GSS. The coefficients on the time trend variables report the change in trust per 100 
years. Our dependent variables are different measures of generalized trust based on the 
GSS trust question.  
We account for two types of controls in our regressions, exogenous demographic 
characteristics, and socioeconomic characteristics. Demographic characteristics include 
decadal age categories, indicators for gender and race (black, white, and other), and an 
indicator for whether a respondent was born in the U.S. These controls are exogenous in 
the sense that they are not affected by choices that people make and by individuals’ trust 
itself. Socioeconomic characteristics include controls for education, employment status, 
income, marital status, a respondent’s number of children, his religious denomination, and 
whether he lives in a rural area. Education is measured using indicators for a respondent’s 
highest degree (less than high school, high school, associates/junior college, bachelor's, or 
graduate degree). His employment status is captured by indicators for full- and part-time 
employment, temporary illness/vacation/strike, unemployed, retirement, in school, 
keeping house, and other in our regressions.  
Because the GSS does not provide a consistent measure of income across survey years 
(Hout, 2004), we manually construct a consistent income measure for our sample as 
described in Stevenson and Wolfers (2008b). First, we convert a respondent's categorical 






to the data on the assumption that income follows a log-normal disruption. We then 
translate income to 2005 dollars using the Consumer Price Index provided by the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Lastly, we use the OECD-modified equivalence scale to make 
the family income of different household types comparable by taking into account shared 
consumption benefits (Hagenaars, de Vos, and Zaidi, 1994).22 We take the quartic of the 
logarithmic equivalized measure as our income controls to also allow for a non-linear 
association between income and trust.  
We control for marital status using indicators for whether a respondent is married, 
widowed, divorced, separated, or has never been married and for a respondent's religious 
denomination with indicators for Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, none, and other 
denominations. Finally, we construct an indicator for whether a respondent lives in a rural 
area, which equals one if he lives in a place with less than 2,500 inhabitants. We include 
region fixed effects in our regressions using information about the U.S. Census Bureau 
division in which interviews were conducted. All regressions are estimated with standard 
errors clustered at the interview year level. 
4.3 The trust trend of people who work in finance 
4.3.1 Baseline results 
Table 4.1 embeds our baseline results from regressions estimating equation (4.1). In the 
first three columns, we report results with Most people can be trusted as the dependent 
variable. Columns (1) and (2) present estimates from OLS regressions with demographic 
controls and demographic and socioeconomic controls, respectively. Consistent with the 
observations from Figure 4.1, the coefficient on the In Finance dummy is positive and 
significant in both columns indicating that, historically, individuals who have been 
 
22 Household needs, e.g., housing space and electricity, do typically not grow proportionally with the number 
of household members due to economies of scale. The OECD-modified scale assigns a value of 1 to the 







working in the financial industry report higher levels of trust. In addition, the coefficients 
on the trend variables show that generalized trust has declined significantly during our 
almost four-decade sample for both individuals in finance and the general population. We 
compare the decline in trust between the two groups in the fourth row of the table by 
estimating the difference between the In Finance and Not In Finance trends. This 
difference is significant on the 10% level when we control for demographics in column (1) 
and on the 1% level when we also add socioeconomic controls in column (2). The results 
hence suggest that generalized trust of individuals working in the financial industry has 
not only declined in absolute terms but also relative to the U.S. population over our sample. 
When evaluating the estimates in column (2), we find that individuals in finance begin 
the sample around seven percentage points more likely than others to report that most 
people can be trusted. Relative to the mean likelihood with which a person trusts others, 
this is a substantial difference of 18 percent. It is hence likely to be economically important. 
From 1978 to 2016, the propensity of people who work in the financial industry to report 
that most people can be trusted fell relative to the U.S. population by (𝛽1 − 𝛽2)∆𝑡 =(−0.864 − (−0.559)) × (2016 − 1978)/100 ≈ 12%. This shift amounts to about one-
fourth of the cross-sectional standard deviation of the Most people can be trusted indicator. 
Because the trust that prevails in a society is relatively persistent over short periods (e.g., 
Knack and Keefer, 1997; Mackie, 2001), the cross-sectional standard deviation is typically 
much larger than the intertemporal variation, and so the same shift is 2.3 times the standard 
deviation of the annual population proportion that responded that most people can be 
trusted. By the year 2000, individuals in the financial industry as well as the average person 
in the U.S. population were roughly equally likely to report that, conditional on their 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, they believed that most other people can 
be trusted. Respondents working in finance, however, end the sample in 2016 with a five 
percentage points lower likelihood of responding that most people can be trusted relative 






Table 4.1: Generalized trust in finance and the U.S. population, 1978-2016 
 Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful with people? 
[3] Most people can be trusted; [2] Depends; [1] Can’t be too careful 










 Ordered Probit 
(5) 
In Finance time trend -0.575*** -0.864*** -2.417***  0.822***  -2.349*** 
 (-5.48) (-7.08) (-7.09)  (5.68)  (-6.22) 
Not in Finance time trend -0.411*** -0.559*** -1.624***  0.540***  -1.560*** 
 (-9.20) (-12.14) (-12.64)  (12.68)  (-13.36) 
In Finance dummy 0.096*** 0.074*** 0.195***  -0.076***  0.200*** 
 (4.74) (3.16) (2.95)  (-3.22)  (2.96) 
Difference in time trends -0.164* -0.306*** -0.793***  0.283**  -0.789** 
p-value of difference 0.0877 0.00289 0.00617  0.0197  0.0133 
Ex. demographic controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Socioeconomic controls No Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 30,959 27,892 27,892  27,892  27,892 
Pseudo / Adj. R-squared 0.0671 0.127 0.104  0.132  0.0887 
Notes: This table reports coefficients from regressions of the form described in equation (4.1) with different measures of generalized trust. The 
coefficients on the time trend variables report the change in trust per 100 years. Exogenous demographic controls include indicators for decadal 
age categories, gender and race (black, white, and other), and an indicator for whether a respondent was born in the U.S. Socioeconomic 
characteristics include controls for education, employment status, income, marital status, a respondent’s number of children, his religious 
denomination, and whether he lives in a rural area. Income is a quartic in log real family income per equivalent = 1 + 0.5 (other adults) + 0.3 kids. 
All specifications include region fixed effects using the U.S. region in which an interview was conducted. Robust t and z-statistics (in parentheses) 






The remainder of Table 4.1 analyzes whether these results are robust to alternative 
specifications. In column (3), we run a probit rather than OLS regressions which does not 
alter our findings. In column (4), we change the dependent variable to Can’t be too careful, 
which equals one for a person who responded that “you can’t be too careful” when dealing 
with people and zero if he responded that either it “depends” or that “most people can be 
trusted.” This specification also allows us to analyze whether the decline in generalized 
trust reflects both changes in the propensity of people to report that most people can be 
trusted as well as changes in the propensity of people to report that you can’t be too careful. 
We indeed also find a relative incline in the proportion of individuals in finance who are 
less trusting, although this shift is slightly lower. Finally, in column (5), we estimate an 
ordered probit with Trust as the dependent variable, which is coded as a count variable 
taking the values 1 (“Can’t be too careful”), 2 (“Depends”), and 3 (“Most people can be 
trusted”). All of these alternative specifications provide estimates that are qualitatively 
similar to the results in the first two columns (results in column (4) are inversely signed as 
this specification assess the propensity to trust less). This leads us to conclude that our 
results provide consistent evidence that generalized trust of people working in the financial 
industry in the U.S. has significantly declined over the past 39 years, and even more so 
than in the general population.23 
To illustrate the economic magnitude of the relative decline in generalized trust of 
people in the financial industry, we compare it with other determinants of trust in society. 
One of these determinants is the level of income inequality (e.g., Knack and Keefer, 1997; 
 
23 Further corroborating evidence for our finding comes from an additional test (not reported in tables), in 
which we assess how people's beliefs about the benevolence of others has trended over our sample. 
Respondents’ beliefs about the benevolence of others is assessed in the GSS using the question: “Would you 
say that most of the time people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?” 
Like the question on generalized trust, this question was asked in all survey waves between 1978 and 2016, 
except for 1982 and 1985. We find that respondents working in the financial industry demonstrate a 
significantly sharper drop in their perceived benevolence of others than the U.S. population. This result 
makes sense as individuals who believe that you “can't be too careful” when dealing with people are also 






Zak and Knack, 2001; Uslaner, 2002). Analyzing U.S. data, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) 
find that an increase in the Gini coefficient by one percent in people’s local environment 
decreases their likelihood of reporting that most people can be trusted by 0.96 percent. The 
ratio between this estimate and the relative decline in trust for individuals in finance that 
we find suggests that their relative trust decline over the past 39 years is roughly 
comparable to a 13 percent increase in the Gini coefficient, for example, from its nation-
wide value of 48 percent in 2016 to 61 percent (almost the level of South Africa). An 
alternative metric is the racial fragmentation in a person’s area of living. Prior studies 
suggest that – at least in the short term – a higher racial diversity in neighborhoods 
generally leads residents to trust others less (e.g., Putnam, 2007). Drawing again on results 
from Alesina and La Ferrara (2002), the relative decline in generalized trust of individuals 
in the financial industry is quantitatively equivalent to moving from the least to the most 
racially fragmented metropolitan area in the U.S. in the 1990s. 
In a further set of unreported robustness checks, we analyze whether the relative decline 
in trust of people in the financial industry occurred throughout our sample or whether it is 
caused by a shift in a particular subperiod. We test for this by breaking the sample at 
various points and estimate equation (4.1) separately in each subperiod. Absent significant 
shocks, trust is relatively persistent over short periods and shifts occur only slowly. One 
reason is that the formation of generalized trust in a society is tied to historical 
developments often dating back hundreds of years. Beliefs and values are transmitted fairly 
unchanged from one generation to the next one (see, for example, Guiso, Sapienza, and 
Zingales, 2006; Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Dohmen et al., 2012; Okada, 2020). We do 
therefore not expect to find a relative trust decline in all subperiods.  
We split the sample into three 13-year periods, i.e., 1978-1990, 1991-2003, and 2004-
2016, and alternatively into four periods with the first three being ten years and the fourth 
nine years long, i.e., 1978-1987, 1988-1997, 1998-2007, and 2008-2016. Examining the 
subperiod-to-subperiod change in trust, we find that the mean difference in residual trust 
between individuals in finance and the general U.S. population consistently decreases from 






followed by the decline in the middle of the 2000s. Turning to within-subperiod shifts in 
generalized trust, we find that the relative trust decline in the earliest subperiod, i.e., during 
the 1980s, is most pronounced. Besides this phase, the within-subperiod decline in trust is 
mostly not significantly different for people in finance compared to the general U.S. 
population. Hence, the results indicate that the disproportional erosion of trust among 
workers in finance was a rather gradual process over our sample and not caused by one 
particular subperiod (or event). 
Taken together, the results in this section suggest that people who work in the financial 
industry have become significantly less trusting over the past decades. Most notably, this 
decline is quantitatively substantial and significantly larger than the decline in trust in the 
general U.S. population, which has been frequently discussed by scholars and in the press. 
4.3.2 Trust trends in other industries 
Is the trend in generalized trust in the financial industry different from the trend in other 
industries? To answer this question, we investigate the generalized trust trend in two other 
industries for which scholars have argued that trust is fundamental: the healthcare industry 
and the legal service industry.24 Zingales notes that “the healthcare sector is a particularly 
good comparison for the financial [industry]” because both sectors provide services that 
most people need but only a few understand. Accordingly, he concludes that “both sectors 
depend heavily on trust” (Zingales, 2015, p. 1342). Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny (2015) 
make a similar argument to illustrate the relationship between an investor and his financial 
adviser. The healthcare sector has also grown steeply relative to the overall economy in a 
similar manner as the financial industry and both sectors have experienced large amounts 
of abuse and fraud cases. Consequently, the implementation of new regulation in both 
sectors is constantly on the agenda of policy makers while companies attempt to influence 
 
24 Adam Smith has already remarked that a high level of trust is required in these professions. In particular, 
he argued that “[w]e trust our health to the physician, our fortune and sometimes our life and reputation to 







or prevent government interventions through massive lobbying. Furthermore, trust is 
frequently cited as an essential element for the provision of legal services and as a 
prerequisite for effective legal representation (see, e.g., Goldstein, 2005, and the literature 
therein). Courts often describe the importance of trust in a lawyer-client relationship and 
stress its reciprocal nature which leads to implicit contracts between a legal advisor and 
his client. Hence, both industries can be viewed as valid comparisons for the financial 
industry with regard to the value of trust. Finally, we study the trend in generalized trust 
in technology firms using the definition of Loughran and Ritter (2004). Many technology 
firms produce products and offer services that are difficult for the average consumer to 
understand, even though they form a crucial part of our lives today. 
Table 4.2 embeds the results from OLS regressions estimating equation (4.1) for the 
three industries. Results for the healthcare sector are reported in columns (1) and (2), 
results for the legal service industry in columns (3) and (4), and results for tech firms in 
the last two columns. Across all three industries, generalized trust of individuals working 
in these industries has declined significantly over our sample (albeit only marginally for 
the tech industry). However, the difference in time trends is not significantly different from 
the decline in generalized trust experienced by the general U.S. population. In robustness 
tests (not shown), we also estimate probit regressions and use the alternative measures of 
generalized trust as in Table 4.1 with qualitatively similar results. Overall, there appears 
to be no evidence that the decline in generalized trust that we observe for the financial 
industry is shared by other industries that depend heavily on trust. 
In unreported tests, we also investigate the time trend in generalized trust across all 
other industries in the sample. Regardless of the industry, there is no significant relative 
decline in trust for workers in any of these except finance. This result holds irrespective of 
whether we include people working in the financial industry in the control group or not. 
Taken together, our results suggest that the relative decline in generalized trust among 
workers in finance that we find is unparalleled by any other industry and hence unique to 
the financial industry. This finding raises the question of why trust has decreased so 







Table 4.2: Generalized trust trends in other industries and tech firms 
Dependent variable Most people can be trusted 
 Healthcare  Legal  Tech firms 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
In Industry time trend -0.509*** -0.613***  -0.429* -0.802**  -0.032 -0.345* 
 (-5.19) (-5.88)  (-1.97) (-2.72)  (-0.18) (-1.87) 
Not in Industry time trend -0.409*** -0.569  -0.421*** -0.572***  -0.431*** -0.580*** 
 (-9.66) (-12.47)  (-9.42) (-11.89)  (-10.11) (-12.63) 
Industry dummy 0.024 -0.005  0.145*** 0.062  0.005 0.019 
 (1.13) (-0.21))  (2.83) (1.09)  (0.14) (0.53) 
Difference in time trends -0.0996 -0.0442  -0.00880 -0.229  0.399*** 0.234 
p-value of difference 0.200 0.592  0.967 0.437  0.00994 0.143 
Ex. demographic controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Socioeconomic controls No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 30,959 27,892  30,959 27,892  30,959 27,892 
Adj. R-squared 0.066 0.127  0.067 0.127  0.067 0.128 
Notes: This table reports coefficients from OLS regressions estimating equation (4.1) with Most people can be trusted as dependent variable. 
Columns (1) and (2) report results for the healthcare industry, columns (3) and (4) for the legal service industry, and columns (5) and (6) for all 
tech firms following the definition in Loughran and Ritter (2004). Columns with odd numbers present estimates with demographic controls, while 
columns with even number additionally include socioeconomic controls. All specifications include region fixed effects. Robust t-statistics (in 






4.3.3 Heterogeneity in the trust trend 
To explore why trust has declined so much among finance professionals, we divide the 
generalized trust trend by hierarchy level, seniority, and industry subsectors. It is likely 
that the decline in trust has not been the same for all workers in finance. It is also plausible 
to expect differences in the trust trend across subsectors, i.e., banking, insurance, and 
investment. Not only is the latter often criticized in public for its allegedly low ethical 
standards, such as the trustworthiness of its employees, but the complexity of products 
offered by investment firms results in particularly high information asymmetries between 
customers and financial service providers which renders generalized trust even more 
important (e.g., Carlin, 2009; Ghent, Torous, and Valkanov, 2019).  
We begin our analysis by studying the trend in generalized trust for individuals in 
higher hierarchy levels of the financial industry, which we refer to as upper echelons. To 
classify respondents as belonging to the upper echelons, we use the latest International 
Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-08) provided in the GSS. The ISCO-08 
divides jobs into ten major groups depending on the skill level required to perform the 
duties of these jobs. We classify a worker in the financial industry as a member of the 
upper echelons if he belongs to one of the top three major groups, i.e., managers, 
professionals, or associate professionals. These jobs typically require workers to perform 
tasks that need an extensive body of knowledge, complex problem-solving, and decision 
making (International Labour Office, 2012). About 60 percent of individuals in the 
financial industry and 40 percent of the general population belong to these groups. 
To formally test whether trust trended differently for individuals in the upper echelons, 
we re-estimate our OLS estimation of equation (4.1) accounting for demographic and 
socioeconomic controls, i.e., paralleling column (2) of Table 4.1, and adjust our sample in 
different ways. Panel A of Table 4.3 presents the results from these regressions. In the first 
column, we restrict respondents in the financial industry to only those who belong to the 
upper echelons of the industry. We thus compare the upper echelons in finance with the 
general U.S. population. The results show a positive and highly significant coefficient on 






hierarchies in the financial industry are historically about 11 percent more likely to report 
that most other people can be trusted than the average U.S. American. Particularly 
important, the coefficients on the time trend variables indicate that this likelihood has 
decreased substantially during our almost four-decade sample. From 1978 to 2016, the 
propensity of workers in the upper echelons of the financial industry to report that most 
people can be trusted fell relative to the U.S. population by 14 percent. Column (2) presents 
estimates from a regression in which we additionally restrict the respondents who do not 
work in the financial industry, i.e., the general population, to individuals in upper echelons. 
Although our study’s focus is the discrepancy in the generalized trust trend between 
employees in finance and the average U.S. American, as described in the introduction, it 
is still interesting to explore whether the relative trust decline is a phenomenon that is 
generally shared among individuals in higher hierarchies irrespective of their profession. 
Table 4.3: Heterogeneity in the trust trend 
Panel A: Heterogeneity by hierarchy level 
Dependent variable Most people can be trusted 
 (1) (2) 
Upper echelons in Finance time trend -0.929*** -0.917*** 
 (-9.73) (-9.88) 
Not in Finance time trend -0.558***  
 (-12.26)  
Upper echelons Not in Finance time trend  -0.552*** 
  (-8.11) 
Upper echelons in Finance dummy 0.111*** 0.081*** 
 (5.33) (4.11) 
Difference in time trends -0.371*** -0.365*** 
p-value of difference 1.90e-05 4.72e-05 
Exogenous demographic controls Yes Yes 
Socioeconomic controls Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes 
Observations 27,378 11,973 






Panel B: Heterogeneity by seniority 
Dependent variable Most people can be trusted 
 
Juniors in Finance & 
general population 
Seniors in Finance & 
general population 
Juniors in Finance & 
Juniors not in Finance 
Seniors in Finance & 
Seniors not in Finance 
 
Age of respondents in finance 
<= Median in finance 
Age of respondents in 
finance > Median in finance 
Age of respondents <= 
Median in Finance 
Age of respondents > 
Median in Finance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
In Finance time trend -0.858*** -0.866*** -0.831*** -0.808*** 
 (-6.38) (-4.96) (-6.02) (-4.70) 
Not in Finance time trend -0.555*** -0.559*** -0.580*** -0.486*** 
 (-12.17) (-12.29) (-8.57) (-9.63) 
In Finance dummy 0.060* 0.091** 0.065* 0.080* 
 (1.95) (2.32) (2.07) (1.87) 
Difference in time trends -0.303** -0.307** -0.251* -0.322** 
p-value of difference 0.0264 0.0343 0.0687 0.0441 
Ex. demographic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Socioeconomic controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 27,261 27,209 12,812 15,080 
Adj. R-squared 0.126 0.128 0.103 0.126 
Notes: This table reports results from OLS regressions exploiting variation in the generalized trust trend by breaking it apart by hierarchy level 
and age. All specifications report coefficients from OLS regressions of Most people can be trusted on time trend variables of trust along with 
demographic and socioeconomic controls (see equation 4.1). Panel A shows how generalized trust trended in the upper echelons and Panel B 
investigates how generalized trust trended for individuals of different ages. All specifications include region fixed effects. Robust t-statistics (in 






However, the results in column (2) do not support this conjecture. The relative trust decline 
is significant at the 1% level and amounts to nearly 14 percent. Thus, the propensity of 
people who work in the upper echelons of the financial industry to report that most other 
people can be trusted declined substantially also relative to people working in the upper 
echelons in other industries. 
Since our demographic controls include decadal age categories, the relative loss of trust 
by the upper echelons in finance is not simply an age effect. Notwithstanding this control, 
it is still interesting to examine how generalized trust has trended for people of different 
age groups. A decline in generalized trust by seniors is perhaps likely to self-correct as 
these individuals retire and drop out of the industry. Hence, we examine the generalized 
trust trend using a cohort analysis. Specifically, we include in the sample only those 
finance professionals with ages either below (and equal to) or above the median age of all 
persons working in finance in a year. Panel B of Table 4.3 reports the results in columns 
(1) and (2). They indicate that the relative trust decline holds for both junior and senior 
cohorts in finance. In columns (3) and (4), we additionally shrink the group of respondents 
who do not work in finance to those with an age that is either below (and equal to) or above 
the median age of people working in the financial industry in a year. Again, relative to 
their cohort peers, the relative decline of trust holds across both senior and junior cohorts. 
Table 4.4 examines the trend in trust separately by finance industry subsector, i.e., 
banking, investment, and insurance.25 We include all respondents who work in the 
respective subsector in columns with odd numbers and restrict the sample to only those in 
the upper echelons of a subsector in columns with even numbers. Our results provide 
evidence for a decline in generalized trust relative to the U.S. population in all three 
subsectors. We do, however, observe some differences between subsectors with regard to 
the size of the decline. 
 








Table 4.4: Heterogeneity in the trust trend per finance subsector 
Dependent variable Most people can be trusted 
 Banking  Investment  Insurance 
 All Upper echelons  All Upper echelons  All Upper echelons 
In Finance time trend -0.847*** -0.627**  -1.180*** -1.280***  -0.873*** -1.022*** 
 (-4.47) (-2.45)  (-3.84) (-4.42)  (-4.84) (-5.72) 
Not in Finance time trend -0.558*** -0.557***  -0.556*** -0.556***  -0.557*** -0.557*** 
 (-12.24) (-12.37)  (-12.22) (-12.27)  (-12.27) (-12.30) 
In Finance dummy 0.065* 0.074  0.096 0.132*  0.089* 0.129*** 
 (1.75) (1.27)  (1.18) (1.81)  (2.62) (3.56) 
Difference in time trends -0.290* -0.0703  -0.624** -0.724***  -0.317* -0.466** 
p-value of difference 0.0950 0.776  0.0320 0.00843  0.0741 0.0117 
Exogenous demographic controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Socioeconomic controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Region FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 27,074 26,878  26,756 26,691  27,089 26,891 
Adj. R-squared 0.127 0.127  0.127 0.127  0.127 0.127 
Notes: This table reports results from OLS regressions exploiting variation in the generalized trust trend by breaking it apart by the financial 
industry subsectors, i.e., banking, investment, and insurance. Each column shows the coefficients from a regression of Most people can be trusted 
on time trend variables of generalized trust along with demographic and socioeconomic controls (see equation 4.1). We include all respondents 
who work in the respective subsector in columns with odd numbers and restrict the sample to only those in the upper echelons of the respective 
finance subsector in columns with even numbers. All specifications include region fixed effects. Robust t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on 






The estimates that rely on the full sample in columns with odd numbers show that the 
largest relative decline occurred in the investment sector, followed by insurance and 
banking. In line with our findings from Panel A of Table 4.3, estimates in columns with 
even numbers show that the relative trust decline is generally stronger in higher hierarchy 
levels. The only exception is the banking sector where we do not observe a significant 
relative decline in trust for individuals in the upper echelons.  
Hence, the results in this section indicate that the decline in generalized trust has not 
been equally strong for all workers in the financial industry over the past almost four 
decades. While both juniors and seniors in finance experienced an erosion of trust relative 
to the general population, we find that the trust decline was particularly strong in the 
investment sector and for workers in higher hierarchy levels, i.e., those who set the tone. 
4.3.4 Confidence in institutions and groups 
The fact that generalized trust of people who work in the financial industry has deteriorated 
not only in absolute terms but also relative to the average American raises the question of 
whether workers in finance also experienced a disproportionally larger trust erosion in 
other domains. In this section, we examine responses to several survey questions that 
assess confidence of individuals in several institutions and groups. These questions are 
available in all survey waves except in 1985: “As far as the people running [institution or 
group] are concerned, would you say you have a great deal of confidence, only some 
confidence, or hardly any confidence at all in them?” We create an indicator that equals 
one if a respondent reports to have “a great deal” of confidence in a party and zero 
otherwise. Our analysis covers the following institutions and groups: banks and financial 
institutions; major companies; the executive branch of the federal government; Congress; 
the U.S. Supreme Court; the military; the press; and the scientific community. 
Table 4.5 reports how confidence in these institutions and groups has trended over time 
for people in finance and the general U.S. population. Each row shows the estimates of 
one regression of the form described in equation (4.1) using as the dependent variable the 
confidence indicator variable for the respective institution or group. All regressions include 






Table 4.5: Confidence in institutions and groups 
 Estimated time trends in confidence per party 
 In Finance Not in Finance Difference 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Financial institutions 
Banks and financial institutions -0.337* -0.331*** -0.00631 
 (-2.04) (-3.87) 0.962 
Panel B: Parties especially relevant to the financial industry 
Major companies -0.596*** -0.356*** -0.240*** 
 (-6.47) (-6.46) 0.00378 
Executive branch of the federal government -0.293** -0.101 -0.193*** 
 (-2.35) (-1.49) 0.00755 
Congress -0.277*** -0.169*** -0.108** 
 (-3.88) (-3.26) 0.0222 
Panel C: Parties not especially relevant to the financial industry 
U.S. Supreme Court -0.260 -0.159* -0.101 
 (-1.39) (-1.93) 0.445 
Military 0.963*** 0.853*** 0.110 
 (8.05) (13.21) 0.420 
Press -0.343*** -0.370*** 0.0275 
 (-6.10) (-8.46) 0.633 
Scientific Community -0.391** -0.173*** -0.217 
 (-2.59) (-4.41) 0.148 
Notes: This table reports how confidence in various institutions and groups trended over time for people 
in finance and the general U.S. population. Each row shows the result of one OLS regression of the 
form described in equation (4.1) and examines the trend vis-à-vis a different party. Panel A reports 
estimates for banks and financial institutions, Panel B for parties that are especially relevant to the 
financial industry, and Panel C for various other parties. The first two columns show the coefficients 
on the trend variables In Finance × Time and Not in Finance × Time and the third column reports the 
difference in these estimates and its p-value. All regressions include demographic and socioeconomic 
controls as well as region fixed effects. Sample sizes vary by data availability. Robust t-statistics (in 
parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by year. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
We first report the relative time trends in confidence in banks and financial institutions 
in Panel A. The negative and significant coefficient on the time trend variable for the 






this group has eroded steadily over our sample. The time trend for respondents in finance 
is also significantly negative. The difference between the two trends is, however, not 
significant. In other words, both groups have experienced a similar increase in their distrust 
of financial institutions in recent decades. Yet, when we examine the levels of confidence, 
which we do not tabulate for brevity, we find strong evidence that they differ substantially 
for workers in finance and the general U.S. population. Specifically, individuals who work 
in the financial industry are significantly more likely to report that they have a great deal 
of confidence in their industry than the average U.S. American.  
For the remainder of Table 4.5, we separate parties that are particularly relevant to the 
financial industry from others. In particular, we deem companies, the executive branch of 
the federal government, and Congress as especially relevant to the financial industry for 
different reasons. First, companies make up a large proportion of customers of financial 
corporations and use various kinds of financial services. Second, the executive branch of 
the federal government includes the regulatory authorities that are responsible for 
monitoring financial players, enforcing regulatory standards, and protecting consumers. 
Third, the U.S. Congress shapes the regulatory environment for financial corporations.  
Panel B reports the time trend in confidence vis-à-vis these three parties. While workers 
in finance begin the sample with a higher level of confidence in each of them, the estimates 
in Panel B suggest that their confidence in all of them declined significantly over our 
sample. At the same time, the confidence of the general U.S. population only declined 
toward major companies and Congress. Most importantly, the last column indicates that 
the loss in confidence in all three parties has been significantly more pronounced for people 
in finance compared to the average U.S. American.  
Finally, Panel C shows how respondents’ confidence vis-á-vis parties that are not 
particularly relevant to the financial industry trended for workers in the financial industry 
and other U.S. Americans. The results indicate that the trends in confidence in the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the military, the press, and the scientific community are not significantly 
different between the two groups. We also find that the levels of confidence vis-á-vis these 






To summarize, the results in this section allow us to draw some conclusions about how 
confidence in various parties trended for workers in finance relative to the U.S. population. 
While their degree of confidence vis-á-vis various institutions and groups eroded over the 
past 39 years, the loss in confidence is in many cases similar to that experienced by the 
average U.S. American. Importantly, parties for which we find a sharper loss in confidence 
are all deemed particularly relevant to the financial industry. It thus seems likely that the 
relative decline in generalized trust that we observe is linked to a growing skepticism and 
vigilance towards institutions and groups with whom people working in financial firms 
regularly interact or on whom they depend. 
4.4 Potential reasons for the relative trust decline 
What has led to the relative trust decline of people working in finance? In this section, we 
shed light on this question by examining different types of transitions in people’s lives 
over our sample that may be associated with a steeper trust decline for workers in finance 
relative to the general U.S. population. In particular, we propose and investigate three 
potential explanations, which are not mutually exclusive: changes in economic conditions, 
selection, and socialization.  
Before we motivate each hypothesis, it is important to lay out the criteria a factor would 
need to fulfill in order to constitute an explanation, even a partial one, for the relative 
decline of trust among finance professionals. First, a proposed factor needs to correlate 
with generalized trust of workers in finance. Second, it needs to change in the relevant way 
over our sample period. Third, it needs to be either correlated significantly more with 
generalized trust of finance professionals or the change in the factor over time needs to be 
significantly larger in finance than in the rest of the U.S. population to explain the relative 
trust decline. We will test each of these criteria in our analyses. 
First, the economic conditions hypothesis argues that the development of economic 
conditions in the U.S. has had a greater impact on the generalized trust of workers in the 
financial industry than on the rest of the U.S. population. The hypothesis is motivated by 






the gap between rich and poor widens (e.g., Uslaner; 2002; Picket and Wilkinson, 2010). 
For example, in light of this literature, one might expect that the rise in income inequality 
over the past decades has affected workers in finance differently due to the steep increase 
in wages in this industry, which has accounted for up to a fourth of the overall increase in 
wage inequality in the U.S. since 1980 (Philippon and Reshef, 2012). Accordingly, we 
examine the link between various measures of economic conditions in the U.S. and the 
prevailing level of generalized trust. 
Second, the selection hypothesis argues that the type of people entering the financial 
industry has changed over time and that the changing composition of the workforce has in 
turn influenced the level of generalized trust of workers in the industry. Importantly, since 
we control for a wide range of individual-level characteristics in our regressions, such as 
gender, ethnicity, education, and income, the selection hypothesis does not maintain that 
changes in workers’ own characteristics have caused the deterioration of trust. Instead, it 
argues that a person’s generalized trust has eroded, conditional on his characteristics, due 
to changes in the type of colleagues with whom he works. The hypothesis is motivated by 
several studies that show lower levels of trust and social capital in more heterogeneous 
environments (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Putnam, 2007). Previous research also 
provides evidence for a shift in the professional environment along several dimensions in 
the financial industry. For example, the proportion of people with professional graduate 
degrees in finance increased strikingly over the last decades of the past century (Goldin 
and Katz, 2008). Philippon and Reshef (2012) reveal a tight link between deregulation and 
the flow of human capital into and out of the financial industry. Specifically, high-skilled 
employees began to enter the financial industry in the 1980s and 1990s when more and 
more regulations were lifted. Moreover, as outlined above, the income in the financial 
industry has increased dramatically over time leading to a sharp growth in the finance wage 
premium (Philippon and Reshef, 2012; Célérier and Vallée, 2019).  
Third, the socialization hypothesis argues that changes in the style of working in the 
financial industry over time have led to fewer opportunities for social interaction, 






example, Putnam, 2000), which suggests that social interactions are particularly conducive 
for generating social capital and generalized trust. Thus, if workers in the financial industry 
have had relatively fewer opportunities to engage socially in recent years, for example, due 
to an ever-increasing workload, their level of generalized trust may have fallen relatively 
more as a result. 
4.4.1 Changing economic conditions 
We obtain three annual measures to investigate the association of generalized trust with 
changing economic conditions over our sample: the Gini coefficient of income inequality, 
the change in gross domestic product, and the poverty rate. Results of OLS regressions 
with each of the measures interacted with an In Finance and a Not in Finance indicator are 
reported in Table 4.6. Consistent with Twenge et al. (2014), we find a negative relationship 
between income inequality and generalized trust. The difference between the coefficients 
for individuals in finance and the U.S. population is significant at the 1% level, indicating 
that generalized trust of finance professionals declines even more as income inequality 
rises. Similarly, whilst economic growth promotes trust among both groups, which is 
consistent with Zak and Knack (2001), among others, finance industry workers seem to be 
more sensitive to GDP changes than the average U.S. American. As expected, results in 
the last column indicate that the poverty rate in the U.S. relates negatively to trust. The 
association with generalized trust is, however, not significantly different for finance 
professionals compared to the general population. Hence, the results in Table 4.6 suggest 
that rising income inequality and higher economic growth are correlated with relatively 
larger shifts in generalized trust of people working in the financial industry.  
Yet, when we study the time trends in both measures in unreported tests, we find that 
only income inequality exhibits a significant linear and positive trend over our sample. 
Specifically, the Gini coefficient of income inequality increased on average by 0.27 
percent per year from its starting point of 36.3 percent in 1978. Therefore, only the sharp 
rise in income inequality in the U.S., which is to a large part driven by the financial industry 







Table 4.6: Changes in economic conditions and the relative trust decline 
Dependent variable Most people can be trusted 
 Gini index  GDP change  Poverty rate 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Economic condition measure -0.031***  0.073***  -0.163*** 
× In Finance (-8.57)  (12.19)  (-13.45) 
Economic condition measure -0.020***  0.051***  -0.156*** 
× Not in Finance (-33.68)  (35.72)  (-35.75) 
In Finance dummy 0.489***  -0.052**  0.104 
 (3.01)  (-2.33)  (0.61) 
Difference in time trends -0.0111***  0.0218***  -0.00648 
p-value of difference 0.00358  0.000470  0.614 
Exogenous demographic controls Yes  Yes  Yes 
Socioeconomic controls Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region & Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 27,892  27,892  27,892 
Adj. R-squared 0.131  0.131  0.130 
Notes: This table reports OLS regression results of analyses that explore whether different changes in 
economic conditions in the U.S. over our sample constitute potential causes for the relative decline in 
generalized trust experienced by individuals working in the financial industry. All specifications include 
demographic and socioeconomic controls as well as region and year fixed effects. Robust t-statistics (in 
parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by year. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
4.4.2 Selection into the financial industry 
Next, we explore whether changes in the workforce composition in the financial industry 
may have driven our observed trust trend. Panel A of Table 4.7 reports coefficients from 
regressions estimating the relation between trust and four dependent variables for finance 
professionals and, for comparison, also for the rest of the population. Highly educated 
fraction is the fraction of individuals with greater than high school educations in a year in 
the financial industry and the rest of the U.S. population, respectively. Similarly, Non-
white fraction is the fraction of non-white people and Female fraction is the fraction of 
female individuals. Income dispersion is measured as the Gini index of equalized family 






that more highly educated and non-white people working in the financial industry relate 
negatively to generalized trust of finance industry employees. However, a higher fraction 
of females correlates with more generalized trust, as indicated in column (3). Finally, 
column (4) provides evidence that larger income inequalities within finance are associated 
with less trust of finance professionals. 
In Panel B of Table 4.7, we examine the time trends in each of the four dimensions. 
Although we find linear time trends in each one of them, only two dimensions experienced 
a significantly different time trend in finance compared to the general U.S. population. 
First, consistent with the literature (e.g., Philippon and Reshef, 2012), the results in column 
(1) suggest that finance has become a high-skill industry over the past decades. Second, as 
shown in column (3), the fraction of females declined in finance, while it slightly increased 
in the general population. The fraction of non-white people and the income dispersion do 
not exhibit different time trends. 
Table 4.7: Changes in the professional environment and the relative trust decline 
Panel A: Relation of trust with the professional environment in finance 
Dependent variable Most people can be trusted 








 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Professional environment in  -0.899***  -1.245***  0.802**  -1.973*** 
Finance × In Finance (-8.11)  (-6.40)  (2.21)  (-5.26) 
Environment outside Finance -0.990***  -1.274***  -0.597  -1.760*** 
× Not in Finance (-16.99)  (-11.02)  (-0.35)  (-8.62) 
In Finance dummy 0.087*  -0.008  -0.839  0.018 
 (1.91)  (-0.24)  (-0.93)  (0.14) 
Difference  0.0914  0.0287  1.400  -0.213 
p-value of difference 0.401  0.888  0.414  0.534 
Ex. demographic controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Socioeconomic controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region & Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 27,892  27,892  27,892  27,892 






Panel B: Time trends in the professional finance environment and the U.S. society 
Dependent variables Highly 
educated  
 Non-white   Female   Income 
dispersion 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
In Finance time trend 0.823***  0.534***  -0.218**  0.259*** 
 (6.53)  (5.88)  (-2.35)  (4.63) 
Not in Finance time trend 0.582***  0.398***  0.035**  0.231*** 
 (15.14)  (20.02)  (2.22)  (8.86) 
In Finance dummy 0.061**  -0.044**  0.202***  -0.050*** 
 (2.45)  (-2.57)  (10.46)  (-4.83) 
Difference in time trends 0.241*  0.135  -0.253**  0.0279 
p-value of difference 0.0542  0.150  0.0115  0.606 
Controls / Fixed effects No  No  No  No 
Observations 49,162  49,251  49,251  49,251 
Adj. R-squared 0.0219  0.0128  0.00429  0.801 
Notes: This table reports results of analyses that investigate whether changes in the composition of the 
workforce in the financial industry over our sample constitute a potential cause for the relative decline 
in generalized trust experienced by individuals working in the financial industry. Panel A presents 
coefficients from OLS regressions that explore the correlation of generalized trust with different 
indicators of the professional environment in the financial industry as well as the U.S. population. The 
independent variable of interest in column (1) is Highly educated fraction, which is defined as the 
fraction of individuals with more than high school education in a year in the financial industry and the 
rest of the U.S. population, respectively. Similarly, Non-white fraction in column (2) is the fraction of 
non-white people and Female fraction in column (3) is the fraction of female individuals. In column 
(4), we use Income dispersion as a measure for income inequality, which is measured as the Gini index 
of equivalized family income. All specifications include demographic and socioeconomic controls as 
well as region fixed effects. Panel B shows results from OLS regressions that explore the unconditional 
time trends on individual level of four measures that are defined in accordance with the variables used 
in Panel A. Highly educated is an indicator that equals one for a respondent who has more than high 
school education, Female equals one for a female person, and Non-white equals one for a non-white 
person. Income dispersion is the Gini index of equivalized family income. Robust t-statistics (in 
parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by year. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Overall, we conclude that the flow of highly educated human capital into the financial 
industry and the decline in the share of women over the past almost four decades provide 
two potential drivers for the absolute as well as relative erosion of generalized trust among 
finance professionals. The rising income inequality within finance and the growing ethnic 






4.4.3 Socialization of people in finance 
Lastly, we analyze shifts in the opportunities people have to generate social capital and 
generalized trust. Specifically, we investigate whether working hours have increased 
disproportionally in the financial industry leaving workers with fewer chances to engage 
in social activities compared to other U.S. Americans. In addition, we explore whether the 
propensity of workers in finance to participate in social groups has decreased over time. 
Our interest in people’s opportunities to associate with one another is motivated by 
Putnam’s seminal research (Putnam, 1993, 1995, 2000) which points out that social 
interactions, particularly interactions as a member of a social group, are conducive to 
generating social capital. He argues that participating in a social group, for example, a 
bowling club, enhances the transmission of knowledge and facilitates the development of 
trust in a society. Consistent with this, Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) study group 
memberships in the U.S. and find that the participation in social activities is significantly 
less likely in more unequal and more racially fragmented localities in which residents are 
also known to be less trusting. 
Table 4.8 reports findings from regressions estimating equation (4.1) with three 
dependent variables, Workings hours, Group membership, and P-Group membership. The 
variable Working hours measures the number of hours individuals worked in the past week 
and is constructed by clustering responses into bins of 20 hours. Following Alesina and La 
Ferrara (2000), we construct Group membership as an indicator that takes the value one 
for a respondent who belongs to at least one social group and zero otherwise.26 Because 
questions on memberships were only asked in 1978 through 1994 (except 1982 and 1985) 
and in 2004, regressions with Group membership as the dependent variable rely on a 
smaller sample. The population proportion that is part of a social group varies between 
72.7 percent in 1983 and 62.1 percent in 2004 and steadily decreases over time. 
 
26 Social groups include, among others, fraternities and sororities, service groups, veteran groups, political 
clubs, labor unions, sports clubs, youth groups, school service groups, hobby clubs, nationality groups, farm 






Additionally, we explore the trends in social activeness by differentiating between 
types of groups following Knack and Keefer (1997). In particular, we classify groups as 
“Putnam-type” groups (denoted P-groups) if they are least likely to act as distributional 
coalitions focused on rent-seeking, but rather focus on social interactions that allow 
individuals to build trust and cooperative habits. We define P-Group membership as an 
indicator that equals one for respondents belonging to either a sports or hobby club, a 
(school) service club, youth groups, literary, art, discussion or study groups, or a church-
affiliated group. 
Table 4.8: Changes in socialization habits in finance and the relative trust decline 
Dependent variables Working hours  Group membership  P-Group membership 






In Finance time trend 0.854***  -0.696***  -0.934*** 
 (3.09)  (-4.70)  (-5.73) 
Not in Finance time trend 0.318***  -0.514***  -0.300** 
 (3.55)  (-4.23)  (-2.50) 
In Finance dummy -0.195**  -0.050**  0.055* 
 (-2.45)  (-2.69)  (1.80) 
Difference in time trends 0.536*  -0.183*  -0.634*** 
p-value of difference 0.0564  0.0782  0.00116 
Exogenous demographic controls Yes  Yes  Yes 
Socioeconomic controls Yes  Yes  Yes 
Region FE Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 27,928  13,589  13,589 
Adj. R-squared 0.228  0.112  0.0927 
Notes: This table reports results of analyses that explore whether changes in the style of working in the 
financial industry over time have led to fewer opportunities for human interactions. In column (1), the 
dependent variable, Working hours, measures the number of hours individuals worked in the past week 
in bins of 20 hours. In column (2), Group membership is a dummy that indicates whether a respondent 
belongs to any social group, while in column (3) P-Group membership only considers groups least 
likely to act as distributional coalitions. All specifications include demographic and socioeconomic 
controls as well as region fixed effects. Robust t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors 







The coefficients on both Working hours variables in column (1), which assess the time 
trend of hours worked, indicate that working hours have increased significantly for both 
workers in finance and the general U.S. population. The difference between the time trends 
is significant at the 10% level suggesting that the increase in working hours was slightly 
larger in the financial industry. Turning to group memberships, columns (2) and (3) suggest 
that the likelihood to participate in a social group or P-group has generally declined and 
even more so among people working in the financial industry. The coefficient difference 
is significant at the 10% and 1% level, respectively. Interestingly, the time trends in P-
group memberships, i.e., those groups that are most likely to focus on the association with 
one another, deviate most strongly from each other. The likelihood of workers in finance 
to be a member of a P-group declined six percent more over a ten-year period than the 
likelihood of the average American. Taken together, the results provide evidence that the 
formation of social capital and consequently the development of generalized trust through 
social activities has become rarer for workers in finance than the general U.S. population.  
In unreported analyses, we additionally test whether workers in any other industries 
also experienced a significant and positive trend in working hours (in absolute terms as 
well as relative to the average U.S. American) and simultaneously a negative trend in their 
likelihood of participating in social groups. Our results do not provide evidence for this 
pattern in any other industry except for the financial industry. The higher number of hours 
worked by employees in the financial industry paired with their lower propensity to engage 
socially thus represents a unique pattern for the financial industry and another potential 
reason for the disproportionate decline in generalized trust. 
4.5 Conclusion 
We document that generalized trust among finance professionals in the U.S. has declined 
significantly more sharply than among the general U.S. population and more than in any 
other industry. This decline holds in different age cohorts and among different levels of 
seniority and is related to a lack of trust only in institutions that are related to the financial 






changes in economic conditions, the professional environment in the financial industry, 
and the level of socialization among finance industry professionals.  
Yet, we note that there may be additional factors that have contributed to the absolute 
and relative decline in generalized trust across the financial industry over the past decades, 
which we are unable to test for due to a lack of data. For example, organizational forms of 
financial firms have changed considerably over the past few decades with partnerships 
being replaced by large publicly traded institutions. In a partnership, the trust of the 
partners and their reputation as trustworthy businessmen are closely bound to the success 
of the enterprise. In large publicly traded institutions, in contrast, the level of trust of 
individual employees, even if they hold management positions, is arguably less closely 
linked to a company’s reputation and performance. Hence, the focus of financial firms on 
social norms, such as trustworthiness and integrity, may have been blurred in more recent 
years because these norms do no longer serve as signals of quality.  
Similarly, as the complexity of the financial world increases, finance professionals may 
more often experience a form of imposter syndrome. Clance and Imes (1978) introduce 
this term to describe a psychological pattern in which individuals experience self-perceived 
intellectual phoniness despite sufficient external evidence of their own competence. It has 
been shown that the imposter syndrome is associated with negative feelings such as 
generalized anxiety, shame, and insecurity, which, in turn, could lead to a situation in 
which people generally trust others, particularly strangers, less. 
All told, our study provides novel empirical findings on the evolution of generalized 
trust in the U.S. financial industry. It thereby offers several avenues for further research. 
On the one hand, it is essential for economists to pin down why trust has eroded to severely 
across the financial industry to broaden our understanding of the motives and drivers of 
those employed in the financial industry. On the other hand, it is necessary to explore ways 
to mitigate possible adverse effects resulting from a lack of trust among finance 
professionals. In this respect, the use of new technologies, such as blockchain, as well as 
a tighter regulatory corset for the industry to substitute for the loss of trust can provide two 






5 Till Death (or Divorce) Do Us Part: Early-life Family 
Disruption and Investment Behavior‡ 
“I had a very nice childhood, certainly. […] And then he [her father] died at the age 
of 38, which I’m sure had a profound effect on me, because I was then 12.” 
J. Lawrie, principal and portfolio manager at HLM Venture Partners (Boston, MA)27 
5.1 Introduction 
The emerging field of social finance explores how societal issues affect economic behavior 
(Hirshleifer, 2015; Cronqvist, 2018).28 This literature has only recently begun to study 
financial consequences of broad societal developments, for example, anti-discrimination 
movements (Lins et al., 2020), climate change (Krueger, Sautner, and Starks, 2019), and 
terrorism (Dai et al., 2020). We contribute to this growing literature by showing that a 
common societal issue, early-life family disruption, is associated with long-lasting effects 
on investment behavior. 
Specifically, in this study, we examine investment behavior by mutual fund managers. 
The mutual fund industry is an appropriate setting as it allows us to directly compare 
observable investment decisions made by professional investors who have been trained to 
make rational decisions while taking appropriate risks. Moreover, mutual fund managers 
perform standardized professional tasks and share a comparable socioeconomic status, 
 
‡ This chapter is based on an earlier version of Betzer et al. (2021). 
27 Interview on May 17, 2000, Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute Records of the Harvard-Radcliffe 
Program in Business Administration Oral History Project, 1945-2015. 
28 Social factors include different aspects of socialization (e.g., Cronqvist and Yu, 2017; Duchin, Simutin, 
and Sosyura, 2021), social interactions (e.g., Hong, Kubik, and Stein, 2004; Kaustia and Knüpfer, 2012; 
Huang, Hwang, and Lou, 2020), as well as ideologies and religions (e.g., Kumar, Page, and Spalt, 2011; 






thereby mitigating concerns of investor or task heterogeneity. Mutual fund investments 
constitute a substantial portion of financial wealth for the average U.S. household and 
mutual fund managers play an important societal role as delegated investors of household 
wealth. Yet, while existing evidence indicates that fund managers are subject to behavioral 
biases such as the disposition effect (e.g., Frazzini, 2006), we still know very little about 
where these investment biases originate (Hirshleifer, 2015). 
Using unique hand-collected data, we show that fund managers who experienced the 
death or divorce of their parents during their childhoods exhibit a stronger disposition 
effect and take less risk, even after accounting for various socioeconomic and family 
factors. We also examine moderators of the relationship between family disruption and 
investment behavior, specifically social support, the age at which a manager experienced 
family disruption, and family wealth. Overall, our results are consistent with an emotional 
channel, as suggested by social psychology and medicine. 
Understanding how financial decisions relate to early-life family disruption is crucial 
because family disruption affects children across virtually all societies. According to 
census data, half of first marriages in the U.S. end up voluntarily dissolved and slightly 
more than half of all divorces involve children under the age of 18 (Amato, 2000). The 
proportion of marriages ending in divorce in the U.S. has also historically been high, 
equaling at least 30 percent since the 1960s (Schoen et al., 1985). Furthermore, one out of 
every 20 children in the U.S. aged 15 or younger suffers the loss of one or both parents 
(Owens, 2008). Therefore, given their prevalence and documented impact, it is important 
to examine whether and how these experiences relate to the investment decisions that can 
affect the allocation of capital in financial markets. 
Our study builds on two strands of literature. First, the social psychology literature, 
based on seminal work by Freud (1953) and Bronfenbrenner (1979), suggests that a 
person’s early-life family environment plays an essential role in forming his or her 
personality and preferences. Second, recent finance studies find that “nature” (genetic 
predisposition) and “nurture” (environmental factors) influence investment behavior, in 






substantially determine the intergenerational transmission of risk-taking behavior. Barnea, 
Cronqvist, and Siegel (2010) and Cesarini et al. (2010) show that genetic factors explain 
at most one-third of the cross-sectional variation in risk-taking, leaving significant 
variation to be explained by environmental factors. Indeed, recent evidence suggests that 
environmental treatments, such as cultural heritage or the experience of recessions or 
natural disasters, can have persistent effects even on highly educated CEOs (Malmendier, 
Tate, and Yan, 2011; Bernile, Bhagwat, and Rau, 2017; Pan, Siegel, and Wang, 2020). 
However, the evidence on lasting early-life shocks to the family of the professional is 
limited. The few existing studies on the role of the manager’s family examine short-term 
economic effects of changes to either the family of choice, i.e., the family created by choice 
of partner (e.g., Roussanov and Savor, 2014; Cronqvist and Yu, 2017), or the family of 
origin, i.e., the family the subject is born into (e.g., Liu et al., 2019). The lack of evidence 
on the long-term effects arising from the family of origin is surprising given that it is the 
“most important and enduring of all human social groupings” (Smith et al., 2009, p.5). We 
provide some of the first evidence on the lasting role that specific early-life family factors 
can play for the investment behavior of finance professionals. 
Laudenbach, Malmendier, and Niessen-Ruenzi (2019) argue that long-lasting effects 
of imprinting experiences are likely to have deep biological foundations. The medical 
literature corroborates this argument by pointing out that these experiences may create 
deep-seated cognitive effects that cannot simply be undone with education or training. 
Nonetheless, there is mixed evidence on the directions of these effects in the literature 
on family disruption. On the one hand, medical studies provide evidence that both parental 
death and divorce in childhood have a long-lasting effect on the hypothalamic-pituitary-
adrenal (HPA) axis, a major neuroendocrine system in our body that controls reactions to 
stress. As a result, early-life family disruption can lead to emotional syndromes of post-
traumatic stress in adulthood, particularly vulnerability to future loss (Mireault and Bond, 
1992), lower self-esteem (Lutzke et al., 1997), and an increased level of anxiety (Kendler 
et al., 1992). Anxiety, in turn, increases people’s risk aversions (Loewenstein et al., 2011; 






effect. Hirshleifer (2015) argues that self-esteem is a key driver of the disposition effect 
and Chang, Solomon, and Westerfield (2016) find that the disposition effect reverses when 
investors can assign blame not to themselves but to others. This literature therefore points 
to the conclusion that investors who experienced early-life family disruption exhibit a 
stronger disposition effect and take less risk compared to their untreated peers. 
On the other hand, there is also a body of literature that finds evidence of post-traumatic 
growth (Tedeschi and Calhoun, 2004). Some children can grow personally as they face 
divorce-related challenges (Gately and Schwebel, 1992) and develop, for instance, higher 
levels of self-confidence (Mack, 2001). Further, Maier and Lachman (2000) find that the 
early death of a parent can cause men to have more confidence in their own opinions. As 
people with high levels of self-confidence believe more in themselves and are not easily 
swayed by risk, they may be more likely to make riskier choices (Chuang et al., 2013) and 
may be less subject to the disposition effect. 
Ex ante, therefore, it is not clear whether the effects of post-traumatic stress outweigh 
the effects of post-traumatic growth or vice versa, or if they cancel each other out on 
average. Furthermore, changes in parenting due to family disruption may add to the 
emotional experiences of affected children and may also directly affect investment 
behavior later in life, again with an unclear direction. Hence, in this study, we address the 
open empirical question of whether investors from disrupted families show different 
investment behaviors than their untreated cohorts.29 
Following the procedure described in Chuprinin and Sosyura (2018), we first hand-
collect information on fund managers’ family backgrounds and their parents’ deaths and 
 
29 Besides the emotional channel, family disruption may also affect people’s investment behavior through 
changes to the socioeconomic status and wealth of the family. We address this channel in several analyses 
and find consistent support for the emotional channel. We note that observational data on family experiences 
does not allow to identify all specific channels as thoroughly as experimental data (see the discussions in 
Malmendier and Nagel, 2011, and Kuhnen and Knutson, 2011). Nevertheless, we contribute to the literature 
by showing that the stability of the family during childhood relates significantly to investor behavior later in 






marital status from various sources, such as the U.S. Census, other federal and state 
records, and historical newspaper articles. We find that the investment behavior of fund 
managers who experienced early-life family disruption, defined as the death or divorce of 
the parent(s) before the age of 20, indeed differs significantly from their untreated cohorts, 
in a manner consistent with the symptoms of long-seated traumatic childhood stress. 
Specifically, we find that treated fund managers exhibit a significantly stronger disposition 
effect. They also reduce total fund risk by up to 20 percent (relative to the mean) after 
assuming office. The reduction in fund risk manifests in less idiosyncratic and market risk 
and a lower tracking error of the funds they manage. 
Our results are based on regressions including various fixed effects, such as fund 
(and/or fund family) fixed effects as well as manager birth cohort and birth state fixed 
effects. The latter two account for managers who grew up during different times or in 
different U.S. states and may have been subject to different factors influencing their 
investment behavior, such as different economic conditions (Malmendier and Nagel, 
2011), different crime rates, and different likelihoods of family disruption. 
Our results are upheld when we additionally control for a broad set of socioeconomic 
and family background measures, including age and country of birth of the parents, their 
homeowner status, and occupation (e.g., whether both parents were working) as well as 
the fund manager’s number of siblings and whether he or she is a first-born. In contrast to 
our family disruption measure, none of these measures consistently explain the difference 
in investment behavior. Our results are robust to the use of both coarsened exact matching 
and propensity score matching methodologies to further address concerns of omitted 
variable bias. To the best of our knowledge, this analysis provides the first comprehensive 
picture of the relationship between investment behavior and family background measures, 
while controlling for confounding socioeconomic effects. Specifically, we find no 
indication that the effect of family disruption varies depending on the wealth of the fund 
manager’s family. This finding speaks to an emotional channel (i.e., persistent stress 
symptoms) and further mitigates concerns of an unobserved socioeconomic channel, 






indication that our results are driven by fund managers providing (financial) support for 
their bereaved parents. 
In additional analyses, we investigate whether treated managers trade differently in 
reaction to events that unexpectedly increase the risk and uncertainty of their investee 
firms. We find that they are significantly more likely to sell shares of investee firms that 
exhibit exogenous CEO turnover (using data from Eisfeldt and Kuhnen, 2013) and make 
takeover announcements. For takeovers, the effect is most pronounced for high-risk deals 
involving foreign or non-public targets. This analysis allows us to examine how managers 
react to arguably unforeseeable firm events after the fund-manager matching took place. It 
also allows us to control for fund manager-stock fixed effects which account for managers’ 
nonrandom selection of stocks and unobserved heterogeneity, i.e., time-invariant manager 
characteristics and previous experiences. 
To provide a more nuanced understanding of early-life family disruptions and to 
address further concerns regarding identification, we exploit heterogeneity in disruption 
events. Specifically, we separately examine parental deaths and divorces as well as 
unexpected deaths and deaths of non-working mothers. Difficult parental relations might, 
for example, cause a divorce and simultaneously affect children’s investment behavior 
later in life. However, our results remain significant for each of the four event types. These 
tests also provide further evidence that a wealth shock caused by parental death is unlikely 
to drive our results given that deaths of non-working mothers arguably do not constitute 
significant shocks to family wealth or socioeconomic status. This conclusion is supported 
when we restrict the sample to those deaths that involve children of school age and 
bereaved parents who had at least the same level of education as their deceased spouses. 
In these cases, the bereaved parent is arguably more likely to compensate for the financial 
loss induced by a parental death. Overall, the evidence supports the view that the trauma 
of family disruption relates to investment behavior later in life. 
We additionally investigate moderators that potentially cause variations in treatment 
intensity across treated managers and may affect the strength of the link between family 






disruption during their formative years, i.e., age 5-15 (Bernile, Bhagwat, and Rau, 2017), 
to managers who had similar experiences during their non-formative years (0-4 or 16-19 
years). We also exploit variation in social support and welfare using the fraction of people 
with a religious denomination in the county where a manager’s family lived at the time of 
the parental death or divorce. We find a significantly stronger association between family 
disruption and fund risk when the disruption occurred during the fund manager’s formative 
years or when the family had less social support. The disposition effect is also stronger in 
case of less social support, while we find a similar association for formative and non-
formative years. Importantly, the results for both risk-taking and the disposition effect 
reverse if social support is very high. Hence, there are instances in which early-life family 
disruption is associated with more risk-taking and a lower disposition effect, consistent 
with post-traumatic growth promoted by social support. The results imply that the 
moderators for early-life family disruption are relevant and further speak to a long-lasting 
emotional channel through which it affects investment behavior. They also mitigate 
endogeneity concerns as any omitted variable would have to show similar patterns. 
Finally, we investigate whether the existence of a skill gap between managers who 
experienced early-life family disruption and those who did not might explain our results. 
We examine active share as a measure of manager skill, as suggested by Cremers and 
Petajisto (2009), as well as risk-adjusted performance. Our tests do not indicate a skill gap. 
Treated managers are not less active, nor do they perform better or worse than their 
untreated cohorts. The performance result is consistent with evidence suggesting that the 
disposition effect does not relate to fund performance (Cici, 2012). 
Our study is broadly related to two papers, which are also concerned with fund 
managers’ family of origin. Chuprinin and Sosyura (2018) establish a link between the 
socioeconomic status of the family of origin and the performance of mutual fund managers. 
Using a similar data source to ours, they find that fund managers born from poor families 
outperform managers born from rich families, arguing that unlike managers from rich 
families, managers born poor are promoted only if they outperform, as they lack the 






we show evidence that an emotional channel relates early-life family conditions to 
investment behavior, even after accounting for the family’s socioeconomic status. In a 
concurrent working paper, Liu et al. (2019) exploit the deaths of managers’ parents to study 
whether bereavement has a direct and immediate impact on investment decisions. We 
address a fundamentally different research question from Liu et al. (2019). Instead of 
asking whether bereavement events during managers’ tenures have short-term effects on 
investment behavior, we ask whether there is a long-term association between investment 
behavior and traumatic early-life events. 
Our study contributes to two strands of the literature. First, we contribute to the 
emerging literature on social finance, particularly to recent research on the financial 
consequences of societal phenomena. Hirshleifer (2015, p. 151) argues that “there is a need 
to move from behavioral to social finance” and calls for more research on how social 
aspects relate to financial behavior. We document that an early-life disruption of the family 
of origin, an event that many children are subject to, is associated with investors’ behavior 
later in life. Furthermore, we provide evidence that the reasons to exhibit behavioral biases, 
in this case the disposition effect, may sometimes lie far back in childhood.30 
Second, our study contributes to the literature on the role that environmental treatments, 
particularly “nurture,” play in explaining differences in investment behavior (e.g., Barnea, 
Cronqvist, and Siegel, 2010; Cesarini et al., 2010). In contrast with existing studies, we 
unravel the family backgrounds of investors using comprehensive data on fund managers’ 
families of origin to enhance our understanding of the factors of “nurture” and relate them 
not only to financial risk-taking but also to the disposition effect. Our results suggest that 
the (in)stability of the family, rather than specific features of the family environment, 
consistently relates to investment behavior later in life. 
 
30 We cannot directly test the role of feelings in contrast to Kuhnen and Knutson (2011). Yet, our study is 
one of the few papers to indicate that social experiences, which are associated with changes in people’s 






5.2 Motivation and theoretical underpinning 
Psychological research posits that the early-life family background plays an essential role 
in forming people’s personalities and preferences (e.g., Freud, 1953; Bronfenbrenner, 
1979; Bornstein, 2015). In this context, attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980) 
focuses on the role that early attachments play in the development of the individual. Central 
to this theory is the idea that a disruption of the bond between a child and his or her 
attachment figures has important implications for the child’s subsequent development. It 
is thus not surprising that psychologists rank parental deaths and parental divorces among 
the most severe experiences that children can make (Monoghan, Robinson, and Dodge, 
1979), and that the causes of family disruption are often seen as traumatic turning points 
in children’s lives (Rutter, 1996). 
Ample evidence from developmental psychology indicates that experiencing early-life 
family disruption has extremely long-lasting effects on personality and well-being (Amato 
and Keith, 1991; Tennant, 1991; Parsons, 2011; Ellis, Dowrick, and Lloyd-Williams, 
2013; Flèche, Lekfuangfu, and Clark, 2019). Medical research suggests channels that drive 
these long-term effects: Parental death and divorce in childhood increase psychological 
distress in adulthood due to a dysregulation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) 
axis, which affects people’s cortisol levels (e.g., Nicolson, 2004; Bloch et al., 2007). 
Further, Meinlschmidt and Heim (2007) show an altered central sensitivity to the effects 
of oxytocin, which is relevant to protect against stress, after early parental separation, and 
Luecken and Appelhans (2005) find that parental loss or divorce increases the risk of 
affective disorder into adulthood. Accordingly, early-life family disruptions act as chronic 
stressors for individuals (Vezzetti, 2008), often leading to symptoms of post-traumatic 
stress (see also Stoppelbein and Greening, 2000). 
As a result, individuals who experienced early-life family disruption show greater 
vulnerability to future loss (Mireault and Bond, 1992), lower self-esteem (Lutzke et al., 
1997; Ellis, Dowrick, and Lloyd-Williams, 2013), and higher levels of anxiety (Bifulco et 






anxiety, in turn, affect people’s long-term behavior (Engelmann et al., 2015). Specifically, 
anxiety has been shown to increase risk aversion (Loewenstein et al., 2011; Kuhnen and 
Knutson, 2005; Maner and Schmidt, 2006; Maner et al., 2007), even after controlling for 
beliefs (Kuhnen and Knutson, 2011). Consequently, investors who experienced early-life 
family disruption can be expected to take less risk. 
Apart from risk-taking, enhanced vulnerability to future loss and lower self-esteem can 
be expected to relate to people’s reluctance to realize losses and hence to the disposition 
effect. While several previous studies provide evidence that even investment professionals 
are subject to this investment bias (e.g., Frazzini, 2006), Hirshleifer (2015) notes that the 
origins of the disposition effect are relatively unexplored. Hirshleifer also argues that the 
fact that the disposition effect is reversed when investors can shift the blame onto others 
(Chang, Solomon, and Westerfield, 2016) indicates that people’s urge to maintain their 
self-esteem is a key driver of the effect. Hence, we expect investors to be more prone to 
the disposition effect if they experienced early-life family disruption because it leads to 
reduced self-esteem and increased vulnerability to future loss. 
Nonetheless, there is also limited evidence for post-traumatic growth (Tedeschi and 
Calhoun, 2004). In the case of parental divorce, children may develop competencies and 
grow personally as they undertake divorce-related challenges (Bernstein and Robey, 1962; 
Gately and Schwebel, 1992). Mack (2001) reports that adults who experienced parental 
divorce in childhood have higher levels of self-confidence than adults raised in intact 
families. Similarly, Maier and Lachman (2000) find that the early death of a parent can 
cause men to have more confidence in their own opinion. Individuals with high self-
confidence, in turn, believe more in themselves and are not easily swayed by risk, which 
makes them more likely to make riskier choices (Chuang et al., 2013). Thus, post-traumatic 
growth may also affect investment behavior by fostering risk-taking and by mitigating the 
disposition effect via enhanced self-confidence. 
Taken together, given the evidence for both post-traumatic stress and post-traumatic 
growth, the literature does not unambiguously predict whether family disruption leads to 






open empirical question whether early-life family disruption has a long-term influence on 
investors’ risk-taking behavior and the disposition effect later in life. Addressing this 
question and providing a first understanding of how family disruption relates to investment 
behavior is important, even beyond just the finance literature. 
5.3 Data, methodology, and summary statistics 
5.3.1 Data 
5.3.1.1 Mutual fund and manager data 
To construct our initial sample, we obtain information on fund managers from Morningstar 
Direct for the period from 1980 to 2017.31 Morningstar reports the name of each manager 
of a fund and provides information on the manager’s education, employment history, and 
the start and end date with a fund. We limit our sample to US-domiciled equity funds 
(active and defunct) by filtering the U.S. Category Group for “US Equity.” We exclude 
index, sector, and specialty funds. A fund share class is only included in our sample if its 
Morningstar style and CUSIP are available. We obtain fund characteristics and returns 
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Survivor Bias-Free Mutual Fund 
Database. We use the fund’s CUSIP to match Morningstar and CRSP data and combine 
share classes using MFLINKS. We obtain fund return data and fund characteristics from 
CRSP. These data include the fund’s expense ratio, turnover ratio, total net assets (TNA), 
fund family size, and a fund's first offer date. Return, expense ratio, and turnover ratio are 
the TNA-weighted averages across all fund share classes. We obtain portfolio holdings 
data from the Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund Holdings database, which we merge with the 
CRSP mutual fund data using MFLINKS. To establish a clean correspondence between a 
fund manager’s family background and mutual fund risk, we exclude team-managed fund 
 
31 We choose Morningstar Direct as the source for fund manager information as it is more accurate than 






years and years in which a fund is managed by more than one manager. We obtain a sample 
of 2,139 managers who pass these initial criteria. 
Next, we obtain the most complete version of a fund manager’s name, including the 
full middle name and suffixes, drawing on the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
(FINRA) investment adviser registration records. We use the employment history provided 
in FINRA to validate the accuracy of a match. We then complement our data on education 
with information from Bloomberg, Capital IQ, funds’ SEC filings, employer websites, 
managers’ LinkedIn profiles, and Marquis Who's Who records. We manually search for a 
manager in each of these sources and only add information to our sample if we verify a 
match using the full name and employment history of the manager. Sometimes we are also 
able to obtain the names of a fund manager’s parents, e.g., from Marquis Who’s Who. 
Finally, we gather information on the manager’s year of birth. For managers without 
information on age or birth year from the above sources, we search in the 1992 edition of 
Nelson's Directory of Investment Managers. For a minority of managers for whom we 
cannot detect the birth year, we follow Chevalier and Ellison (1999) and approximate it 
using the graduation year. 
5.3.1.2 Family background data 
Our main source of data for information on fund managers' family backgrounds are federal 
and state records. For the collection of family background data, we limit our sample to 
managers born in 1949 or earlier. The reason for this restriction is twofold. First, we require 
that the latest available U.S. decennial census - the main data source for family control 
variables - accurately reflects a manager's familial situation. The U.S. government does 
not release personally identifiable information about individuals until 72 years after it was 
collected for the decennial census (“72-Year Rule”; 92 Stat. 915; Public Law 95-416; 
October 5, 1978). Thus, the latest decennial census with personally identifiable 
information available is the 1940 federal census. Second, by restricting our sample to older 
fund managers, we ensure that most of the parents are deceased so that we can identify the 
year of death of the parents. This filter restricts the sample to 615 managers. Investigating 






families were therefore not covered in the U.S. Census. After eliminating these cases, we 
arrive at 579 fund managers with potential census records. 
To identify personal census records for the households in which fund managers grew 
up, we apply the data collection procedure described in Chuprinin and Sosyura (2018) with 
some minor modifications. We provide a detailed description of our data collection 
methodology in the appendix. We are able to find the households’ census records for 538 
(93 percent) of our 579 fund managers. This share is essentially the same as in Chuprinin 
and Sosyura (2018). In terms of the number of fund managers, our sample compares well 
with extant studies on (older) fund managers, for example, Chevalier and Ellison (1999) 
(492 managers), Chuprinin and Sosyura (2018) (387), Hong and Kostovetsky (2012) (600), 
and Liu et al. (2019) (471). 
The decennial federal census provides information on the home value or rent of each 
household, the number of household members, their age, class of work (employee, self-
employed, government worker, etc.), education, income, occupation, state of birth, and 
their relation to the household’s head. We use this information to search for the manager’s 
parents in state and federal databases accessed through the genealogy research service 
Ancestry.com. We identify the mother’s and father’s year of death by screening death 
records using their full name, birth state, year of birth, and place of residence obtained 
from the census. When we find a match, we search for the person’s obituary in local and 
state newspapers on Newspaper.com (the world’s largest online newspaper archive) and 
on Legacy.com (the largest commercial provider of online memorials) to obtain additional 
information about the deceased parents. Obituaries typically mention the deceased parent’s 
spouses and other family members. To verify a potential match, we require the obituary to 
mention the name of the fund manager and the names of other relatives listed in the 
household’s census record. This procedure nearly eliminates the possibility of a spurious 
match as the identified obituary contains the unique combination of a parent’s name, birth 
state, year of birth, name of spouse and children as well as other relatives mentioned in the 
census. We are able to identify the death years of 1,025 manager parents (502 mothers and 






mitigates the concern that our data collection is biased, as newspapers and other public 
sources may be more likely to report the death of parents from wealthier or more well-
known families, for example. We do not remove managers from the sample if we are 
unable to identify the death records of both parents since some parents may still be alive. 
To identify parental divorces, we screen death records and obituaries of parents for the 
following signals: a name of a spouse of a parent that is different from the name reported 
in the census, a reference to a divorce, separation, or new marriage, a reference to a step-
child, or a male child with a different last name. Our (almost) complete set of death records 
and obituaries of parents again mitigates the concern that our data collection is biased 
toward wealthier or more well-known families. If we find any indication for a divorce, we 
search for a divorce record on Ancestry.com and screen local newspapers for a notification 
about a divorce, a custody, or a maintenance dispute. We verify matches using the names 
of all relatives and the locations mentioned in these documents. In some cases, we can 
directly identify a divorce from the U.S. Census if the marital status of a fund manager’s 
parent in the census is “divorced.” 
We obtain further data from several other sources. First, we complement and verify 
information on fund managers’ education using college yearbooks. Second, we extend our 
information on parental occupations to years after the census using historical U.S. city 
directories from the locations of the parents’ census records. We identify parents in the 
city directories using their names and addresses from the census record. College yearbooks 
and city directories are accessible via Ancestry.com. Third, to compare parents of fund 
managers to other U.S. households, we retrieve anonymized household census data from 
the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS). Using the IPUMS data, we construct 
state-level medians for male income, rent, and home value. Fourth, we obtain county-level 
data on the membership in religious bodies throughout the United States for the year 1952 
from the American Religion Data Archive. 
Overall, our final sample comprises 569 funds for which we have information on 
whether a fund manager experienced an early-life family disruption or not and for which 






accounts for 25 percent of all assets of single-managed domestic equity funds in the median 
sample year, i.e., 1998. This share is significantly higher in earlier years (up to 73 percent) 
and decreases over the more recent years of the sample, e.g., 15 percent in the 2008 
financial crisis. The 569 funds account for 4,839 fund years. Because we are not able to 
obtain data on all fund and manager characteristics for all these fund years, most of our 
empirical analyses on fund-year level are based on fewer observations. 
5.3.2 Methodology and key variables 
To examine whether a long-term association between early-life family disruption and fund 
manager investment behavior exists, we conduct regressions using the baseline model 
shown in equation (5.1): 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐵𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑟𝑗𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽 × 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡 + Г1 × 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗𝑡−1 + Г2 × 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛿 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡 
(5.1) 
where j and t index funds and years (or quarters), respectively; δ stands for fixed effects.  
Consistent with the theoretical underpinning and predictions of this study, we use the 
following measures of investment behavior as our main dependent variables. First, we use 
four measures of fund risk. The primary risk measure, Total Risk, is the standard deviation 
of monthly gross returns during the year. We decompose Total Risk into its idiosyncratic 
component, i.e., Idiosyncratic Risk, and its systematic component, i.e., Market Risk, by 
estimating a market model using the monthly gross returns of a fund and the value-
weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks. Market Risk is the estimated 
β from this model, while Idiosyncratic Risk is the standard deviation of the estimated 
residuals, i.e., the root-mean-squared error. Finally, since the tracking error is an important 
metric to assess portfolio risk in the mutual fund industry, we retrieve quarterly data on the 
tracking error of funds from Antti Petajisto’s website for the period 1980-2009. Tracking 






return of its benchmark index and is a proxy for systematic factor bets (Cremers and 
Petajisto, 2009). 
To assess the extent to which funds exhibit the disposition effect, we follow prior 
studies (e.g., Odean, 1998; Frazzini, 2006; Cici, 2012) and calculate the variable 
Disposition Effect as the difference between the proportion of realized gains and realized 
losses for each fund in each quarter. We use the average purchase price as the cost basis. 
A fund that is prone to the disposition effect will disproportionately realize more gains 
than losses, and the variable Disposition Effect will take on larger and positive values. The 
appendix provides detailed definitions of all variables used in this study. 
Our main explanatory variable of interest is Family Disruption. This indicator variable 
equals one if a fund manager experienced either the death of a parent or the divorce of his 
or her parents before the age of 20 and zero otherwise. We use parental deaths and divorces 
as the two events that mark the disruption of a manager's family as both are viewed by 
psychologists as the most severe events that can happen in an individual’s childhood and 
adolescence (Monoghan, Robinson, and Dodge, 1979; Rutter, 1996). We choose the age 
of 0-19 years for two reasons: first, to measure the influence of family disruption 
throughout a manager’s entire childhood and teenage years and, second, because children 
typically leave their parents’ households at the age of 19 or younger to attend college or, 
generally, to gain greater independence from their parents. 
Our baseline regression model includes two sets of control variables covering fund and 
fund manager characteristics. Fund characteristics include the variables Fund Age, Fund 
Size, Fund Family Size, Avg. Monthly Return, Expense Ratio, and Turnover Ratio. 
Manager characteristics include the variables Manager Age and Manager Tenure and the 
indicator variables Female, Ivy League, MBA, and PhD. We define all the above variables 
in line with the existing literature. Manager characteristics also include controls for a 
manager’s family background, i.e., Parental Education and Family Wealth, as social class 
relates to managerial risk-taking (Kish-Gephart and Campbell, 2015). For the former, we 
follow Chuprinin and Sosyura (2018) and measure the education of parents as their average 






parent attended college, 2 if the parent attended high school but not college, 1 if the parent 
attended elementary school but not high school, and 0 if the parent has no formal education. 
We construct Family Wealth as a measure for the socioeconomic status of a fund manager's 
family during his childhood. It is defined as the income of a manager’s father reported in 
the census record, if the record is available and if the father worked for at least 20 full-time 
equivalent weeks during the previous year. If not, it is defined as the father’s home value 
or rent. Imposing a minimum of 20 full-time equivalent weeks effectively excludes part-
time or irregular jobs. In a small number of cases in which neither income nor rent or home 
value is available for the father, we use the mother’s home value or rent. As in Chuprinin 
and Sosyura (2018), income is expressed in multiples of the state median male income in 
the state of the household, and rent and home value are expressed in multiples of their state 
medians. 
All continuous (dependent and explanatory) fund variables are winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentiles. Time-varying explanatory variables enter the regressions with one lag. 
Furthermore, all regressions include time fixed effects and are complemented with varying 
other fixed effects (FE), i.e., fund FE, fund family FE, investment style FE, manager birth 
cohort FE (based on decades), and manager birth state FE. We explain the specific use of 
different fixed effects as well as two matching approaches, coarsened exact matching and 
propensity score matching, in Section 5.4.4. Standard errors are clustered at the fund 
manager level to allow for serial correlation resulting from unobservable managerial 
characteristics, as in Chuprinin and Sosyura (2018). 
For robustness purposes and to compare the importance of family disruption to 
measures of socioeconomic status and family background, we conduct further regressions 
based on an extended regression model. Specifically, we complement the regression model 
in equation (5.1) by two sets of additional variables. The first set of additional variables 
are indicators related to the occupation of managers’ parents: (i) Parent Self-employed 
equals one if at least one of the fund manager’s parents worked on his or her own account 
or was an employer according to the “class of worker” item in the census, (ii) Parent 






financial industry, i.e., banking, insurance, investment, or real estate, (iii) Father Blue-
collar Worker, which equals one if the father’s job involved manual labor, e.g., in the 
manufacturing, mining, or farming industry, and (iv) Both Parents Working, which equals 
one if both parents were working according to their census records. 
The second group of variables relates to the lives of fund managers at home during 
their childhood: (v) Firstborn is an indicator equal to one if a manager is the firstborn child, 
(vi) Number of Siblings indicates a manager’s number of siblings, (vii) Avg. Parental Age 
at Manager’s Birth measures the average age of the parents at the time of the fund 
manager’s birth, (viii) Parents’ Age Difference measures the absolute age difference 
between the father and the mother, (ix) Parent Born Outside U.S. is an indicator equaling 
one if at least one of the parents of a manager migrated to the U.S., and (x) Parent 
Homeowner equals one if a parent lived in a house that was not rented but owned by the 
residents according to the census record. Finally, we add the indicator variable Manager 
Works for Home State Fund, which equals one if a fund is managed by a fund manager 
whose home state is the state in which the fund firm is located. 
We also use the baseline regression model to examine whether family disruption relates 
to fund manager skill using three different dependent variables. Specifically, instead of the 
measures discussed above, we use the following variables on the left-hand side of equation 
(5.1): Active Share (Cremers and Petajisto, 2009) as well as measures of risk-adjusted 
performance, i.e., Alpha (one-factor alpha) and Sharpe Ratio. We define these variables in 
the appendix and discuss the regressions in Section 5.5. 
5.3.3 Summary statistics 
Table 5.1 presents the summary statistics for our sample. We provide statistics for the total 
sample as well as for the two subsamples of treated and untreated fund managers (i.e., 
Family Disruption = 1 vs. 0) and report t-statistics for tests of mean differences between 
the two subsamples. In 15.1% (or 732) of all fund years, a fund is managed by a manager 







Table 5.1: Summary statistics 
Panel A: Time-invariant manager characteristics (on manager level) 
 Total  Family Disruption = 1  Family Disruption = 0  Difference in means  
Variable Mean  Mean  Mean  t-statistic 
Avg. Parental Age at Manager's Birth  30.459   32.153   30.224   -2.05  
Birth Year of Manager  1941   1940   1941   0.85  
Both Parents Working  0.190   0.136   0.198   1.27  
Family Wealth  2.705   3.096   2.650   -0.98  
Father Blue-collar Worker  0.270   0.255   0.272   0.25  
Female  0.048   0.034   0.049   0.60  
Firstborn  0.546   0.421   0.564   2.03  
Ivy League  0.312   0.271   0.318   0.74  
MBA  0.545   0.542   0.546   0.05  
Number of Siblings  1.782   1.667   1.798   0.61  
Parents Age Difference  4.005   5.542   3.805   -2.13  
Parental Education  2.373   2.305   2.382   0.81  
Parent Born Outside U.S.  0.127   0.145   0.124   -0.42  
Parent Homeowner  0.558   0.559   0.558   -0.02  
Parents Self-employed  0.143   0.203   0.134   -1.25  
Parents Worked in Finance  0.167   0.153   0.169   0.33  









Panel B: Family disruption and time-varying manager and fund characteristics (on fund-year level) 
 
Total  Family Disruption = 1  Family Disruption = 0  
Difference in 
means 
Variable N Mean P50  N Mean  N Mean  t-statistic 
Manager characteristics 
Family Disruption 4,839 0.151   732   4,107    
Manager Age 4,839 54.799 55.000  732 56.148  4,107 54.558  -4.18 
Manager Tenure 4,839 7.579 5.083  732 8.241  4,107 7.461  -2.44 
Fund characteristics            
Total Risk 4,839 0.045 0.041  732 0.043  4,107 0.046  3.13 
Idiosyncratic Risk 4,837 0.020 0.016  731 0.020  4,106 0.020  -0.14 
Market Risk 4,839 0.979 0.955  732 0.932  4,107 0.987  4.20 
Avg. Monthly Return 4,742 0.009 0.011  718 0.009  4,024 0.009  0.04 
Expense Ratio 4,742 0.012 0.012  718 0.013  4,024 0.012  -3.75 
Fund Age 4,836 15.469 10.167  729 17.105  4,107 15.178  -2.74 
Fund Size 4,796 4.680 4.671  726 4.718  4,070 4.673  -0.55 
Fund Family Size 4,796 6.172 6.924  726 6.080  4,070 6.188  0.78 







Panel C: Portfolio activities (on fund-quarter level) 
 Total 
Family 
Disruption = 1 
Family  




Variable N Mean P50 N Mean N Mean t-statistic 
Active Share 9,482 0.849 0.878 1,335 0.846 8,147 0.850 1.10 
Disposition Effect 15,256 -0.016 0.000 2,341 0.008 12,915 -0.021 -8.19 
Tracking Error 9,479 0.077 0.064 1,332 0.074 8,147 0.077 3.31 
 
Panel D: Parental deaths 
Cause of death Share of treated managers (%) 
Accident  2.3 
Died during military service 4.7 
Long-term disease 18.6 
Sudden illness 23.3 
Unreported but sudden 23.3 
Unreported other 27.9 
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the variables used in this study. The sample period is 
1980-2017. Summary statistics on manager level for time-invariant manager characteristics are shown 
in Panel A. Panel B reports summary statistics on fund-year level for family disruption as well as time-
varying manager and fund characteristics. Panel C reports summary statistics on fund-quarter level for 
variables of portfolio activity. Fund characteristics, except for fund age, and measures of portfolio 
activities are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Summary statistics are shown for the total 
sample and for the subsamples of managers who did and did not experience early-life family disruption 
(Family Disruption = 1 vs. 0). The last column reports the t-statistics for difference-in-means tests 
between the two subsamples. Panel D provides an overview of the causes of parental deaths that lead 
to family disruption for those cases with available information. If both parents died early, the cause of 
death for the first deceased parent is reported. 
 
Panel A shows the statistics for time-invariant fund manager characteristics, including 
the manager’s birth year, education (i.e., Ivy League, MBA, PhD), and gender as well as 
his or her family background. Treated and untreated managers do not significantly differ 
in terms of most of these characteristics. The typical treated and untreated managers were 
born around the same time (1940 vs. 1941) and have comparable levels of education (54 






parents also have similar educational backgrounds, occupations, and wealth. Statistically 
significant differences only exist for three characteristics: treated managers are less likely 
to be firstborns, the age difference of their parents is, on average, slightly larger, and their 
parents are marginally older at the manager’s birth. 
Panel B reports summary statistics for time-varying manager and fund characteristics 
at the fund-year level. Treated managers are marginally older and have marginally longer 
tenures. There are also significant differences across a number of dimensions for fund 
characteristics. Specifically, treated and untreated managers differ in terms of the age of 
the funds they manage and the funds’ expense ratios. The (family) size, performance, and 
turnover ratios of the funds are not significantly different across the two groups. 
Importantly, treated managers are associated with significantly lower total fund risk and 
lower market risk. Hence, managers who experienced early-life family disruption appear 
to be associated with less risky funds. Panel C reports summary statistics at the fund-
quarter level. Consistent with Panel B, treated managers’ portfolios have a significantly 
lower Tracking Error. The mean Disposition Effect for the total sample of funds is negative 
indicating that mutual funds realize, on average, more losses than gains, which is consistent 
with prior findings by Sialm and Starks (2012). Interestingly, funds managed by treated 
fund managers have, on average, a positive Disposition Effect suggesting that they realize 
disproportionately more gains than losses. The difference in the Disposition Effect between 
funds managed by treated and untreated managers is significant. 
Finally, Panel D of Table 5.1 provides an overview of the types of parental deaths that 
caused early-life family disruption. These deaths occurred between 1927 and 1964. We are 
able to identify the cause of death for more than 70 percent of all deaths. Only a few parents 
died during military service or because they suffered from a long-term disease such as 
hypertension or skin cancer. Most parents died suddenly, either due to an accident or due 
to sudden illness, e.g. pneumonia or stroke, or for any other unknown reason reported to 
have occurred suddenly. Hence, the majority of all deaths for which we can identify a cause 






Figure 5.1: Distribution of fund manager birth states and fund locations 
 
Notes: This figure illustrates the geographical dispersion of fund managers’ states of birth and the locations of mutual fund firms. The shading of 







To illustrate the wide geographical dispersion of our data points, Figure 5.1 depicts the 
distribution of fund managers’ states of birth and the locations of mutual fund firms across 
the U.S. Importantly, the figure does not indicate any unusual clustering of birth states or 
fund locations. As expected, mutual funds are located in states with larger populations and 
these states are also more likely to be birth states of fund managers, for instance, New York 
(80 managers in total, 9 treated managers), Massachusetts (48, 3), Pennsylvania (44, 6), 
Ohio (33, 6), Illinois (31, 2), and California (23, 2). 
5.4 Early-life family disruption, the disposition effect, and risk-taking 
In this section, we investigate the relationship of early-life family disruption with the 
disposition effect and risk-taking of fund managers. Section 5.4.1 presents evidence on the 
disposition effect, Section 5.4.2 discusses results on risk-taking behavior, and Section 5.4.3 
provides evidence on fund managers’ trading behavior in reaction to events that increase 
the risk and uncertainty of their investee firms. In Section 5.4.4, we consider various 
socioeconomic and family background factors and present evidence from two matching 
approaches. Sections 5.4.5 and 5.4.6, respectively, present evidence on different events 
and moderators of family disruption. 
5.4.1 Early-life family disruption and the disposition effect 
The disposition effect describes the greater propensity of individuals to sell stocks when 
they are at a gain than when they are at a loss (Shefrin and Statman, 1985). To analyze the 
prevalence of this investment behavior, we use the variable Disposition Effect, which is 
defined as the difference between the proportion of realized gains and losses for each fund 
in each quarter (e.g., Odean, 1998). 
We regress the variable Disposition Effect on the variable Family Disruption, along 
with fund and manager controls and time fixed effects as described in Section 5.3.2. We 
additionally include varying combinations of other fixed effects to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity across funds and fund managers as well as fund families and investment 






Table 5.2: Early-life family disruption and the disposition effect 
Dependent variable Disposition Effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Family Disruption 0.051***  0.071***  0.076***  0.117***  
 (3.45)  (2.78)  (3.14)  (5.12)  
Female -0.001  0.038*  0.034  0.003  
 (-0.04)  (1.80)  (1.60)  (0.10)  
Manager Age 0.002  0.001  0.001  0.004*  
 (1.06)  (0.50)  (0.73)  (1.76)  
Manager Tenure -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.001  
 (-0.21)  (-0.00)  (-0.05)  (-0.66)  
Ivy League -0.003  -0.022  -0.022  0.003  
 (-0.35)  (-1.14)  (-1.19)  (0.16)  
MBA 0.012  -0.009  -0.008  -0.010  
 (0.99)  (-0.50)  (-0.48)  (-0.57)  
PhD -0.028  -0.008  -0.007  0.021  
 (-1.50)  (-0.26)  (-0.24)  (0.37) 
Parental Education 0.014*  0.025*  0.025*  0.036***  
 (1.85)  (1.86)  (1.82)  (2.59)  
Family Wealth -0.004*  -0.007**  -0.008**  -0.020***  
 (-1.85)  (-2.28)  (-2.52)  (-4.38)  
Fund Age 0.000  -0.018***  -0.019***  -0.021***  
 (0.09)  (-3.56)  (-3.66)  (-3.57) 
Fund Size 0.000  0.007**  0.007**  0.005*  
 (0.04)  (2.47)  (2.27)  (1.70)  
Fund Family Size -0.002  -0.005**  -0.004*  -0.005*  
 (-0.96)  (-2.20)  (-1.73)  (-1.92)  
Avg. Monthly Return -0.213  -0.199  -0.178  -0.205  
 (-1.22)  (-1.15)  (-1.01)  (-1.17)  
Expense Ratio -0.823  -1.170  -1.168  -0.982  
 (-1.01)  (-1.06)  (-1.08)  (-0.91)  
Turnover Ratio -0.015**  0.001  -0.001  -0.001  
 (-2.52)  (0.26)  (-0.28)  (-0.11)  
Fund FE No Yes Yes Yes 
Fund Family FE Yes No Yes No 
Investment Style FE Yes No Yes No 
Birth Cohort FE Yes No No Yes 






Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,290  13,290  13,290  13,290  
Adj. R-squared 0.158  0.195  0.198  0.204  
Notes: This table reports coefficients from regressions of Disposition Effect on Family Disruption with 
controls for manager and fund characteristics (for the previous period). All specifications include year 
fixed effects. Additional fixed effects include fund family FE and fund investment style FE (columns 1 
and 3), fund FE (columns 2 to 4), as well as manager birth cohort FE and manager birth state FE 
(columns 1 and 4). All variables are defined in the appendix. Robust t-statistics (in parentheses) are 
based on standard errors clustered by manager. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 
In column (1), we include fund family and investment style FE as well as fixed effects 
for managers' birth cohorts and birth states. Birth cohort and birth state FE allow us to 
control for the possibility that fund managers who grew up during different times or in 
different U.S. states might have been differentially likely to have witnessed family 
disruption, e.g., because divorce rates have increased over time. Furthermore, fund 
managers from different states might have been subject to different factors that affect their 
investment behavior, such as different (macro)economic and social conditions, e.g., state-
level policies, crime rates, or natural disasters. In column (2), we use fund FE instead of 
fund family and style FE to account for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity across 
funds, while in column (3), we additionally include fund family and investment style FE. 
Fund family and investment style FE, in conjunction with fund FE, address the concern 
that funds change their trading strategy and, simultaneously, hire (or fire) treated fund 
managers as they switch their investment objectives or fund families (typically as the result 
of fund family mergers). In column (4), we use fund, birth cohort, and birth state FE. 
In all four columns, the coefficient on Family Disruption is negative and significant at 
the 1% level. Thus, our estimates indicate that managers who experienced the disruption 
of their families early in their lives exhibit a significantly stronger disposition effect than 
their untreated cohorts. In untabulated robustness tests, we also estimate several other 
regression specifications using varying combinations of fixed effects or no fixed effects at 






statistically significant with comparable coefficient size.32 Moreover, our results remain 
qualitatively similar when we measure the disposition effect via the disposition ratio 
instead of the disposition spread (see, e.g., Odean, 1998; Cici, 2012). 
5.4.2 Early-life family disruption and risk-taking 
To examine whether and how early-life family disruption relates to fund manager risk-
taking, we next regress different measures of fund risk on our variable of interest, Family 
Disruption. We again include varying combinations of fixed effects to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity across funds and fund managers as well as fund families and 
investment styles. The results are shown in Table 5.3. 
Panel A of Table 5.3 presents the results for Total Risk, our main risk measure, and 
parallels the regression specifications shown in Table 5.2. The coefficient on Family 
Disruption is negative and significant at the 5% level in column (1) and at the 1% level in 
columns (2) to (4). The estimates hence suggest that fund managers who experienced early-
life family disruption take significantly less risk than their peers from intact families. 
Assessing the magnitude of the effect, we find that treated fund managers reduce total fund 
risk by up to 20 percent relative to the sample mean, which is economically important. The 
coefficient on Family Disruption is also important on a relative basis given that it is almost 
as large as that for fund manager gender (i.e., females) and one magnitude larger than that 
of a one-decade increase in manager age. As before, we estimate several other regression 
specifications in unreported robustness tests. Across all untabulated tests, the coefficient 
on Family Disruption remains statistically significant and the size of the regression 
coefficient remains virtually unchanged.33  
 
32 The coefficient on Family Disruption remains statistically significant when we use fund investment style 
× time fixed effects, birth cohort × birth state fixed effects, fund family but no fund investment style fixed 
effects, as well as no fixed effects (except for time). The results also remain statistically significant when we 
cluster standard errors on fund level instead of fund manager level. 
33 We use fixed effects similar to those mentioned in the previous footnote. Again, the results also remain 






Table 5.3: Early-life family disruption and risk-taking 
Panel A: Family disruption and total fund risk 
Dependent variable Total Risk 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Family Disruption -0.002**  -0.008***  -0.007***  -0.009***  
 (-2.10)  (-2.87)  (-2.73)  (-3.23)  
Female -0.006***  -0.009*  -0.010**  -0.011***  
 (-2.96)  (-1.86)  (-2.08)  (-3.57)  
Manager Age 0.000  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000  
 (0.69)  (-3.33)  (-2.93)  (-1.23)  
Manager Tenure -0.000**  0.000  0.000  -0.000  
 (-2.07)  (0.50)  (0.39)  (-1.26)  
Ivy League 0.000  0.003  0.003  0.002  
 (0.12)  (1.52)  (1.56)  (1.05)  
MBA 0.000  -0.003*  -0.004**  -0.004**  
 (0.19)  (-1.82)  (-2.14)  (-2.10)  
PhD -0.002  -0.009**  -0.008**  -0.006  
 (-1.25)  (-2.12)  (-2.15)  (-1.09)  
Parental Education 0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.000  
 (1.28)  (-0.67)  (-0.36)  (-0.37)  
Family Wealth -0.000  0.001*  0.001*  0.001*  
 (-0.72)  (1.89)  (1.92)  (1.66)  
Fund Age 0.000  0.613  -7.623  -0.022  
 (0.26)  (0.00)  (-0.00)  (-0.00)  
Fund Size 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
 (1.31)  (0.91)  (1.03)  (0.81)  
Fund Family Size 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
 (0.63)  (0.38)  (0.43)  (0.34)  
Avg. Monthly Return 0.067  0.105**  0.102**  0.105**  
 (1.29)  (2.26)  (2.20)  (2.20)  
Expense Ratio 0.068  0.250  0.213  0.272  
 (0.61)  (1.51)  (1.38)  (1.61)  
Turnover Ratio 0.001*  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  
 (1.65)  (-0.74)  (-1.05)  (-1.07)  
Fund FE No Yes Yes Yes 
Fund Family FE Yes No Yes No 
Investment Style FE Yes No Yes No 






Birth State FE Yes No No Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,929  3,929  3,929  3,929  
Adj. R-squared 0.729  0.764  0.767  0.769  
 
Panel B: Family disruption and other risk measures 
Dependent variables Idiosyncratic Risk  Market Risk  Tracking Error 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Family Disruption -0.006***   -0.199***   -0.030**  
 (-3.19)   (-3.01)   (-2.53)  
All controls as in Panel A Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fund FE Yes  Yes  Yes 
Birth Cohort FE Yes  Yes  Yes 
Birth State FE Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time FE Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 3,929   3,929   8,219  
Adj. R-squared 0.696   0.502   0.618  
Notes: This table explores the difference in risk-taking between managers who grew up in disrupted 
families compared to managers from intact families of origin. Panel A reports results from regressions 
of Total Risk on Family Disruption along with controls for manager and fund characteristics (for the 
previous year). All specifications include year fixed effects. Additional fixed effects include fund family 
FE and fund investment style FE (columns 1 and 3), manager birth cohort FE and manager birth state 
FE (columns 1 and 4) as well as fund FE (column 2 to 4). Panel B reports results from regressions of 
Idiosyncratic Risk (column 1), Market Risk (column 2), and Tracking Error (column 3) on Family 
Disruption along with controls for manager and fund characteristics (for the previous year). All 
specifications include fund FE, manager birth cohort FE and manager birth state FE, as well as year FE. 
All variables are defined in the appendix. Robust t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard 
errors clustered by manager. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
 
In Panel B of Table 5.3, we investigate the influence of family disruption on the 
components of fund risk, i.e., Idiosyncratic Risk, Market Risk, and Tracking Error. The 
specifications in Panel B parallel the one presented in column (4) of Panel A, which 
includes fund, birth cohort, birth state, and year FE. In all specifications in Panel B, the 
coefficient on Family Disruption is negative and significant at the 5% level or better. We 






three risk components. Furthermore, in untabulated tests, we re-estimate our fund risk 
regression model shown in column (4) of Panel A in Table 5.3 with a fund’s semi-deviation 
and upside beta (Whaley, 2002) as dependent variables. We find the coefficient on Family 
Disruption to be negative and significant for both measures. Treated fund managers hence 
appear to reduce both upside and downside potential. 
5.4.3 Reactions to uncertainty-increasing events of investee firms 
Next, we investigate how fund managers who experienced early-life family disruption 
trade in reaction to idiosyncratic increases in risk and uncertainty of their investee firms. 
This analysis, which is motivated by the approach in Pool et al. (2019), is econometrically 
important for two reasons. First, it allows us to examine how managers react to arguably 
unexpected firm events after the fund manager-fund matching takes place. Second, it 
enables us to control for fund manager-stock fixed effects, which account for managers’ 
endogenous selection of stocks. We can hence mitigate potential concerns of endogenous 
fund manager-fund matching, i.e., treated fund managers preferring to manage less risky 
funds or fund boards hiring managers to simply execute their plans of reducing fund risk 
(via selecting lower risk stocks). Importantly, fund manager-stock fixed effects also 
account for any time-invariant manager characteristics, which rules out that unobserved 
(early-life) fund manager experiences or differences in innate talent explain our results. 
Therefore, we are not only able to provide additional insights into the investment behavior 
of treated managers, but we also strengthen the causal link between early-life family 
disruption and investment behavior. 
To examine this trading behavior, we consider two corporate events, exogenous CEO 
turnover and takeover announcements, which are difficult to foresee (consistent with the 
significant stock price reactions to these events). Exogenous CEO turnover is arguably 
unrelated to prior firm performance and increases firms’ risk and uncertainty with regard 
to subsequent CEO-firm match quality and corporate strategy. Takeovers are major 
corporate investments, often with long-term impact on the acquiring firm, which are risky 
in the sense that they can lead to either considerable value creation or value destruction. If 






to be more likely to sell their holdings in firms following exogenous CEO turnover or 
takeover announcements. We examine the reactions of fund managers to these two types 
of events using the regression model in equation (5.2) below: 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑗𝑠𝑡  = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 × 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡 × 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2 × 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑗𝑠𝑡  + Г × 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗𝑡−1 + 𝛿 + 𝜀𝑗𝑠𝑡 
(5.2) 
where j, s, and t index funds, stocks, and holding periods, respectively; δ stands for fixed 
effects. We use Sell and, alternatively, Terminating Sell as the dependent variable. Sell is 
an indicator variable that equals one if a fund sells (as opposed to holds or buys) at least 
some of the shares it holds in the investee firm from the previous holdings report date to 
the current holdings report date. The indicator variable Terminating Sell is identical to the 
variable Sell except that it only equals one if a fund sells all the shares it holds in the 
investee firm. The regressions include the same (time-varying) fund and fund manager 
controls as used in our baseline regression model shown in column (4) of Table 5.2 as well 
as fund manager-stock fixed effects and time fixed effects. We cluster standard errors on 
fund-stock level. 
In equation (5.2), Event is a placeholder that stands for the variables Exogenous CEO 
Turnover and M&A. The indicator variable Exogenous CEO Turnover equals one if a firm 
in the fund’s portfolio experienced an exogenous CEO turnover in year t. Exogenous CEO 
turnover data are classified and provided, on an annual level, by Eisfeldt and Kuhnen 
(2013) for the years 1992-2006, which limits our analysis to this period. M&A is an 
indicator variable equal to one if a firm in the fund’s portfolio announces an M&A 
transaction as the bidder between the previous holdings report date and the current holdings 
report date. Data on M&As are obtained from the SDC Platinum M&A database for the 
period 1980-2017. These data also allow us to examine potentially riskier and more 
uncertain M&A transactions, namely cross-border M&As (variable Cross-border M&A) 






Table 5.4: Reactions to uncertainty-increasing events at firm-level 
Panel A: Reactions to exogenous CEO turnover 
Dependent variables Sell Terminating Sell 
 (1) (2) 
Family Disruption ×  0.027*** 0.026*** 
Exogenous CEO Turnover (2.90) (3.51) 
Exogenous CEO Turnover -0.010** -0.013*** 
 (-2.21) (-3.32) 
Manager Age 0.140*** 0.108*** 
 (22.14) (19.38) 
Manager Tenure -0.001*** -0.000 
 (-6.42) (-1.25) 
Fund Age 0.000*** 0.001*** 
 (6.86) (9.80) 
Fund Size 0.003*** -0.002*** 
 (4.41) (-2.92) 
Fund Family Size -0.002*** 0.004*** 
 (-3.64) (9.35) 
Avg. Monthly Return -2.334*** -1.480*** 
 (-37.91) (-28.36) 
Expense Ratio -1.955*** -1.864*** 
 (-7.80) (-8.92) 
Turnover Ratio -0.007*** -0.004*** 
 (-4.98) (-3.69) 
Manager-Stock FE Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes 
Observations 1,233,462 1,233,462 








Panel B: Reactions to M&A announcements 
Dependent variables Sell Terminating Sell Sell Terminating Sell Sell Terminating Sell 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Family Disruption × M&A 0.014*** 0.008** 0.011** 0.004 -0.013 -0.017** 
 (3.08) (2.19) (2.23) (0.83) (-1.51) (-2.31) 
Family Disruption ×   0.010 0.019**   
Cross-border M&A   (1.02) (2.29)   
Family Disruption ×     0.035*** 0.033*** 
Non-public M&A     (3.60) (3.98) 
M&A -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.009** -0.010*** 
 (-7.31) (-8.88) (-6.34) (-7.57) (-2.33) (-2.88) 
Cross-border M&A   -0.001 -0.002   
   (-0.24) (-0.52)   
Non-public M&A     -0.008* -0.008** 
     (-1.80) (-2.11) 
Manager Age 0.139*** 0.107*** 0.139*** 0.107*** 0.138*** 0.107*** 
 (22.01) (19.21) (22.01) (19.21) (22.01) (19.21) 
Manager Tenure -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 
 (-6.45) (-1.29) (-6.45) (-1.29) (-6.44) (-1.29) 
Fund Age 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 
 (6.86) (9.80) (6.86) (9.81) (6.86) (9.81) 
Fund Size 0.003*** -0.002*** 0.003*** -0.002*** 0.003*** -0.002*** 
 (4.42) (-2.91) (4.42) (-2.91) (4.42) (-2.90) 
Fund Family Size -0.002*** 0.004*** -0.002*** 0.004*** -0.002*** 0.004*** 
 (-3.64) (9.36) (-3.64) (9.36) (-3.64) (9.36) 
Avg. Monthly Return -2.325*** -1.471*** -2.325*** -1.471*** -2.325*** -1.471*** 






Expense Ratio -1.959*** -1.868*** -1.958*** -1.867*** -1.957*** -1.867*** 
 (-7.82) (-8.94) (-7.82) (-8.94) (-7.81) (-8.94) 
Turnover Ratio -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.004*** 
 (-4.99) (-3.71) (-4.99) (-3.71) (-4.99) (-3.71) 
Manager-Stock FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,233,462 1,233,462 1,233,462 1,233,462 1,233,462 1,233,462 
Adj. R-squared 0.029 0.063 0.029 0.063 0.029 0.063 
Notes: This table reports results from tests exploiting variation in risk/uncertainty regarding the firms that mutual funds are invested in. Exogenous 
CEO turnover (based on annual data provided by Eisfeldt and Kuhnen, 2013) and mergers and acquisitions (M&As) (retrieved from SDC) are 
used as risk/uncertainty-increasing firm-specific events. The tests are conducted on stock level based on the stock holdings reported by mutual 
funds. Regression results are from OLS regressions of stock selling measures, i.e., Sell and Terminating Sell, on different variables of interest 
along with controls for fund and time-varying manager characteristics (for the previous holdings report date) as well as fund manager-stock and 
year fixed effects. Sell is an indicator variable that equals one if a fund reduced the number of shares of a stock from the previous to the current 
holdings report date (as opposed to increasing the number of shares or holding it constant) and Terminating Sell is an indicator that equals one if 
the number of shares was reduced to zero. Panel A presents results for exogenous CEO turnovers based on regressions of the two stock selling 
measures on the variables Family Disruption × Exogenous CEO Turnover and Exogenous CEO Turnover along with controls. Exogenous CEO 
Turnover is an indicator variable that equals one if a company in a fund's portfolio experienced an exogenous CEO turnover in year t. Panel B 
present results for M&As based on regressions of the two stock selling measures on the variables Family Disruption × M&A and M&A (columns 
1 and 2), or on the variables Family Disruption × Cross-border M&A and Cross-border M&A (columns 3 and 4), or on the variables Family 
Disruption × Non-public M&A and Non-public M&A (columns 5 and 6) along with controls. M&A is an indicator variable that equals one if a 
company in a fund's portfolio announced an M&A between the previous holding report date and the current holding report date. Cross-border 
M&A and Non-public M&A are indicator variables that equal one if the M&A target company is not located in the U.S. and if the M&A target 
company is not publicly listed, respectively. All variables are defined in the appendix. Robust t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard 






The regression results for the trading behavior of fund managers in reaction to the risk-
increasing events of investee firms are shown in Table 5.4. Panel A presents the results for 
exogenous CEO turnover, while Panel B reports the results for M&A announcements. The 
estimates suggest that treated fund managers are significantly more likely to sell their 
shareholdings when their investee firms exhibit risk-increasing events. Specifically, for 
both dependent variables, Sell and Terminating Sell, the coefficients on Family Disruption 
× Exogenous CEO Turnover and Family Disruption × M&A are positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level and at the 5% level in the first two columns of both panels. 
Furthermore, consistent with treated managers taking less risk, the results for takeovers in 
columns (3) to (6) of Panel B are more pronounced for riskier transactions, particularly 
those involving non-public targets that fund managers arguably find harder to evaluate. 
Overall, Table 5.4 provides significant support for the notion that mutual fund managers who 
experienced family disruption early in their lives exhibit a change in their investment behavior 
and take less risk in their delegated portfolios. 
In an untabulated robustness test, we additionally estimate the regression model shown 
in equation (5.2) relying on a market-wide measure of risk and uncertainty instead of 
specific corporate events. In particular, we interact Family Disruption with the variable 
VIX, which is the average of the daily Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility 
Index (VIX) over the period between the previous holdings report date and the current 
holdings report date of the fund. Data are obtained from the CBOE for the period 1990-
2017. The VIX measures the implied volatility of the S&P 500 index anticipated on the 
derivative market and is thus a measure of perceived stock market risk or simply a “fear 
gauge” (Bloom, 2009). For the dependent variable Terminating Sell, we find that treated 
fund managers are more likely to sell stocks in reaction to increased market-wide risk and 
uncertainty as measured by higher VIX values. 
Moreover, the appendix reports results of an additional test that addresses the concern 
of endogenous fund manager-fund matching more directly. Specifically, we restrict our 
sample to those years in which a fund manager takes office in order to examine whether a 






fund manager and the fund. The number of observations in these regressions is relatively 
small because we are unable to obtain information on (lagged) fund characteristics when 
the fund manager-fund match occurred before the start of our sample period or when the 
funds were set up for the first time. We regress the variable Family Disruption on Total 
Riskt-1, i.e., fund risk in the year before the matching took place, and controls for fund 
characteristics (i.e., fund age and size, fund family size, performance, turnover, and 
expense ratios), which also enter the regressions with one lag. We further control for year 
and investment style fixed effects. Columns (1) and (2) of Table A5.3 report results from 
OLS regressions, while columns (3) and (4) report estimates based on Logit regressions. 
The coefficient on Total Riskt-1 is statistically insignificant in all four specifications 
suggesting that treated fund managers are not more likely to match to lower-risk funds. In 
untabulated regressions, we also find no indication that the likelihood of fund manager 
departure differs across treated and untreated fund managers. 
5.4.4 Additional family background measures and other robustness tests 
The results in the previous sections indicate that early-life family disruption exhibits a 
significant long-term association with the disposition effect and the risk-taking of treated 
fund managers. Our evidence thus suggests that the (in)stability of the family environment 
during childhood helps explain differences in fund managers’ investment behavior. In this 
section, we provide additional evidence to support this conclusion. 
Our detailed data on the families of fund managers allow us to compare how early-life 
family disruption relates to investment behavior later in life relative to various measures 
of socioeconomic status and family background. We can hence address several alternative 
explanations for our results by controlling for potential confounding features of early-life 
family disruption and provide a better understanding of the relative importance of the 
(in)stability of the family environment. To the best of our knowledge, this analysis yields 
the first comprehensive picture of the long-term association between the early-life family 
environment and investment behavior, which also enhances our knowledge of how 






We re-estimate our baseline regression model, i.e., column (4) of Table 5.2, and include 
our variable of interest, Family Disruption, together with a broad set of additional controls. 
To construct these control variables, we hand-collect data from the U.S. Census, obituaries, 
and city directories. Panel A of Table 5.5 shows the results from regressions with Total 
Risk and Disposition Effect as dependent variables. The models include fewer observations 
than our regressions in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 since we are not able to obtain the additional 
socioeconomic and family background data for all managers. 
We augment our baseline model by including the following additional variables, which 
are defined in Section 5.3.2 and intend to measure differences in socioeconomic status and 
wealth as well as parenting style. The first set of variables related to the occupations of 
managers’ parents. Generally, the use of occupation-related variables is motivated by the 
economics literature, which provides evidence that people’s occupation and employment 
status provide valuable information about their preferences to take risks (Ekelund et al., 
2005; Bonin et al. 2007). Here, we use the indicators variables Father Blue-collar Worker 
and Both Parents Working. Blue-collar jobs are arguably more dangerous and may thus 
relate to a person’s risk aversion as well as the likelihood of parental deaths, while a 
household in which both parents are employed may be affected differently, both financially 
and in terms of parenting, by the death or divorce of the parent(s). Additionally, we include 
the indicator variables Parent Self-employed and Parent Worked in Finance as having self-
employed parents or parents who work in the financial industry may influence one’s 
investment style and ability to invest due to different perceptions of risk and a “kitchen 
table” education. 
The second set of variables comprises six controls that are related to the fund manager’s 
life at home during his or her childhood. We use the variable Number of Siblings (i.e., the 
manager’s number of siblings) and the indicator variable Firstborn as Campbell, Jeong, 
and Graffin (2019) provide recent evidence that managers’ strategic risk-taking is related 
to their birth order. Besides these two, we include three additional variables to capture 
differences in parenting. Avg. Parental Age at Manager’s Birth measures the average age 






offspring’s behavior as adults (e.g., Belsky et al., 2012). Parents’ Age Difference is the 
absolute age difference between father and mother, which may relate to conflicts between 
parents and the likelihood of parental divorces and deaths. The indicator variable Parent 
Born Outside U.S. captures whether at least one of the fund manager’s parents migrated to 
the U.S., which may relate to different parenting habits but also captures differences in 
socioeconomic status. Such differences are also captured by the indicator variable Parent 
Homeowner, which equals one if a parent lived in a home that was not rented but owned. 
Homeowners may have higher or lower financial burdens than others, which arguably 
affect their willingness to take financial risks. 
Lastly, we add the indicator variable Manager Works for Home State Fund because 
fund managers who experienced family disruption may be more likely to stay in their home 
state to take care of their bereaved parent, which may provide them with an informational 
advantage on or an uninformed bias for local firms (Pool, Stoffman, and Yonker, 2012) 
that could affect their investment behavior. 
Table 5.5: Family disruption, family background, and investment behavior 
Panel A: Importance of family disruption relative to other family background measures 
Dependent variables Total Risk  Disposition Effect 
 (1)  (2) 
Family Disruption -0.006***   0.155***  
 (-3.03)   (4.37)  
Firstborn 0.008*   0.054  
 (1.86)   (0.69)  
Number of Siblings -0.003***   0.001  
 (-4.02)   (0.15)  
Parent Self-employed 0.002   -0.041  
 (0.80)   (-1.12)  
Parent Worked in Finance -0.005   0.083*  
 (-1.39)   (1.72) 
Father Blue-collar Worker -0.001   -0.113**  
 (-0.56)   (-2.24)  
Both Parents Working -0.008***   0.092**  
 (-3.07)   (1.97)  






Avg. Parental Age at Manager’s Birth 0.000  0.000  
 (0.69)   (0.09)  
Parents’ Age Difference 0.000   -0.000  
 (0.46)   (-0.05)  
Parent Born Outside U.S: 0.008*   0.110*  
 (1.72)   (1.89)  
Parent Homeowner -0.001   -0.122  
 (-0.27)   (-1.47)  
Manager Works for Home State Fund 0.001   0.318***  
 (0.21)   (3.73)  
Controls as in Table 5.2 Yes  Yes 
Fund FE Yes  Yes 
Birth Cohort FE Yes  Yes 
Birth State FE Yes  Yes 
Time FE Yes  Yes 
Observations 2,913   9,813  
Adj. R-squared 0.769   0.200  
 
Panel B: Can the socioeconomic status of the family explain our results? 
Dependent variables Total Risk  Disposition Effect 
 (1)  (2) 
Family Disruption × Family Wealth -0.000   0.008  
 (-0.40)   (0.89)  
Family Disruption -0.008**   0.093**  
 (-2.14)   (2.54)  
Controls as in Table 5.2 Yes  Yes 
Fund FE Yes  Yes 
Birth Cohort FE Yes  Yes 
Birth State FE Yes  Yes 
Time FE Yes  Yes 
Observations 3,929   13,290  








Panel C: Does (financial) support for the bereaved parent explain our results? 
Dependent variables Total Risk  Disposition Effect 
 Only treated fund years after both parents died 
 (1)  (2) 
Family Disruption -0.000   0.008  
 (-0.40)   (0.89)  
Controls as in Table 5.2 Yes  Yes 
Fund FE Yes  Yes 
Birth Cohort FE Yes  Yes 
Birth State FE Yes  Yes 
Time FE Yes  Yes 
Observations 3,744   12,655  
Adj. R-squared 0.770   0.205  
Notes: This table reports how Family Disruption relates to other family background measures in terms 
of economic and statistical magnitude. Panel A shows results from regressions of fund investment 
measures, i.e., Total Risk (column 1) and Disposition Effect (column 2) on Family Disruption along 
with controls for manager and fund characteristics (for the previous period) as well as fund and year 
fixed effects and manager birth cohort and birth state fixed effects. All regressions include additional 
controls for fund managers’ family background, i.e., Firstborn, Number of Siblings, Parent Self-
employed, Parent Worked in Finance, Avg. Parental Age at Manager’s Birth, Father blue-collar 
Worker, Both Parents working, Parents Age difference, Parent born outside U.S., Parent Homeowner 
as well as for fund managers’ home state employment measured by the indicator variable Manager 
Works for Home State Fund. Panel B presents estimates from regressions of Total Risk and Disposition 
Effect on the two variables Family Disruption and Family Disruption × Family Wealth along with 
controls for manager and fund characteristics (for the previous year) as in Table 5.2 as well as fund and 
year fixed effects and manager birth cohort and birth state fixed effects. Panel C reports the results from 
regressions of Total Risk and Disposition Effect on Family Disruption based on the sample that (besides 
all untreated fund years) includes only those treated fund years after both of a manager’s parents died. 
Both specifications again include controls for manager and fund characteristics (for the previous year) 
as in Table 5.2 as well as fund and year fixed effects and manager birth cohort and birth state fixed 
effects. All variables are defined in the appendix. Robust t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on 
standard errors clustered by manager. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
Even after adding these eleven controls to our regression model, the coefficient on 
Family Disruption in Panel A of Table 5.5 remains significant at the 1% level for both 
Total Risk and Disposition Effect. This evidence suggests the following. First, the long-
term association of early-life family disruption with both risk-taking and the disposition 






wealth as well as family background and parenting. The robustness of our results to the 
inclusion of these measures indicates that the emotional channel (i.e., post-traumatic stress) 
is more likely to explain the results than a straightforward socioeconomic explanation. 
Second, in both regressions, Family Disruption ranks among the most significant variables. 
Specifically, no other variable, except for Both Parents Working, does explain both risk-
taking and the disposition effect. This leads us to the conclusion that the (in)stability of the 
family environment relates more closely to investment behavior later in life than other 
specific characteristics of a manager’s family background. 
Panel B shows reports from re-estimations of our baseline model, i.e., column (4) of 
Table 5.2, in which we additionally include the interaction Family Disruption × Family 
Wealth. If the observed relationship between early-life family disruption and investment 
behavior is caused by a socioeconomic/wealth channel, we would expect it to vary with 
family wealth. In contrast, if an emotional channel explains this relation, we should find 
an insignificant coefficient on the above interaction term. Our results are in line with the 
latter channel. The coefficient on Family Disruption × Family Wealth is statistically 
insignificant, while the coefficient on Family Disruption remains significant for both 
dependent variables, Total Risk and Disposition Effect. The results thus suggest that the 
association between early-life family disruption and investment behavior is unlikely to be 
caused by wealth shocks induced by family disruption, particularly parental deaths. We 
further address this concern in the next section. 
A related concern is that early-life family disruption may only be associated with the 
investment behavior of fund managers because treated managers need to take care of and 
financially support their bereaved parent. Simply put, the need to (financially) support 
someone else might cause less risk-taking. To address this concern, we re-estimate our 
baseline regression and limit the treated fund years to those after which a manager’s last 
parent died, assuming that (financial) support ends with the remaining parent’s death. We 
report the results in Panel C. The coefficient on Family Disruption is significant at the 1% 
level when using Total Risk and Disposition Effect as dependent variable, indicating that 






Lastly, to further mitigate concerns of omitted variable bias and to ensure that our 
results are not caused by inappropriate counterfactuals, we use two matching procedures.  
First, we use a coarsened exact matching (CEM) to match managers based on different 
dimensions of their early family life. CEM is a relatively new matching approach that is 
described in detail in Iacus, King, and Porro (2012). We consider it here because several 
studies have demonstrated that it may outperform other matching approaches with respect 
to covariate balance and effect bias (e.g., King and Nielsen, 2019).34 
We exactly match treated and control observations based on three sets of matching 
criteria. Each set includes managers’ birth cohorts and birth states. The first set additionally 
includes the wealth of a manager’s parents defined as the Family Wealth quintile to which 
his or her family belongs. The second set uses the education of fund managers’ parents 
defined as the maximum education attainment score of the parents, i.e., 3 for college, 2 for 
high school, 1 for elementary school, and 0 for no formal education. The last set of 
matching criteria uses the indicator variable Both Parents Working, which equals one if 
both parents had a job according to their census records. We use this variable for matching 
because it is the only variable, besides Family Disruption, that consistently explains 
investment behavior in Panel A of Table 5.5. Matching on these criteria ensures that treated 
and untreated managers grew up during the same time period and in the same U.S. states, 
experienced similar events and trends, and were subject to comparable (socio)economic, 
familial, and regional influences. The regression estimates based on the CEM-matched 
samples are reported in Table 5.6. The coefficient on Family Disruption remains 
significant at the 5% level or better when used to explain Total Risk in columns (1) to (3) 
and Disposition Effect in columns (4) to (6).  
 
34 CEM allows users to group observations in distinct strata based on coarsened values of selected matching 
variables, e.g., coarse age groups rather than exact birthdays. Weights are assigned to matched control 
observations to balance the number of treatment and control observations in each stratum. Observations in 
strata without treatment and control observations are eliminated to ensure common support, which is why 
only a limited number of matching criteria can be chosen without reducing the sample size considerably. For 






Table 5.6: Coarsened exact matching 
Dependent variables Total Risk  Disposition Effect 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Family Disruption -0.006** -0.007** -0.008***  0.081*** 0.059** 0.091*** 
 (-2.16) (-2.01) (-2.67)  (4.01) (2.21) (4.25) 
Exact matching based on:        
     Birth Cohort Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
     Birth State Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
     Family Wealth Quintile Yes No No  Yes No No 
     Max. Parental Education No Yes No  No Yes No 
     Both Parents Working No No Yes  No No Yes 
Controls as in Table 5.2 Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Fund FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,880 3,774 3,896  13,160 12,854 13,174 
Adj. R-squared 0.759 0.755 0.769  0.200 0.218 0.194 
Notes: This table reports the estimation results on the CEM-matched sample with three different sets of 
matching criteria. Robust t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by manager. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Second, we employ a propensity score matching (PSM) (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) 
to identify a control group for the treated fund managers in our sample. For each treated 
fund year in our sample (i.e., Family Disruption = 1), we select an untreated sample fund 
year (i.e., Family Disruption = 0) with the closest propensity score. The PSM criteria 
include all fund manager and fund characteristics that we use as explanatory variables in 
the regressions in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 as well as year and investment style fixed effects. To 
maintain statistical independence of our tests, we implement a nearest neighbor matching 
algorithm without replacement. This algorithm uses the distance between the covariate 
patterns to define the “closest” neighbor and removes a matching sample fund year from 
the matching pool once it was selected. For the sake of brevity, we report the PSM results 
in the appendix. Panels A, B, and C of Table A5.2 present the intermediate steps, which 
provide evidence for the support of covariate balance, as well as the results of the PSM 






The regression model we use is identical to that shown in column (2) of Table 5.2 and 
is based on all fund years of all matched funds. In Panel D, column (1) shows the results 
when we omit the fund and fund manager characteristics, which were used to match treated 
and control observations, while column (2) shows the results from the regression model 
including all covariates. When used to explain Total Risk, the coefficient on Family 
Disruption is significant at the 1% level and similar in terms of economic magnitude to the 
coefficients found in our baseline regressions in Table 5.2. Applying the same PSM 
approach and replacing Total Risk by the variables Disposition Effect, Idiosyncratic Risk, 
Market Risk, and Tracking Error in Panel E, we find the coefficient on Family Disruption 
to remain statistically significant in all regressions. 
In summary, we can thus conclude that, despite their differences in methodology and 
matching criteria, both matching procedures provide corroborating evidence that treated 
fund managers indeed take less risk and exhibit a stronger disposition effect compared to 
their peers from intact families. 
5.4.5 Do different disruption types affect investment behavior differently? 
In this section, we examine whether different causes of family disruption show different 
long-term associations with investment behavior. Examining the heterogeneity in family 
disruption factors is not only important because it provides a more nuanced understanding 
of this prevalent societal phenomenon but also because it addresses several endogeneity 
concerns, which cause threats to identification. 
Panel A to Panel E of Table 5.7 each report results from estimations of our baseline 
regression model, i.e., column (4) of Table 5.2, for the dependent variables Total Risk (in 
column 1) and Disposition Effect (in column 2). We regress these dependent variables on 
four different variables of interest, which measure the cause of family disruption, along 
with the same controls as used in the baseline analyses in Table 5.2. These variables of 
interest are (1) Parental Death, which is an indicator variable that equals one if family 
disruption is caused by the death of a parent, (2) Parental Divorce, which is an indicator 
variable that equals one if family disruption is caused by the divorce of the parents, (3) 






caused by the death of a parent that is not due to a long-term disease or occurred during 
military service, and (4) Maternal Death, which is an indicator variable that equals one if 
family disruption is caused by the death of the mother. As before, all cases of family 
disruption have taken place before the fund manager was 20 years old. 
As the first test, we distinguish between the two components of family disruption, i.e., 
parental death and parental divorce. It is unclear whether we should expect to find a 
stronger relation to investment behavior in case of parental death or in case of parental 
divorce. While the former is arguably the more severe form of family disruption in the 
sense that it causes a complete, irreversible break of the parent-child relationship (whereas 
parental contact is still possible after a divorce), the latter may lead to an ongoing conflict 
and feeling of disruption that the child has to cope when growing up. However, Mack 
(2001) finds that relative to adults who experienced parental death during childhood or 
adolescence, adults who experienced parental divorce report higher levels of confidence. 
Hence, it is an open empirical question which form of family disruption has a stronger 
long-term impact on children and whether the impact is even the same. Second, it is 
plausible that parental divorce is endogenous to the pre-divorce structure of family life. 
Simply put, difficult parental relations might cause the divorce of the parents and 
simultaneously affect the investment behavior of the child later in life. 
Table 5.7: Heterogeneity in early-life-family disruption factors 
Dependent variables Total Risk  Disposition Effect 
 (1)  (2) 
Panel A: Disruption due to parental death 
Parental Death -0.010***  0.092*** 
 (-3.17)  (3.67) 
Observations 3,765  12,719 
Adj. R-squared 0.770  0.196 











Panel B: Disruption due to parental divorce 
Parental Divorce -0.010**  0.193*** 
 (-1.98)  (3.30) 
Observations 3,489  11,785 
Adj. R-squared 0.773  0.203 
Panel C: Disruption due to unexpected death 
Unexpected Death -0.009**   0.080***  
 (2.59)   (2.97)  
Observations 3,653   12,334  
Adj. R-squared 0.770   0.197  
Panel D: Disruption due to maternal deaths (non-working mothers only) 
Maternal Death -0.019***   0.094**  
 (-4.33)   (2.17)  
Observations 3,516   11,908  
Adj. R-squared 0.774   0.199  
Panel E: Parental deaths involving bereaved parents with an education level ≥ the deceased’s 
education level and children aged ≥ 6 years 
Parental Death Same Educ. -0.008**   0.074***  
 (-2.30)   (2.65)  
Observations 3,594   12,112  
Adj. R-squared 0.770   0.193  
    
Controls as in Table 5.2 Yes  Yes 
Fund FE Yes  Yes 
Birth Cohort FE Yes  Yes 
Birth State FE Yes  Yes 
Time FE Yes  Yes 
Notes: This table investigates how different types of family disruption affect investment behavior. All 
panels report results from regressions of fund investment measures, i.e., Total Risk (column 1) and 
Disposition Effect (column 2) on different variables of interest along with controls for manager and 
fund characteristics (for the previous period) as well as fund and year fixed effects and manager birth 
cohort and birth state fixed effects. Panel A and Panel B report the results from separate regressions of 
Parental Death or Parental Divorce, while Panels C, D, and E present results using Unexpected Death, 
Maternal Death, and Parental Death Same Educ. as variables of interest, respectively. All variables are 
defined in the appendix. Robust t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by 






Panels A and B of Table 5.7 report the results from this test. We consider the two 
variables Parental Death and Parental Divorce separately to investigate if both have 
explanatory power for fund manager risk-taking and the disposition effect when compared 
to the counterfactual of an intact family background. In Panel A, we find that the 
coefficient on Parental Death is negative in column (1) and positive in column (2). It is 
statistically significant at the 1% level in both columns. Similarly, in Panel B, the 
coefficient on Parental Divorce is negative in column (1) and positive in column (2), and 
it is statistically significant at the 5% level or better. We conclude that both components 
of family disruption significantly relate to fund managers’ investment behavior later in life 
and that our results are not solely driven by parental divorces, which might be endogenous. 
Analogous to parental divorces, some parental deaths may also be endogenous to 
investment behavior later in life and might drive our results. Panel C of Table 5.7 provides 
evidence that our results for parental deaths are robust to focusing on unexpected deaths 
by excluding deaths that were caused by long-term illness or occurred during military 
service according to death records and obituaries. The respective variable of interest, 
Unexpected Death, has the expected sign in both specifications and is statistically 
significant at the 5% level for Total Risk and 1% level for Disposition Effect. 
Lastly, we investigate whether potential wealth implications of family disruption are 
the main reason why treated fund managers show a different investment behavior later in 
life. In the years during which our treatment took place, the father was typically the main 
income earner in the family. Our results could thus be driven by paternal deaths reflecting 
shocks to family wealth that might affect children’s attitudes toward financial risk.35  
To test this hypothesis, we examine a specific subgroup of parental deaths: deaths of 
non-working mothers. Such deaths are unlikely to have significant financial implications 
and thus allow us to disentangle the wealth and emotional implications of family 
 
35 Koudijs and Voth (2016) find that the risk of a wealth shock, even without real consequences, affects the 
subsequent risk-taking behavior of financial experts, whereas Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) suggest that 






disruption. Panel D of Table 5.7 shows the results from regressions that use Maternal 
Death as the variable of interest. The coefficient on this variable is negative and significant 
at the 5% level or better in both columns. As an alternative test, shown in Panel E, we 
examine only those cases of deaths involving bereaved parents who have at least the same 
level of education as their deceased spouses as well as children of school age (6 years or 
older). The idea is that any potential wealth shock should be weaker if the bereaved parent 
has at least a similar level of education allowing him or her to compensate for the wealth 
shock by starting to work (or working more), which is more feasible when children already 
go to school. Again, our results remain statistically significant.  
Overall, both tests provide corroborating evidence for the hypothesis that the trauma 
of early-life family disruption itself, and not just a potential wealth shock induced by 
parental deaths, relates to fund managers’ investment behavior later in life. Given that the 
vast majority of all fund managers are male, the evidence in Panel D further suggests that 
parental deaths do not just matter for managers’ risk-taking and investment behavior 
because male children lose their male role models 
5.4.6 What factors moderate the effect of early-life family disruption? 
In this section, we investigate what factors moderate the long-term association between 
early-life family disruption and investment behavior. To this end, we exploit different 
sources of exogenous variation in treatment intensity across treated fund managers. These 
variations in treatment intensity also provide further support for an emotional channel of 
family disruption and help address endogeneity concerns as any omitted variable would 
have to generate the same patterns as the moderators in order to explain our results. 
Our first test is motivated by prior research, which suggests that imprinting events have 
a particularly strong impact on an individual’s later life when experienced during formative 
years, i.e., between the ages of 5 and 15 (see Bernile, Bhagwat, and Rau, 2017, and the 
literature therein). Thus, we explore whether fund managers take fewer risks and are more 
prone to the disposition effect if an early-life family disruption occurred during their 
formative years as opposed to their non-formative years. We re-estimate our baseline 






by the two indicator variables Family Disruption_Formative Years and Family 
Disruption_Non-formative Years. The former variable equals one if family disruption took 
place during a fund manager’s formative years, whereas the latter equals one if family 
disruption took place during the non-formative years of a manager’s early life, i.e., ages 0-
4 vs. ages 16-19. Panel A of Table 5.8 presents the results from regressions of Total Risk 
(column 1) and Disposition Effect (column 2) on the two above variables. 
Column (1) shows that the reduction in total fund risk can be attributed mainly to those 
treated fund managers who experienced a family disruption during their formative years. 
Specifically, while the regression coefficients on both variables have the expected negative 
sign, only the coefficient on Family Disruption_Formative Years is significant at the 1% 
level and the difference between the coefficients is statistically significant. This evidence 
implies that treatment in non-formative years has only a limited impact on risk-taking but 
a considerable effect in formative years. Regarding the disposition effect, we find in 
column (2) that family disruption during formative and non-formative years are related to 
an equally large increase in the disposition effect. 
In our second test, we exploit county-level variation in social support and welfare as 
provided by members of religious denominations. This analysis is motivated by the idea 
that family disruption constitutes an arguably less severe shock, i.e., the treatment intensity 
is weaker, when the levels of social support and welfare are higher. Support for this idea 
is provided by the evidence in Ellis, Dowrick, and Lloyd-Williams (2013) who find that 
social support, for example, provided by friends, religious organizations, and schools, 
reduces the distress associated with parental death. A large literature regards religious 
communities as the main source of social support and welfare for individuals in need (see, 
for example, Cnaan et al., 2002) and as an informal insurance mechanism protecting 
individuals against certain idiosyncratic risks (Ager and Ciccone, 2017). Furthermore, 
there is evidence on facilitated coping through spirituality among grieving children 
(Andrews and Moratta, 2005). However, in the case of parental divorces, it is not entirely 
clear whether religious people indeed provide social support to disrupted families or 






Table 5.8: Moderators of early-life family disruption 
Panel A: Family disruption during formative vs. non-formative years 
Dependent variables Total Risk  Disposition Effect 
 (1)  (2) 
Family Disruption_Formative Years -0.025***  0.086* 
 (-4.18)  (1.96) 
Family Disruption_Non-formative Years -0.005  0.127*** 
 (-1.60)  (4.56) 
Difference in Family Disruption coefficients -0.0209***   -0.0403  
p-value of difference 0.00107   0.468  
Controls as in Table 5.2 Yes  Yes 
Fund FE Yes  Yes 
Birth Cohort FE Yes  Yes 
Birth State FE Yes  Yes 
Time FE Yes  Yes 
Observations 3,929  13,290 
Adj. R-squared 0.769  0.203 
 
Panel B: Family disruption during formative vs. non-formative years 
Dependent variables Total Risk  Disposition Effect 
 (1)  (2) 
Family Disruption × Religiosity Ratio 0.048**   -0.469*  
 (2.34)   (-1.88)  
Family Disruption -0.036***   0.373***  
 (-2.96)   (2.60)  
Controls as in Table 5.2 Yes  Yes 
Fund FE Yes  Yes 
Birth Cohort FE Yes  Yes 
Birth State FE Yes  Yes 
Time FE Yes  Yes 
Observations 3,925   13,276  
Adj. R-squared 0.769   0.204  
Notes: This table explores factors that potentially moderate the effect of family disruption on investment 
behavior. Both panels report estimates from regressions of fund investment measures, i.e., Total Risk 






manager and fund characteristics (for the previous period) as well as fund and year fixed effects and 
manager birth cohort and birth state fixed effects. Panel A reports the results from regressions of risk 
measures on the two variables Family Disruption_Formative Years and Family Disruption_Non-
formative Years along with controls. Panel B reports the results from regressions of fund investment 
measures on the two variables Family Disruption and Family Disruption × Religiosity Ratio along with 
controls. All variables are defined in the appendix. Robust t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on 
standard errors clustered by manager. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 
To proxy for social support and welfare, we use the level of religiosity in the home 
county of a manager’s family that prevails around the time that family disruption took 
place. Specifically, we define the variable Religiosity Ratio as the fraction of members of 
religious denominations in the county that was the home county of a manager’s family 
when family disruption took place. For managers who experienced family disruption, this 
variable is defined as the number of members of all religious denominations in the home 
county divided by the county’s total population. By definition, this variable is set to zero 
for managers who did not experience family disruption. Religious membership statistics 
and county population data are obtained from the Association of Religion Data Archives 
for 1952 because this year lies in the middle of our family disruption period and religiosity 
ratios tend to be relatively stable over time. 
To test whether higher levels of religious support lessen the impact of family disruption 
on investment behavior, we again re-estimate our baseline regression model using an 
additional interaction term, Family Disruption × Religiosity Ratio. If social support and 
welfare indeed attenuate our effect, the coefficient on the interaction term would have the 
opposite sign of the Family Disruption coefficient, i.e., positive in regressions with Total 
Risk and negative in regressions with Disposition Effect as dependent variable. We regress 
the same two dependent variables on Family Disruption, the interaction term Family 
Disruption × Religiosity Ratio, and controls and report the results in Panel B of Table 5.8. 
Consistent with the notion that more social support and welfare attenuate the relationship 
between family disruption and fund manager risk-taking, we find the coefficient on the 
interaction term Family Disruption × Religiosity Ratio to be positive and significant at the 






negative and significant at the 10% level indicating that social support and welfare also 
lessen the long-term relationship between family disruption and the disposition effect. 
Importantly, our estimates indicate that the above results reverse if social support was 
very high, that is, if Religiosity Ratio is at least equal to 0.75 (the variable has a mean and 
median of 0.55 and 0.51, respectively). Hence, consistent with post-traumatic growth 
promoted by considerable social support, there are instances in which early-life family 
disruption is associated with more risk-taking and a lower disposition effect. This result 
further supports our proposed emotional channel. 
In an additional unreported test, we find that the association between early-life family 
disruption and investment behavior lingers over time, consistent with the notion that family 
disruption is an imprinting experience with long-term consequences caused by persistent 
post-traumatic symptoms. We test this by interacting Family Disruption with an indicator 
for whether a manager’s age is above the median manager age in the sample. When we 
add this interaction term to our regressions, the coefficient is not statistically significant. 
5.5 Early-life family disruption and manager skill 
As the last step in this study, we explore whether a skill gap exists between fund managers 
who experienced early-life family disruption and those who come from intact families. 
Such a skill gap, which may exist, e.g., due to differences in parenting across treated and 
untreated fund managers, could explain some of the results we present in Section 5.4.  
To test for differences in fund manager skills, we analyze three different skill measures. 
We begin by following Cremers and Petajisto (2009) and Petajisto (2013) and examine 
whether treated fund managers differ in their active share, i.e., the fraction of their portfolio 
holdings that deviate from the holdings of the benchmark index. According to Cremers 
and Petajisto (2009), a fund’s active share is a proxy for stock selection, i.e., the ability to 
pick individual stocks that are expected to outperform their peers. It hence serves as a 
measure of fund manager skill. For this analysis, we retrieve quarterly data on active share 
from Antti Petajisto's website for the period 1980-2009. The regressions with Active Share 






managers’ families in their early lives are associated with differences in their risk-adjusted 
fund performance by using two performance measures, Alpha and Sharpe Ratio.  
We regress the three aforementioned variables on Family Disruption, along with the 
same controls as used in our baseline regressions, i.e., column (4) of Table 5.2. The results 
of these regressions are shown in Table 5.9. We find the coefficient on Family Disruption 
to be statistically insignificant in all regressions, i.e., for Active Share in column (1), as 
well as for Alpha and Sharpe Ratio in columns (2) and (3). In untabulated regressions, we 
find similar results for multi-factor alphas. Thus, our results do not indicate a skill gap 
between treated and untreated mutual fund managers. We thus conclude that, while fund 
managers who experienced early-life family disruption tend to make fewer risky 
investments, they do not seem to differ in terms of skills. The performance results are also 
consistent with evidence suggesting that the disposition effect does not relate to fund 
performance (Cici, 2012). 
Table 5.9: Family disruption and fund manager skill 
Dependent variables Active Share  Alpha  Sharpe Ratio 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Family Disruption -0.022  0.027  0.162 
 (-0.59)  (1.54)  (1.20) 
Controls as in Table 5.2 Yes  Yes  Yes 
Fund FE Yes  Yes  Yes 
Birth Cohort FE Yes  Yes  Yes 
Birth State FE Yes  Yes  Yes 
Time FE Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 8,220  3,929  3,929 
Adj. R-squared 0.876  0.223  0.753 
Notes: This table reports results from regressions of Active Share (column 1), Alpha (column 2), 
and Sharpe Ratio (column 3) on Family Disruption and controls for manager and fund 
characteristics (for the previous period). All specifications also include fund fixed effects, year 
fixed effects, and manager birth cohort and birth state fixed effects. All variables are defined in the 
appendix. Robust t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by manager. 







This study contributes to the emerging literature on social finance by documenting the 
potential long-term financial consequences of a prevalent societal phenomenon, early-life 
family disruption. Specifically, we show that the death or divorce of the parent(s) during 
childhood relates to risk-taking and the extent to which professional investors exhibit the 
disposition effect later in life. Our results are consistent with well documented long-lasting 
symptoms of post-traumatic stress caused by family disruption. Specifically, we find that 
treated managers exhibit a stronger disposition effect and reduce idiosyncratic and market 
risk as well as a fund’s tracking error when taking office. Consistently, treated managers 
are also more likely to sell their shareholdings in reaction to risk-increasing corporate 
events. Our results are robust to a large set of controls for socioeconomic and family 
background measures and do not appear to be driven by a wealth shock caused by family 
disruption. Social support seems to be an important moderator that can even reverse the 
documented effects, consistent with instances of post-traumatic growth. 
Taken together, the evidence in this study suggests that an individual’s early-life family 
environment is a potential source of variation that may help explain the behavior of 
professional investors. It thus has potential implications for the allocation of capital in 
financial markets. Since we focus on mutual fund managers who are highly educated and 
trained in dealing with financial risks, it is possible that we underestimate the impact of 
family disruption during childhood on the investment behavior of the average individual 
later in life. Yet, since mutual fund investments constitute a significant portion of the 
financial assets of the average U.S. household, our results still affect the portfolio 
characteristics of the typical non-professional investor in the U.S. 
Our evidence further suggests that environmental stability rather than specific 
observable features of the childhood rearing environment relate to risk-taking and trading 
behavior later in life. Thus, our study extends the limited literature on the role that 
“nurture” can play for investor behavior. Thereby, it also expands our understanding of the 






6 Concluding remarks 
This thesis comprises three studies that shed light on the backgrounds that shape finance 
professionals and determine their economic behavior. However, research in the field of 
social finance is still in its infancy and promises to provide many more explanations for 
various behavioral patterns and anomalies in financial markets in the future. A brief look 
at the daily events in our economy is sufficient to identify exciting new research questions. 
At the time of writing, the world economy is crippled as a result of shutdowns imposed 
to combat a global epidemic. In the wake of this pandemic, governments have spent an 
unprecedented 14+ trillion dollars on stimulus measures by June 2020, with the U.S. alone 
exceeding its responses to the 2008 financial crisis by a factor of 6.5. The crisis has not 
only upended how businesses operate but also radically transformed our lives and 
communities. The current economic situation thus offers numerous research opportunities.  
As a (prospective) behavioral economist, I am of course particularly interested in the 
psychological, social, and cultural dimensions of this epidemic that shape our economic 
behavior in the long run. One example is social distancing, the practice of reducing contact 
with others to a minimum to physically disrupt the contagion. It could, similar to the social 
phenomenon analyzed in the third essay of this thesis, have a lasting impact on our 
professional and also our private lives even when direct economic effects have long been 
surmounted. Another potential research question addresses the traditionally strong 
preference of Germans to pay with cash. The current hygiene guidelines could change this 
preference profoundly in favor of electronic payment methods along with all its advantages 
and disadvantages, such as more effective prevention of tax evasion but also increased 
costs for businesses due to service fees.  
These examples are only two of many research questions that behavioral finance and 
in particular social finance scholars can investigate and which are of high relevance for 
companies and political decision-makers. Overall, I am very curious to see in which 
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Appendix to Chapter 2 
Sample selection and variables  
This appendix contains a detailed documentation of the data sources and sample selection 
procedure for my analyses of the personal characteristics of employees in the U.S. financial 
industry in Chapter 2. I obtain data from two representative surveys of the U.S population, 
the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) of the Current Population Survey 
(CPS) and the General Social Survey (GSS). 
Annual Social and Economic Supplement 
To examine the demographic characteristics, i.e., gender, race, and age, of people working 
in the U.S. financial industry and the rest of the private sector, I use data from the Annual 
Social and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey, which is also known 
as the March supplement. The ASEC is a nationally representative survey conducted 
annually by the United States Census Bureau as part of the CPS. The survey contains 
detailed questions covering social and economic characteristics, such as employment 
status, earnings, industry, and demographic characteristics, of all members of a household. 
Because of the breadth of data available, the ASEC is one of the most popular data sets for 
analyzing the population in the United States and has been used in several studies in 
economics (e.g., Beck, Levine, and Lavkov, 2010; Philippon and Reshef, 2012). 
For this study, I examine data from the survey years 1976 to 2019, which pertain to the 
actual years 1975 to 2018 because questions in the survey refer to the preceding calendar 
year. For example, interviewees are asked in which industry they worked during the 
previous calendar year. For the sake of simplicity, I call the year to which a survey refers 
‘year’, whereas I refer to a CPS year as ‘survey year’. The 1976 ASEC file was the first 
data set that was released by the U.S. Census Bureau as public use files and the first to 
include household-level records in the original data. So my sample starts with this data set 
and covers data from over four decades.  
Its long duration and consistent language make the survey well suited for exploring 






the person-level weight variable ASECWT. As is common in the literature, I exclude a few 
individuals from the sample for whom the CPS assigns negative or missing sampling 
weights. I further restrict the sample to persons who are at least 15 years of age and work 
in the private sector, i.e., I exclude government employees and employees of the U.S. 
Postal Service. In order to account for the experimental redesign of the sample in 2014, I 
also limit the data to respondents in the 5/8 file in 2014. Imposing these restrictions results 
in a total sample of 3,278,943 survey participants. The annual number of observations 
varies between 52,459 and 98,095 with an average of 74,521. 
To classify respondents as workers in the financial industry, I use the 1990 Census 
Bureau industrial classification. In line with Philippon and Reshef (2012) as well as 
Greenwood and Scharfstein (2013), among others, the financial industry is defined as a 
combination of the credit intermediation, securities, and insurance subsectors. The 
corresponding industry codes are 700 (Banking), 701 (Savings institutions, including 
credit unions), 702 (Credit agencies), 710 (Security, commodity brokerage, investment 
companies), and 711 (Insurance). The sample covers between 2,300 and 5,200 finance 
industry employees per year. On average, 5.5 percent of respondents work in the financial 
industry in each year. This proportion increases slightly in the late 1970s and remains 
stable thereafter. The high number of observations allows me to calculate annual estimates 
that are unlikely to be driven by only a few outliers.  
General Social Survey 
In order to examine the intelligence of finance industry employees, I obtain data from the 
General Social Survey (Smith et al., 2019). The GSS is a nationally representative survey 
administered by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago that is 
designed to track attitudes, preferences, and social behavior in American society.  
For this analysis, I obtain data from cross-sectional waves spanning the 45-year period 
from 1974 to 2018. The survey contains about 1,500 respondents each year from 1974 






second year from 1994 through 2018. The analysis relies on a subset of the total sample 
due to the availability of variables as discussed in more detail below. 
The long duration of the GSS and the use of consistent language make it well suited 
for exploring long-term trends. However, in line with the literature (e.g., Stevenson and 
Wolfers, 2008b), I make two necessary adjustments to the data to account for changes in 
the survey over time. First, I drop black oversamples in the years 1982 and 1987, and 
second, I exclude all interviews from 2006 onwards that occurred in Spanish and could not 
have been completed in English. Furthermore, I weight all estimates using the GSS weight 
variable WTSSALL to ensure the representativeness of the sample.  
The GSS only includes individuals who are at least 18 years old. So I do not need to 
impose an age restriction. As in the ASEC sample, I restrict my GSS sample to all 
respondents working in the private sector. The 2007 Census industry classification is used 
to classify respondents as workers in the financial industry following the definition in 
previous studies (see above). The corresponding industry codes are 6870-6990. This 
classification yields an annual proportion of about five percent of respondents who work 
in finance in a year, which is very similar to the proportion in the ASEC sample. The 
indicator variable In Finance equals one for a respondent who works in the financial 
industry and zero otherwise. 
To measure people’s intelligence, I follow previous studies (e.g., Caplan and Miller, 
2010) and use the GSS variable WORDSUM. This simple count variable is defined as the 
number of correct answers to a ten-word test vocabulary test taken by a randomly selected 
half of all survey respondents. The vocabulary test is a subtest from the WAIS, a commonly 
used IQ test (Zhu and Weiss, 2005), and is highly correlated with other measures of general 
intelligence. For example, Wechsler (1958) reports a correlation greater than 0.8 between 
the overall WAIS score and the WAIS vocabulary subtest. The test was carried out in the 
GSS in each survey over the period 1974-2018, except 1975, 1977, 1980, 1983, 1985, 
1986, and 2002, leaving me with 23 cross-sectional GSS waves for analysis. The final 
sample contains 17,916 respondents who meet the sampling restrictions and completed the 






The regression models in Section 2.2.4 include region and year fixed effects as well as 
various control variables. Region fixed effects capture differences between the nine U.S. 
Census Bureau divisions where respondents live, which could affect test scores, while year 
fixed effects capture differences between interview years, e.g., due to improvements in 
education over time. The demographic controls are three indicator variables assessing 
whether a respondent is non-white (black or other), female, and born in the U.S. Education 
is measured using four indicators for the highest level of education, i.e., high school, 
associate/junior college, bachelor's degree, or graduate degree. The indicators measure the 
effect of a respondent’s educational degree compared to less than a high school degree. 
The income control Ln(Income) is the natural logarithm of a respondent’s equivalized 
family income. Since the GSS does not provide a consistent measure of income across 
survey years, I manually construct this control following the description in the 
supplementary material of Stevenson and Wolfers (2008b). First, I convert a respondent's 
categorical family income in the previous year to a continuous measure by fitting interval 
regressions to the data on the assumption that income follows a log-normal disruption. I 
then translate income to 2005 dollars using the Consumer Price Index provided by the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Lastly, I use the OECD-modified equivalence scale to make 
the family income of different household types comparable by taking into account shared 
consumption benefits (Hagenaars, de Vos, and Zaidi, 1994). The OECD-modified scale 
assigns a value of 1 to the household head, 0.5 to each additional adult member of the 







Appendix to Chapter 3 
Sample construction and variables 
In this section, I describe the construction of the sample and the most important variables 
used in the study in Chapter 3. All variables are defined in Table A3.1. Summary statistics 
are reported in Table A3.2. The study examines the intergenerational industry mobility of 
individuals working in the U.S. financial industry using data from the General Social 
Survey (GSS) (Smith et al., 2019). The GSS is a nationally representative survey that is 
conducted by the National Opinion and Research Center at the University of Chicago. It is 
among the most influential research studies in the social sciences and is frequently quoted 
in the press, including the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal. 
The target population of the GSS is adults, i.e. people over 18 years of age, who live in 
households in the United States. The survey was conducted every year from 1972 to 1994, 
except in 1979, 1981, and 1992, and has been conducted every other year since 1994. It 
contains about 1,500 respondents each year from 1972 through 1993 and continues with 
around 2,800 respondents every second year from 1994 through 2018. The sample in this 
study includes all 32 cross-sectional waves currently available spanning the 47-year period 
from 1972 to 2018.  
In line with the previous literature on the intergenerational link in career choices (e.g., 
Corak and Piraino, 2016), I limit the sample to employees in the private sector (full-time 
and part-time). This means that I exclude respondents who are temporarily not working, 
are in school, running the household, or are retired. I additionally exclude from the sample 
all persons working in the public sector, including the U.S. military. Finally, I eliminate 
all cases where information on a respondent’s industry is missing or could not be coded. 
Despite the broad consistency of questions across survey waves, a few changes to the 
GSS over time require researchers to make some adjustments (see Smith, 1990). Two 
changes are particularly relevant in my context: (1) an oversample of blacks in the 1982 
and 1987 survey; (2) from 2006 onwards, surveys that could not have been completed by 






adjust the data as suggested by prior studies that use the GSS (e.g., Stevenson and Wolfers, 
2008a, 2008b, 2009; Ifcher and Zarghamee, 2014). First, I drop black oversamples in the 
years 1982 and 1987, and second, I exclude all interviews from 2006 onwards that occurred 
in Spanish and could not have been completed in English (as in previous years). Lastly, to 
ensure the representativeness of my sample, I weight all estimates using the GSS weight 
variable WTSSALL. 
Financial industry variables. I use the 2007 Census industry classification to classify 
respondents and their parents as workers in the financial industry. Following the definition 
in Philippon and Reshef (2012) and Greenwood and Scharfstein (2013), the financial 
industry is the combination of the following three subsectors: (1) credit intermediation; (2) 
securities; and (3) insurance. The corresponding industry codes are 6870-6990. This 
classification yields a yearly proportion of around five percent of respondents who work 
in the financial industry. I verify this figure using data from the March supplement of the 
Current Population Survey (CPS) for the same period. The CPS data provide very similar 
yearly proportions, and the average yearly difference between the two data sets is 0.032%.  
To determine the occupation, industry, and occupational prestige of respondents’ 
parents, the GSS uses the following set of questions: 
“What kind of did your father (mother) normally do while you were growing up?” 
“What did he (she) actually do in that job?” 
“What kind of place did he (she) work for?” 
“What did they make / do?” 
The main variable of interest in this study is the indicator In Finance that equals one if 
a respondent works in the financial industry and zero otherwise. The variables Father in 
Finance and Mother in Finance are defined analogously and record whether a respondent’s 
father or mother worked in the financial industry while the respondent was growing up. 
Information on the industry and occupation of fathers is available for the entire sample 
period, whereas information for mothers is available for years after 1994. Therefore, 
regressions that examine the intergenerational correlation in the decision to work in finance 






Income. Because the GSS does not provide a consistent measure of income across 
survey years (Hout, 2004), I manually construct an income measure for my sample as 
described in Stevenson and Wolfers (2008b). First, I convert a respondent's categorical 
family income in the previous year to a continuous measure by fitting interval regressions 
to the data on the assumption that income follows a log-normal disruption. I then translate 
income to 2005 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. Lastly, I use the OECD-modified 
equivalence scale to make the family income of different household types comparable by 
taking into account shared consumption benefits (Hagenaars, de Vos, and Zaidi, 1994). 
The income variable Ln(Income) is the logarithmic equivalized income measure. 
Occupational prestige. In robustness tests, I also control for parents’ occupational 
prestige using the variables Father’s occupational prestige and Mother’s occupational 
prestige, respectively. A parent’s occupational prestige score is based on the 2010 Census 
occupation classification. It is measured as the mean value of ratings for each occupation 
category converted to a scale of 0 (bottom) to 100 (top). 
U.S. regions. In some analyses, I draw on information about the U.S. regions where 
respondents lived at age 16 or where they live today, i.e., where the GSS interview was 
conducted. A region is one of the nine divisions defined by the U.S. Census Bureau, i.e., 
New England (Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode 
Island), Middle Atlantic (New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania), East North Central 
(Wisconsin, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio), West North Central (Minnesota, Iowa, 
Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas), South Atlantic (Delaware, 
Maryland, West Virginia, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, 
District of Columbia), East South Central (Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi), 
West South Central (Arkansas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Texas), Mountain (Montana, Idaho, 
Wyoming, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico), and Pacific (Washington, 







Table A3.1: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
In Finance Indicator variable equal to one for a respondent who works in the financial 
industry. 
Parental job characteristics and education 
Father in Finance Indicator variable equal to one if the father of a respondent worked in the 
financial industry while the respondent was growing up. 
Mother in Finance Indicator variable equal to one if the mother of a respondent worked in the 
financial industry while the respondent was growing up. 
Available 1994-2018 
Father in same finance 
subsector 
Indicator variable equal to one if the father of a respondent worked in the 
financial industry and in the same subsector as the respondent (credit 
intermediation, securities, or insurance). 
Father in different 
finance subsector 
Indicator variable equal to one if the father of a respondent worked in the 
financial industry but in another subsector as the respondent. 
Father’s occupational 
prestige  
Prestige score of the occupation of a respondent’s father; coded from 0 
(bottom) to 100 (top). 
Mother’s occupational 
prestige  
Prestige score of the occupation of a respondent’s mother’s; coded from 0 
(bottom) to 100 (top). 
Available 1994-2018 
Father’s highest degree Variable indicating the highest degree a respondent’s father has obtained; 
coded from 0 (less than high school) to 4 (graduate degree). 
Mother’s highest degree Variable indicating the highest degree a respondent’s mother has obtained; 
coded from 0 (less than high school) to 4 (graduate degree). 
Demographic characteristics 
Age Respondent’s age in years. 
Age squared Respondent’s squared age. 
Female Indicator variable equal to one if a respondent is female. 
Non-white Indicator variable for a respondent’s race, which equals one if he or she is 
not white, i.e., black or other. 








High school degree Indicator variable equal to one if the highest degree a respondent has 
obtained is a high school degree. 
Junior college degree Indicator variable equal to one if the highest degree a respondent has 
obtained is a junior college degree. 
Bachelor’s degree Indicator variable equal to one if the highest degree a respondent has 
obtained is a Bachelor’s degree. 
Graduate degree Indicator variable equal to one if the highest degree a respondent has 
obtained is a graduate degree. 
Family background characteristics 
Lived with both parents 
at age 16 
Indicator variable equal to one if a respondent lived with both parents at 
age 16. 
Number of siblings Number of a respondent’s siblings. 
Lived in a city at age 16 Indicator variable equal to one if a respondent at the age of 16 lived in a 
city with at least 50,000 inhabitants. 
Income below average at 
age 16 
Indicator variable equal to one if a respondent answers that his or her 
family income at the age of 16 was below or far below the average (vs. 
average, above average, or far above average). 
Available 1972-2018, except for 1996, 1998, and 2000 
Income 
Ln(Income) Natural logarithm of a respondent’s equivalized family income. 
Notes: This table provides definitions of all variables used in the study in Chapter 3. Data are obtained 
from the General Social Survey over the period 1972-2018. It is indicated in the table if a variable is 







Table A3.2: Summary statistics 
 In Finance = 1  In Finance = 0  Difference in means 
Variable N Mean  N Mean  t-statistic 
In Finance 1,816 1.000  33,028 0.000   
Father in finance 1,496 0.057  26,646 0.022  5.48*** 
Mother in finance 674 0.055  12,293 0.043  1.19 
Father in same finance subsector 1,496 0.036  33,028 0.000  5.97*** 
Father in different finance subsector 1,496 0.021  33,028 0.000  6.14*** 
Father's occupational prestige score 1,481 45.350  26,335 44.285  3.15*** 
Mother's occupational prestige score 674 42.666  12,366 41.742  1.81* 
Father's highest degree 1,453 1.260  25,606 1.030  6.58*** 
Mother's highest degree 1,655 1.124  29,607 0.968  4.85*** 
Non-white 1,816 0.179  33,028 0.183  -0.37 
Female 1,816 0.608  33,028 0.471  10.39*** 
U.S.-born 1,598 0.896  28,983 0.904  -0.95 
Age 1,807 39.576  32,937 40.436  -2.20** 
High school degree 1,814 0.518  32,962 0.540  -1.33 
Junior college degree 1,814 0.070  32,962 0.068  0.32 
Bachelor's degree 1,814 0.299  32,962 0.167  11.44*** 
Graduate degree 1,814 0.085  32,962 0.086  -0.20 
Lived with both parents at age 16 1,777 0.774  32,228 0.727  4.09*** 
Number of siblings 1,773 3.102  32,176 3.640  -7.28*** 
Lived in a city at age 16 1,775 0.545  32,200 0.444  7.59*** 
Income below average at age 16 1,460 0.247  25,926 0.312  -4.38*** 
Ln(Income) 1,686 10.544  30,609 10.237  15.13*** 
Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the variables used in this study. The sample period is 
1972-2018. Summary statistics are shown for the subsamples of respondents who work and do not work 
in the financial industry (In Finance = 1 vs. 0). The last column reports t-statistics from regressions of 
the respective variables on the indicator In Finance to test for differences in the mean values of each 







Table A3.3: Intergenerational finance industry mobility robustness tests 
Dependent variable In Finance 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Father in finance 0.075*** 0.079*** 0.078*** 0.081*** 0.082***      
 (5.56) (4.15) (4.24) (4.33) (4.41)      
Mother in finance      0.015 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.004 
      (1.21) (0.45) (0.49) (0.41) (0.36) 
Non-white  0.010* 0.009 0.011** 0.010*  0.019** 0.019** 0.019** 0.019** 
  (1.88) (1.59) (2.18) (1.95)  (2.51) (2.54) (2.56) (2.59) 
Female  0.026*** 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.027***  0.021*** 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 
  (7.28) (7.07) (7.54) (7.65)  (4.29) (4.07) (4.54) (4.39) 
U.S.-born  -0.008 -0.010 -0.004 -0.003  -0.023** -0.022** -0.014 -0.016 
  (-0.99) (-1.15) (-0.40) (-0.32)  (-2.13) (-2.03) (-0.91) (-0.98) 
High school degree  0.029*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.028***  0.025*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.022*** 
  (6.25) (6.21) (6.63) (6.07)  (3.41) (3.36) (3.55) (3.25) 
Junior college degree  0.026*** 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.025***  0.028** 0.028** 0.029** 0.028** 
  (3.15) (3.24) (3.09) (3.39)  (2.24) (2.24) (2.45) (2.41) 
Bachelor’s degree  0.061*** 0.062*** 0.060*** 0.061***  0.066*** 0.066*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 
  (9.40) (9.42) (9.31) (9.57)  (8.28) (8.05) (8.38) (8.17) 
Graduate degree  0.022*** 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.022***  0.031** 0.031** 0.024** 0.024** 
  (2.90) (3.09) (3.01) (2.85)  (2.36) (2.30) (2.13) (2.05) 
Lived with both parents   0.013*** 0.013*** 0.011** 0.011**  0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 
at age 16  (2.71) (2.66) (2.36) (2.40)  (1.44) (1.36) (1.38) (1.49) 
Number of siblings  -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001*  -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002* 
  (-1.82) (-1.84) (-1.89) (-1.86)  (-2.14) (-2.14) (-2.12) (-1.92) 
Lived in a city at age 16  0.014*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.014***  0.013*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 






Income below average at   -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007*  -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 
age 16  (-1.27) (-1.52) (-1.56) (-1.71)  (-1.12) (-1.13) (-1.02) (-1.07) 
Father’s highest degree  0.000 0.002        
  (0.09) (0.98)        
Father’s occupational    -0.000*        
prestige    (-1.93)        
Mother’s highest degree       -0.002 -0.003   
       (-0.78) (-1.03)   
Mother’s occupational         0.000   
prestige         (0.55)   
Constant 0.051*** -0.037*** -0.020 -0.030 0.022 0.050*** -0.008 -0.011 0.017 0.010 
 (34.40) (-2.87) (-1.46) (-1.46) (1.19) (19.96) (-0.61) (-0.78) (0.49) (0.32) 
Birth year FE No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No 
Region FE No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes 
Region at age 16 FE No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes 
Graduation year FE No No No No Yes No No No No Yes 
Observations 28,075 18,882 18,652 19,829 19,814 12,933 8,614 8,566 8,823 8,815 
Adj. R-squared 0.00255 0.0159 0.0161 0.0175 0.0185 0.000106 0.0137 0.0135 0.0159 0.0160 
Notes: This table reports results from robustness tests of the estimates reported in Table 3.1. Columns (1) and (6) examine the parent-child relation 
without fixed effects and controls. In columns (2) and (7), I extend the model shown in column (3) of Table 3.1 by including a control for the 
degree of a parent, and in columns (3) and (8), I additionally include the occupational prestige score of the parent. Columns (4) and (9) include 
fixed effects for the U.S. regions where respondents lived at age 16 and for the regions where they live today. Finally, in columns (5) and (10), I 
replace birth year fixed effects with graduation year fixed effects, which are estimated using information on a respondent’s year of birth and years 
of schooling. Robust t-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by birth year. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 






Appendix to Chapter 5 
This appendix provides a detailed description of the data collection methodology used for 
the study in Chapter 5. Table A5.1 defines all variables used in this study. Table A5.2 
presents report results from the propensity score matching, while Table A5.3 investigates 
the question of whether matching between fund managers and mutual funds can explain 
our risk-taking results. 
 
Identifying fund managers' ancestry and census records 
To identify a fund manager's family in the U.S. Census, we use the data collection 
procedure described in Chuprinin and Sosyura (2018) with minor modifications. The 
modifications are necessary because we utilize open-access U.S. people-search websites, 
such as FamilyTreeNow, Intelius, Spokeo, and Whitepages.com, to identify the names and 
birth years of a fund manager's parents, siblings, and other relatives. People-search 
websites collect publicly available information like birth, court, marriage, and property 
records to create profiles on individuals that may include their age, name of employer, 
occupation, and current and past addresses. Whitepages.com, for example, has the largest 
database of contact information on Americans. As of 2008, it had data on about 90 percent 
of the U.S. adult population. These websites also propose possible family members based 
on individuals mentioned in the same public records and provide their age. We search for 
a manager's profile on these websites using his or her full name, year of birth, and location 
(city or county) of the employer. When we find a potentially matching profile, we require 
a confirmation of the match according to one of the following criteria: (a) the profile 
includes as employer a firm for which the fund manager has worked; (b) the individual's 
e-mail addresses indicate the domain of the company the fund manager has worked for; 
(c) the occupation of the individual is “portfolio manager,” “investment manager,” or 
“investment adviser”; (d) one of the individual’s addresses matches the official business 
address of the fund manager’s company; (e) one of the individual’s addresses matches the 






management firm; (f) the names of possible family members match the names of the fund 
manager's spouses or parents retrieved from one of the sources used to gather information 
on managers’ education, e.g., Marquis Who’s Who.  
If we verify a profile, we continue our search by sequentially checking three types 
of events in a fund manager’s life: birth, marriage, and death. First, we attempt to identify 
a manager's birth record on the genealogy research website Ancestry.com using the 
manager's full name and year of birth. We require the names of both parents provided in 
the birth record to match the names of possible family members from the people-search 
website profile of the fund manager. Furthermore, possible family members from the 
manager's profile with matching names need to be in an appropriate age so that they could 
realistically be the manager's parents. If we are unable to find a matching birth record for 
a manager, we proceed with the second event: a fund manager's marriage(s). Marriage 
announcements, often published in local newspapers, typically provide the place of 
residence of bride and groom, their education, current employer and occupation, and their 
parents' names. We search historical newspapers on Newspaper.com, the largest online 
newspaper archive, for marriage announcements of individuals using a fund manager's full 
name. Verification of a match is done using the individual's year of birth, attended 
universities, employer, and occupation. Sometimes marriage records also provide the 
names of parents of the bride and the groom. Thus, we also search for a manager’s marriage 
record(s) in the database of state marriage records accessed through Ancestry.com and 
establish unique matches by obtaining the full names and years of birth of the bride and 
the groom as well as the parent's names. We again verify matches using the names of the 
individual’s parents and the spouse’s name, which need to match the names of possible 
family members from the manager's people-search website profile. If we are still unable to 
identify the fund manager’s parents, we proceed with the analysis of death records and 
obituaries. For this purpose, we search for a fund manager’s obituary on Newspaper.com 
as well as the database of obituaries maintained by the service provider Legacy.com. To 
verify a potential match, we require that, besides a matching name and birth year, the 






managers for whom we are unable to identify the names of their parents and siblings, we 
search for obituaries of all potential family members from the manager's people-search 
website profile who are in an age so that they could be the manager's parents. Because 
obituaries typically mention the spouse, children, and other family members of the 
deceased, we identify a fund manager’s parents by locating the obituaries in which the 
manager is listed as a child.  
We use the combination of the names of a fund manager's parents, siblings, and other 
relatives as well as their birth years to identify the households where fund managers grew 
up in the 1940 census. For a small subgroup of fund managers, we obtain the 1930 census 
records if the 1940 census record cannot be found or if the information is missing in the 
1940 census record. Following this data collection procedure, we are able to find the 
households' census records for 93 percent of mutual fund managers. As in Chuprinin and 
Sosyura (2018), unmatched observations mainly result from transcription errors in the 
indexing of handwritten family names in the digital archives, which prevent us from being 







Table A5.1: Variable definitions 
Variable Definition 
Manager characteristics 
Family Disruption Indicator variable for a manager’s early-life family disruption that is equal to 
one for a manager who experienced either the death of a parent or the divorce 
of her parents before the age of 20 and zero otherwise. 
Female Indicator variable equal to one for a female fund manager and zero otherwise. 
Manager Age Fund manager’s age in years. 
Manager Tenure Number of years since a fund manager’s start date with a fund. 
Ivy League Indicator variable equal to one for a manager who attended an Ivy League 
university and zero otherwise. 
MBA Indicator variable equal to one for a manager who holds an MBA degree and 
zero otherwise. 
PhD Indicator variable equal to one for a manager who holds a PhD or JD degree 
and zero otherwise. 
Parental Education Average education attainment score for a manager’s parents as in Chuprinin 
and Sosyura (2018). The education attainment score is equal to 3 if the person 
attended college, 2 if the parent attended high school but not college, 1 if the 
parent attended elementary school but not high school, and 0 if the parent has 
no school education. 
Family Wealth Income of a manager’s father from his census record, if available and if the 
father worked for at least 20 weeks during the previous year, and if not the 
father’s home value or rent. If neither income nor home value or rent is 
available for a manager’s father, the mother’s home value or rent is used. 
Income is expressed in multiples of the state median male income in the state 
of the household and rent and home value are expressed in multiples of the 
state median. 
Religiosity Ratio Fraction of members of all religious denominations in the home county of a 
manager’s family around the time that family disruption took place. Defined 
as the number of members of all religious denominations in a county divided 
by the county’s total population as reported by the Association of Religion 
Data Archives for the year 1952. 












Indicator variable equal to one for a fund manager if both of her parents 
worked either as employees for the government or in a private business, on 
own account, or as employers according to the “class of worker” item in the 
parents’ census record and zero otherwise. 
Father Blue-collar 
Worker 
Indicator variable equal to one for a fund manager if her father had a blue-
collar job, i.e., he performed manual labor such as manufacturing, mining, or 
farming, and zero otherwise. 
Firstborn Indicator variable equal to one if a manager is the firstborn child and zero 
otherwise. 
Number of Siblings Number of a fund manager’s siblings. 
Parents’ Age 
Difference 
Absolute difference between the age of a fund manager’s parents. 
Parent Born Outside 
U.S. 
Indicator variable equal to one for a fund manager if at least one of her parents 
was born outside the U.S. and zero otherwise. 
Parent Homeowner Indicator variable equal to one for a fund manager if at least one of her parents 
did not live for rent according to the parents’ census records. 
Parent Self-employed Indicator variable equal to one for a fund manager if one of her parents 
worked on their own account or as employer according to the “class of 
worker” item in the parents’ census record and zero otherwise. 
Parent Worked in 
Finance 
Indicator variable equal to one for a fund manager if one of her parents 
worked in the banking, insurance, investment, or real estate sector according 
to the parent’s census record, obituary, city directory, or other state or federal 
records and zero otherwise. 
Manager Works for 
Home State Fund 
Indicator variable equal to one if a fund is managed by a fund manager whose 
home state is the state in which the fund firm is located and zero otherwise. 
A fund’s location is the location of the firm that offers the mutual fund as 
reported in Morningstar Direct. 
Fund and fund-stock characteristics 
Total Risk Standard deviation of a fund’s monthly gross returns during a year. 
Idiosyncratic Risk Standard deviation of residuals from annual estimations of a market model 
with monthly gross returns and the value-weighted return on all NYSE, 
AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks. 
Market Risk Fund’s beta from annual estimations of a market model with monthly gross 







Tracking Error Standard deviation of the difference between a fund’s return and the return of 
the benchmark index from the fund’s prospectus. Quarterly data are obtained 
from Antti Petajisto’s website for the period 1980-2009. See Petajisto (2013) 
for details. 
Fund Age Number of years since the inception date of a fund. 
Fund Size Natural logarithm of 1 plus the total net assets under management of a fund 
(in m$) at the end of a year. 
Fund Family Size Natural logarithm of 1 plus the total net assets under management (in m$) of 
all funds in the same family as the fund in focus at the end of a year. 
Avg. Monthly Return Annual average of monthly gross returns of a fund. 
Turnover Ratio Minimum of a fund’s security purchases and sales divided by the average 
total net assets under management either for the most recently completed 
fiscal year or the twelve months ending on the CRSP begdt. 
Expense Ratio Ratio of the total investment that shareholders pay as fund fees as of the most 
recently completed fiscal year. 
Alpha Annualized difference between a fund’s monthly gross returns in excess of 
the risk-free rate and the fitted values from a market model for which the 
market factor loading is estimated over the period [t-12, t-1]. 
Sharpe Ratio Annualized monthly gross return in excess of the risk-free rate divided by the 
annualized monthly standard deviation of excess returns. 
Sell Indicator variable equal to one for a fund-stock observation if the fund 
reduced the number of shares of the stock from the previous to the current 
holdings report date and zero otherwise. 
Terminating Sell Indicator variable equal to one for a fund-stock observation if the fund 
reduced the number of shares of the stock to zero from the fund’s previous to 
the current holdings report date and zero otherwise. 
Exogenous CEO 
Turnover 
Indicator variable equal to one for a fund-stock observation if the respective 
company experienced an exogenous CEO turnover in a year and zero 
otherwise. The data is obtained from Andrea Eisfeldt’s website for the period 
1992-2016. For details see Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013). 
M&A Indicator variable equal to one for a fund-stock observation if the respective 
company announced an M&A transaction between the fund’s previous and 
the current holdings report date and zero otherwise. Data is obtained from the 







Cross-border M&A Indicator variable equal to one for a fund-stock observation if the respective 
company announced an M&A transaction between the fund’s previous and 
the current holdings report date and if the target company is not located in the 
U.S. and zero otherwise. Data is obtained from the SDC Platinum Mergers 
and Acquisitions database for the period 1980-2017. 
Non-public M&A Indicator variable equal to one for a fund-stock observation if the respective 
company announced an M&A transaction between the fund’s previous and 
the current holdings report date and if the M&A target company is not 
publicly listed and zero otherwise. Data is obtained from the SDC Platinum 
Mergers and Acquisitions database for the period 1980-2017. 
Portfolio activity measures 
Disposition Effect Difference between the proportion of realized gains and realized losses for 
each fund in each quarter. The proportion of realized gains (PGR) is defined 
as 𝑃𝐺𝑅𝑗𝑇 = 𝑅𝐺𝑗𝑇𝑅𝐺𝑗𝑇 + 𝑈𝑁𝑅𝐺𝑗𝑇 
where 𝑅𝐺𝑗𝑇 is the number of realized capital gains by fund 𝑗 in quarter 𝑇 and 𝑈𝑁𝑅𝐺𝑗𝑇 is the number of unrealized gains. The proportion of realized losses 
is defined analogously. We use the average purchase price as the cost basis. 
A fund that is prone to the disposition effect will disproportionately realize 
more gains than losses, and it will thus have a positive and larger Disposition 
Effect. See, for example, Odean (1998) and Frazzini (2006) for details. 
Active Share Share of a fund’s portfolio that is different from the fund’s prospectus 
benchmark index. Quarterly data is obtained from Antti Petajisto’s website 
for the period 1980-2009. See Petajisto (2013) for details. 
Notes: This table provides the definitions of all variables used in the study in Chapter 5. Data on fund 
manager characteristics are gathered from Morningstar Direct as well as from Bloomberg, Capital IQ, 
Marquis Who’s Who, and SEC filings, among other sources. Data on fund managers’ family 
backgrounds are gathered from the U.S. Census as well as from Ancestry.com, Legacy.com, and 







Table A5.2: Propensity score matching 
Panel A: Pre-match propensity score regression and post-match diagnostic regression 
Dependent variable Family Disruption 
 Pre-Match Post-Match 
 (1) (2) 
Fund Age 0.006*** -0.003 
 (3.03) (-1.34) 
Fund Size 0.030 0.020 
 (1.61) (0.62) 
Fund Family Size 0.013 0.005 
 (1.40) (0.36) 
Avg. Monthly Return -3.620 1.646 
 (-1.17) (0.36) 
Expense Ratio 33.649*** 6.924 
 (5.85) (0.94) 
Turnover Ratio 0.001 0.045 
 (0.03) (0.96) 
Female -0.918*** -0.202 
 (-4.06) (-0.47) 
Manager Age 0.009* -0.002 
 (1.90) (-0.27) 
Manager Tenure -0.012*** 0.017** 
 (-2.93) (2.40) 
Ivy League 0.300*** -0.076 
 (5.56) (-0.94) 
MBA -0.053 0.000 
 (-0.95) (0.00) 
PhD 0.473*** -0.055 
 (5.14) (-0.42) 
Parental Education -0.305*** -0.025 
 (-7.77) (-0.42) 
Family Wealth 0.027*** -0.006 
 (2.74) (-0.69) 
Investment Style FE Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes 
Observations 3,929 1,194 








Panel B: Differences in fund and manager characteristics 
Variables Treated Control Difference t-statistic 
Risk before manager assumes office    
Total Riskt-1 0.043 0.044 -0.001 0.820 
ΔTotal Risk[t-3,t-2] 0.076 0.069 0.007 -0.245 
ΔTotal Risk[t-2,t-1] 0.097 0.113 -0.016 0.579 
Covariates used for PSM     
Fund Age 18.519 19.403 -0.884 0.841 
Fund Size 4.984 4.894 0.090 -0.825 
Fund Family Size 6.367 6.153 0.214 -1.059 
Avg. Monthly Return 0.009 0.009 0.000 -0.467 
Expense Ratio 0.014 0.014 0.000 -0.927 
Turnover Ratio 0.708 0.665 0.043 -0.899 
Female 0.007 0.010 -0.003 0.635 
Manager Age 56.595 56.000 0.595 -1.114 
Manager Tenure 8.627 7.723 0.905 -2.109 
Ivy League 0.487 0.484 0.003 -0.116 
MBA 0.506 0.489 0.017 -0.578 
PhD 0.126 0.127 -0.002 0.087 
Parental Education 2.111 2.173 -0.062 1.412 
Family Wealth 2.853 2.995 -0.142 0.599 
 
Panel C: Estimated propensity score distributions 
Propensity Scores No. of Obs. P5 Mean Median P95 
Treatment 597 0.06116 0.22298 0.20121 0.44715 
Control 597 0.06125 0.22648 0.20123 0.46054 







Panel D: Estimation with PSM-matched sample 
Dependent variable Total Risk 
 (1) (2) 
Family Disruption -0.008*** -0.007*** 
 (-3.07) (-2.81) 
Fund Age  32.768 
  (0.00) 
Fund Size  0.001 
  (1.40) 
Fund Family Size  -0.000 
  (-0.61) 
Avg. Monthly Return  0.068 
  (1.46) 
Expense Ratio  0.293* 
  (1.74) 
Turnover Ratio  0.001 
  (0.90) 
Female  -0.012** 
  (-2.05) 
Manager Age  -0.000*** 
  (-3.29) 
Manager Tenure  0.000 
  (0.10) 
Ivy Leagues  0.005** 
  (2.09) 
MBA  -0.005*** 
  (-2.59) 
PhD  -0.009* 
  (-1.94) 
Parental Education  -0.001 
  (-0.52) 
Family Wealth  0.000 
  (0.95) 
Fund FE Yes Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes 
Observations 3,024 3,024 







Panel E: Estimation with PSM-matched sample - other variables 
Dependent variables Idiosyncratic Risk Market Risk Tracking Error Disposition Effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Family Disruption -0.004** -0.134* -0.022* 0.071*** 
 (-2.00) (-1.93) (-1.94) (2.85) 
All controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,024 3,024 7,203 12,657 
Adj. R-squared 0.682 0.507 0.604 0.194 
Notes: This table report results from a propensity score matching. Panel A presents parameter estimates 
from the Probit model used to estimate propensity scores for firms in the treatment and control groups. 
Column (1) shows the results from the Probit regression explaining the dependent variable Family 
Disruption prior to matching. We use the propensity scores from this regression to perform a nearest 
neighbor match. Column (2) shows the results from the same Probit regression with the matched 
sample. Supporting covariate balance, none of the independent variables is statistically significant post-
match (except for Manager Tenure). Panel B reports univariate comparisons between the treatment and 
control observations and the corresponding t-statistics from difference-in-means tests. The estimates 
also support covariate balance. Importantly, Panel B additionally reports statistics on fund risk prior to 
managers assuming office (which we do not use to match groups), i.e., mean total fund risk in the 
previous year, denoted Total Riskt-1, and mean growth in total fund risk from year t-3 to year t-2 as well 
as from t-2 to t-1. The differences in average risk and growth rates of risk between treated and control 
observations are statistically indistinguishable from zero indicating that the reduction in fund risk we 
observe takes place when treated managers assume office. Panel C reports the distribution of estimated 
propensity scores for the treatment and control observations and the difference in estimated post-match 
propensity scores. The differences between the propensity scores of treated and control observations 
are virtually zero (median = 0.00006). Panel D and Panel E report the estimation results based on the 
PSM-matched samples. All regressions include fund and time fixed effects. Robust t-statistics (in 
parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by manager. ***, **, * denote statistical significance 







Table A5.3: Does fund manager-fund matching explain less risk-taking? 
Dependent variables Family Disruption 
 OLS  Logit 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Total Riskt-1 -0.620  -0.357   -9.199  -5.683  
 (-0.72)  (-0.35)   (-0.61)  (-0.40)  
Fund Age 0.001 0.001  0.009 0.020 
 (0.67)  (0.87)   (0.50)  (0.97)  
Fund Size -0.029 -0.034  -0.322 -0.508 
 (-1.41)  (-1.49)   (-1.37)  (-1.59)  
Fund Family Size -0.003 -0.004  -0.034 -0.058 
 (-0.37)  (-0.39)   (-0.29)  (-0.41)  
Avg. Monthly Return -5.216* -4.662  -83.376** -66.713 
 (-1.75)  (-1.47)   (-2.05)  (-1.56)  
Expense Ratio -4.345* -5.755**  -66.705 -137.694 
 (-1.68)  (-1.99)   (-0.80)  (-1.54)  
Turnover Ratio 0.024 0.040  0.342 0.844 
 (0.67)  (1.09)   (0.61)  (1.60)  
Investment style FE No Yes  No Yes 
Time FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 224 224  136 136 
Adj. R-squared 0.015  -0.010   0.135  0.178  
Notes: This table reports the results from OLS and Logit regressions of Family Disruption on Total 
Riskt-1 (i.e., total fund risk in the previous year), controls for fund characteristics (for the previous year) 
and investment style and year fixed effects. The sample is restricted to years in which a manager and a 
fund match. The sample size is limited because manager-fund matches that occurred prior to 1980 are 
not part of the sample and because newly set-up funds for which no past data are available have to be 
excluded. Robust t- and z-statistics (in parentheses) are based on standard errors clustered by manager. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Logit regressions 
contain fewer observations due to exclusion of explanatory variables in instances in which these 
variables cause separation. 
